| Perez v Violence Intervention Program |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02722 [116 AD3d 601] |
| April 22, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Grace Perez, Respondent, v Violence InterventionProgram et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Law Offices of Jimmy M. Santos, PLLC, Cornwall (Jimmy M. Santos of counsel),for respondent.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton A. Tingling, J.), entered July 29,2013, which denied defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint,unanimously reversed, on the law, the motion granted, and the complaint dismissed,without costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Plaintiff was a limited purpose public figure, and therefore, to prevail on her claim ofdefamation, was required to show by clear and convincing evidence that defendantspublished the statements at issue with actual malice (see Huggins v Moore, 94NY2d 296, 301-302 [1999]; James v Gannett Co., 40 NY2d 415, 421-422[1976]). Plaintiff, by not only granting news interviews, but driving media members tothe property in question and posing for a photograph in front of it, attending a pressconference, answering questions in connection with the drafting of an open letter callingfor her reinstatement and defendants' resignations from the Board of Directors ofViolence Intervention Program (VIP), and by her involvement in a community grouporganized in large part to seek her reinstatement, took affirmative steps to attract publicattention. Plaintiff fails to raise any triable issue of fact as to her status as a limited publicfigure, as she merely argues that she did not initiate certain of these contacts, such asorganizing the press conference. Nevertheless, she consistently encouraged andresponded to such attention and thereby thrust herself to the forefront of the publiccontroversy in the hope of influencing her reinstatement and/or the board members'resignations.
Plaintiff, who had a full opportunity to conduct discovery, failed to present clear andconvincing evidence of actual malice, i.e., that defendants "entertained seriousdoubts as to the truth of [their] publication or acted with a high degree of awareness of. . . probable falsity . . . . at the time of publication" (Kipper v NYP Holdings Co.,Inc., 12 NY3d 348, 354-355 [2009]).
She cites to her contentious relationship with defendants and their dissatisfactionwith her job performance, but does not cite facts suggesting that defendants had seriousdoubts about the truth of any of the statements at issue, or that defendants acted with ahigh degree of awareness of their falsity at the time of publication. To the extent thatplaintiff claims that defendants acted in retaliation to the public outcry over hertermination and/or demands that they resign, she does not [*2]show by clear and convincing evidence that they knowinglypublished false statements, as opposed to the true reason for her termination. Indeed, thepublic statement, although more detailed, was consistent with her termination letterissued nearly a month earlier, prior to any public outcry that purportedly would havegenerated such malice.
The remaining claims of injurious falsehood, tortious interference with prospectivecontractual/business relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress should havebeen dismissed as duplicative of the defamation claim, as they allege no new facts andseek no distinct damages from the defamation claim. Concur—Tom, J.P.,Renwick, Richter, Feinman and Gische, JJ.