| People v Pileggi |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02803 [116 AD3d 984] |
| April 23, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v James Pileggi, Appellant. |
—[*1] Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Jennifer Spencer, Steven A.Bender, and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County(Zambelli, J.), rendered January 17, 2012, convicting him of manslaughter in the seconddegree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in making its Sandovalruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]), which permittedinquiry into the defendant's prior use of illegal steroids, and his injection of a fellowpolice officer with illegal steroids in 2008. This prior conduct was relevant to thedefendant's credibility because it demonstrated his willingness to further his self-interestat the expense of society (see id. at 377; People v Celleri, 29 AD3d 707, 709 [2006]; People v Blackman, 13 AD3d640, 641-642 [2004]; People v Floyd, 143 AD2d 143 [1988]).
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish thathe acted recklessly in causing the death of the victim is unpreserved for appellate review(see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10 [1995]; People v Huddleston, 101AD3d 901 [2012]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable tothe prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it waslegally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of manslaughter in the second degreebeyond a reasonable doubt (see Penal Law § 15.05 [3]; People vLicitra, 47 NY2d 554 [1979]; People v Johnson, 205 AD2d 707, 708[1994]). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied thatthe verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]).
The defendant's contention that the prosecution elicited improper opinion testimonyon the issue of recklessness which invaded the province of the jury is also unpreservedfor appellate review (see Peoplev Minter, 106 AD3d 934 [2013]) and, in any event, without merit (see People v Kozlowski, 11NY3d 223, 240 [2008]; People v Minter, 106 AD3d at 934-935).
Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its[*2]discretion in denying the defendant's request to strikethe testimony of a police detective who admitted that he spoke to the prosecutor during abreak in his testimony (see People v Branch, 83 NY2d 663, 667 [1994];People v Neil, 289 AD2d 611, 614-615 [2001]; People v Thanh Giap,273 AD2d 54, 55 [2000]; cf. People v Robinson, 190 AD2d 697 [1993]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the supplemental charge that the SupremeCourt gave in response to the jury's request for a definition of the "conscious disregard"component of recklessness was proper (see People v Lewie, 17 NY3d 348, 362-363 [2011]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Leventhal,Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur.