| Matter of Thorpe v Homoet |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02785 [116 AD3d 962] |
| April 23, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Quincy Thorpe,Respondent, v Murielle Homoet, Appellant. |
—[*1] Francine Shraga, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
In a child custody proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the motherappeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, KingsCounty (Cannataro, J.), dated December 20, 2012, as, after a hearing, granted, in part, thefather's petition for joint custody of the parties' child and denied, in part, her crosspetition for sole custody of the child to the extent of awarding her sole medical andeducational decision-making authority, and awarding joint decision-making authoritywith respect to all other custodial matters.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In making an initial custody determination, the court must consider whatarrangement is in the best interests of the children under the totality of the circumstances(see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171-173 [1982]; see also Scholar v Timinisky,87 AD3d 577, 578 [2011]). A custody determination depends greatly "upon anassessment of the character and credibility of parties and witnesses" (Matter of Langlaise vSookhan, 48 AD3d 685, 685 [2008]). Because the hearing court is able toobserve witnesses and evaluate evidence firsthand, its determination "is generallyaccorded great deference on appeal and should not be disturbed unless it lacks a soundand substantial basis in the record" (Matter of Perez v Martinez, 52 AD3d 518, 519 [2008]).
Contrary to the mother's contention, the Family Court did not err in granting hercross petition for sole custody only to the extent that she "shall have sole medical andeducational decision-making authority," for the subject child and in granting the father'spetition for joint custody to the extent that "the parents will have joint decision-makingauthority with respect to all other custodial matters outside the spheres of medical andeducational needs." Although it is evident that there is some antagonism between theparties, it is also apparent that both parties generally behave appropriately with the childand in a relatively civilized fashion toward each other. Furthermore, there is no evidencethat they are so hostile or antagonistic toward each other that they would be unable to putaside their differences for the good of the child. Under these circumstances, the FamilyCourt's determination has a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Carter v Carter,111 AD3d 715, 716 [2013], lv denied 22 AD3d 863[*2][2014]; Prohaszka v Prohaszka, 103 AD3d 617, 618 [2013]).Rivera, J.P., Lott, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.