| People v Rutledge |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02885 [116 AD3d 645] |
| April 29, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Michael Rutledge, Appellant. |
—[*1] Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Sylvia Wertheimer of counsel),for respondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ruth Pickholz, J., at hearing; LauraA. Ward, J., at plea and sentencing), rendered September 7, 2010, convicting defendantof manslaughter in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to aterm of 17 years, unanimously affirmed.
Defendant's purported waiver of his right to appeal was invalid for the same reasonsfound in People vBraithwaite (73 AD3d 656 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 849[2010]).
The Supreme Court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress statements madeto the police since the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the People met theirburden of establishing the voluntariness of the statements (see United States vAnderson, 929 F2d 96, 99 [2d Cir 1991]; People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35,38 [1977]). The detective who spoke to defendant at the precinct after his arrest candidlytestified at the suppression hearing that, prior to administering Miranda warnings,for a period of approximately 20 minutes, he urged defendant to talk to the police and"gave him several reasons why he should." The detective properly conveyed to defendantthat he knew defendant was involved in the crime, stating "point blank" that the evidenceagainst defendant was strong, including videotape and eyewitness evidence. He urgeddefendant to take advantage of "your chance" to speak before the other suspectsimplicated him (see People v Vasquez, 235 AD2d 322 [1st Dept 1997],affd 90 NY2d 972 [1997]; People v Tarleton, 184 AD2d 463 [1st Dept1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 910 [1992]; People v May, 100 AD3d 1411 [4th Dept 2012], lvdenied 20 NY3d 1063 [2013]). The detective also told defendant that cooperationcould be beneficial and that the detective would "call the D.A." once defendant "putdown" his story. After defendant indicated that he wanted to talk, he was read hisMiranda rights, waived them, and proceeded to make several written statementand one videotaped statement.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant's will was overborne or thatthe detective's preliminary remarks tricked, cajoled or threatened him into waiving hisMiranda rights. Defendant was no novice to the criminal justice system (seeUnited States v Anderson, 929 F2d at 99). Indeed, defendant's initial statementdenied any involvement in the crime. His subsequent statements, made after again beingproperly given his Miranda rights, were [*2]voluntarily made (People v Vasquez, 235 AD2d at322).
People v Thomas (22NY3d 629 [2014]) does not compel a different result. Thomas involved adefendant who was interrogated for a total of approximately 9½ hours, broken intotwo segments of 2 and 7½ hours, all of which were videotaped. At the end of theinterrogation, defendant demonstrated to police how he threw the infant victim from overhis head to a low-lying mattress. This videotape was the only evidence that defendanthad caused his son's death.
During this interrogation, the police told defendant a number of quasi and outrightfalsehoods. For example, he was told at least 21 times that his son was still alive and thatby telling the police how he was injured it would assist the treating physicians inproviding care to the infant. Defendant was also told that if he continued to denyresponsibility for his son's injuries, the police would arrest his wife. Finally, defendantwas told 67 times the incident could be viewed as merely an accident and that if he madefull disclosure, he would not be arrested (14 times) and would be permitted to go home(eight times).
The Court of Appeals found that "the set of highly coercive deceptions" utilized bythe police "were of a kind sufficiently potent to nullify individual judgment in anyordinarily resolute person and were manifestly lethal to self-determination whendeployed against defendant, an unsophisticated individual without experience in thecriminal justice system" (22 NY3d at 642).
None of those factors are present in this case. As noted, defendant was experiencedin the criminal justice system. His will and judgment were clearly not overborne by thedetective's initial self-described "spiel" about the evidence in the case and the potentialbenefits to defendant of cooperation. There is no indication in this record that thedetective's characterization of the evidence, including the representation that defendantwas one of a group of individuals identified on a surveillance video, and that on thatvideo he was holding a cane that witnesses to the crime said was used in the assault onthe victim, was inaccurate or fabricated. His motion to suppress these statements wastherefore properly denied. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Sweeny, Andrias,Manzanet-Daniels and Kapnick, JJ.