| Matter of O'Brien v DiNapoli |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02366 [116 AD3d 1124] |
| April 3, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Stephanie Cannon O'Brien,Petitioner, v Thomas P. DiNapoli, as New York State Comptroller, et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (William E. Storrs of counsel), forrespondents.
Peters, P.J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court byorder of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination ofrespondent Comptroller which denied petitioner's application for disability retirementbenefits.
Petitioner is the widow of Richard O'Brien (hereinafter decedent), a State Trooperwho died as a result of injuries sustained in a non-work-related accident on December 7,2009. On that date, petitioner and decedent's coworkers attempted to file an applicationfor disability retirement benefits on decedent's behalf. After many unsuccessful attemptsto fax the application, it was ultimately received by respondent New York State andLocal Retirement System minutes after decedent's death. The application was initiallydenied as untimely and, following a hearing, respondent Comptroller adhered to thatdetermination. This proceeding ensued.
The Comptroller has exclusive authority to determine all applications for retirementbenefits and the "determination must be upheld if [the] interpretation of the controllingretirement statute is reasonable and the underlying factual findings are supported bysubstantial evidence" (Matter of Schwartz v McCall, 300 AD2d 887, 888 [2002][citations omitted]; see Matter of Lewandowski v New York State & Local Police &Fire Retirement Sys., 69 AD3d [*2]1027, 1028[2010]). Pursuant to the applicable statutory provisions, an applicant may receive StatePolice disability retirement benefits only if he or she is actually a member of theRetirement System at the time of filing (see Retirement and Social Security Law§ 363-b). Membership in the Retirement System ceases upon death (seeRetirement and Social Security Law § 340 [f] [2]). With the exception ofdocuments sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, filing "only occurs upon actualdelivery to and receipt by [the Retirement System]" (Matter of Jarek v McCall,268 AD2d 654, 655 [2000]; see Retirement and Social Security Law § 19;2 NYCRR 366.2).
While it is unfortunate that so many failed attempts were made to fax the retirementdocuments while decedent was still alive, there is no dispute that he died—and hismembership in the Retirement System therefore terminated—prior to their receipt.Despite the contrary position taken by the dissent, this case is about—andhinges on—whether petitioner was or was not a member of the Retirement Systemat a particular moment in time. If the application was received before petitioner's death,petitioner would still have been a member of the Retirement System at the time of filing,and the application would have been timely. On the other hand—without regard towho actually filed it—when the application at issue here was filed, decedent wasno longer alive and, thus, no longer eligible to receive disability retirement benefits. Asthe Comptroller's determination that the application was untimely is consistent with theapplicable statutory provisions, we find no basis upon which to disturb it (see Matter of Krysa v New YorkState & Local Retirement Sys., 53 AD3d 1027, 1029 [2008]; Matter of Jarekv McCall, 268 AD2d at 655; Matter of Kriedemann v New York State Teachers'Retirement Sys., 134 AD2d 746, 747 [1987], lv denied 71 NY2d 801[1988]; Matter of Blaisdell v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 62AD2d 1116, 1117 [1978], lv denied 45 NY2d 706 [1978]).[FN*] To the extent that petitioner argues that the Comptroller acted arbitrarily andcapriciously by not extending the time for filing under the circumstances of this case,petitioner's reliance on Retirement and Social Security Law § 390 (bb) (1) ismisplaced. That statute permits the Comptroller to extend the time to file an optionelection, and petitioner cites no similar statute that would allow the Comptroller toextend the time to file the application for retirement benefits itself. In the absence of suchstatutory authority, the Comptroller lacked the power to extend the time for filing and thefailure to do so here therefore cannot, as the dissent suggests, be deemed arbitrary andcapricious (see Matter of Morrissey v New York State Employees' RetirementSys., 298 NY 442, 449-450 [1949]; Matter of Gammone v Murphy, 299AD2d 551, 551 [2002], appeal dismissed 99 NY2d 650 [2003]; Matter ofBrei v Regan, 89 AD2d 1060, 1061 [1982]).
Lahtinen and Stein, JJ., concur.
Egan Jr., J. (dissenting). I agree with the majority that membership in respondentNew York State and Local [*3]Retirement System ceasesupon death. But this case is not about whether Richard O'Brien, an Investigator for theState Police and petitioner's husband (hereinafter decedent), was or was not a member ofthe Retirement System as of a particular moment in time; it is about whether a writtenapplication for disability retirement benefits completed by petitioner on decedent's behalfprior to his death but received by the Retirement System via fax minutes after his deathwas timely filed. Reading Retirement and Social Security Law § 363-b in isolation,one could perhaps conclude that a retirement application had to be physically filed withrespondent Comptroller before a member died and that receipt of those papers at anytime after death—even seven minutes later—would be too late. If that werethe rule, the denial of petitioner's application by the Comptroller—and the resultreached by my colleagues—would be defensible although harsh. But, in my view,Retirement and Social Security Law § 363-b cannot be read alone; rather, it mustbe read in conjunction with both Retirement and Social Security Law § 19 and 2NYCRR 366.2.
The cited provisions reflect the realities of the modern world—that membersdo not always file for retirement in person, but also do so by mail or fax. In each case, thestatute or regulation employ comparable language. Retirement and Social Security Law§ 19 provides that "[w]henever a statute requires that a document be filed with the. . . [C]omptroller . . . within a prescribed period of time or bya specified date, and such document has been mailed . . . by. . . certified mail, return receipt requested, the document shall be deemedfiled on the date of mailing" (emphasis added). Similarly, the regulation providesthat "[w]henever a statute requires that [a] document be filed with the Comptroller. . . within a prescribed period of time or by a specified date, such documentwill be considered filed on the date that it has been successfully transmitted viafacsimile . . . to the Retirement System" (2 NYCRR 366.2 [emphasisadded]). Notably, both the relevant statute and the subject regulation provide that thedocument in question is deemed to be filed on the date that it is faxed ormailed—not the precise moment in time that it is successfully received by thepostal service or via fax machine. Decedent died on December 7, 2009, and hisapplication for retirement was received on December 7, 2009. Therefore, to my analysis,his application was timely filed—notwithstanding the fact that he died sevenminutes before that application actually was received via the Retirement System's faxmachine. Accordingly, I would annul the Comptroller's determination and grant thepetition.
Moreover, even assuming—as the majority posits—that the filingregulation must yield to Retirement and Social Security Law §§ 340 (f) (2)and 363-b, I nonetheless would annul the Comptroller's determination based upon theunique facts of this case. The record reflects that upon learning of decedent's debilitatinginjuries, Neely Jennings, a lieutenant with the State Police, transmitted the disabilitypaperwork via fax machine to Vincent DeLango, a State Police investigator who hadbeen dispatched to St. Luke's Cornwall Hospital in Orange County where decedent wasundergoing treatment. Neely first attempted to transmit the relevant documents toDeLango at 5:28 p.m. When that attempt failed, Neely made a second unsuccessfulattempt at 5:32 p.m., followed by a partially successful third attempt at 5:36 p.m. and afinal successful attempt at 5:41 p.m. There is no question that decedent was alivethroughout this time period.
After petitioner completed the relevant portions of the application and accompanyingoption election form (hereinafter referred to as the application), DeLango embarked upona lengthy series of attempts to transmit the document to Jennings, who was to review theapplication and transmit it to the Retirement System. Beginning at 6:01 p.m.,DeLango—utilizing what ultimately entailed three different faxmachines—made nine separate attempts to return the completed application toJennings before finally succeeding at 6:19 p.m. Again, decedent was alive during thistime period. Upon receipt of the completed application at or [*4]about 6:20 p.m. (while decedent was still alive), Jenningsreviewed the document and faxed it to the Retirement System at 6:30 p.m., where it wasreceived at 6:31 p.m. In the interim, decedent passed away at 6:24 p.m.
It is undisputed that decedent was alive throughout the numerous, repeated attemptsto transmit the necessary paperwork to Jennings for filing with the Retirement Systemand that the completed application was received by the Retirement System only momentsafter decedent died. It also is undisputed that this minuscule delay (seven minutes) was,as the Hearing Officer correctly found, occasioned solely by "the inferior quality andgeographic restrictions of the hospital's fax machines"—matters that clearly werebeyond petitioner's control. Notably, nothing in the record even remotely suggests thatany fraud or deceit occurred here, and it is readily apparent that petitioner and thoseassisting her—recognizing the dire nature of decedent'sinjuries—endeavored to promptly and diligently submit the underlying applicationin a timely fashion. Under these circumstances, the Comptroller's decision to denypetitioner the requested benefits is, to my analysis, arbitrary and capricious.
Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote *: To the extent thatpetitioner argues that the denial of benefits is arbitrary and capricious inasmuch as theComptroller would have deemed the application timely if it was sent by certified mail onthe same date, but after the time of decedent's death, such claim is speculative.