| Matter of Snyder v County of Suffolk |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02942 [116 AD3d 1052] |
| April 30, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Emily Snyder, Individually and asProposed Administrator of the Estate of Finneaus Egan, Respondent, v Countyof Suffolk et al., Appellants, et al., Respondent. |
—[*1] Morici & Morici, LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Mia-Laine Martinez of counsel), forpetitioner-respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave toserve a late notice of claim, the appeal is from so much of an order of the Supreme Court,Suffolk County (Martin, J.), dated March 7, 2013, as granted that branch of the petitionwhich was for leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the Kings Park Fire District.
Ordered that the appeal by the County of Suffolk is dismissed, as that party is notaggrieved by the portion of the order appealed from (see CPLR 5511); and it isfurther,
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from by the Kings Park FireDistrict, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, and that branch of the petitionwhich was for leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the Kings Park Fire District isdenied; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the Kings Park Fire District, payable bythe petitioner.
Initially, we note that this appeal is limited as a result of the petitioner's concession,in her brief, that an action was commenced in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County on orabout August 28, 2013, only as against the Kings Park Fire District (hereinafter the FireDistrict), and that she is not pursuing any further legal action arising out of the subjectmotor vehicle accident as against the County of Suffolk or the Town of Smithtown.
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch ofthe petition which was for leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the Fire District. Indetermining whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, thecourt must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the publiccorporation acquired actual knowledge of [*2]theessential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonabletime thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to servea timely notice of claim, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the publiccorporation in its defense on the merits (see General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]; Matter of Mitchell v City ofNew York, 112 AD3d 940, 940 [2013]; Matter of Destine v City of New York, 111 AD3d 629, 629[2013]). "While the presence or the absence of any one of the factors is not necessarilydeterminative, whether the municipality had actual knowledge of the essential factsconstituting the claim is of great importance" (Matter of Placido v County of Orange, 112 AD3d 722, 723[2013] [citations omitted]; seeMatter of Gonzalez v City of New York, 60 AD3d 1058, 1059 [2009]).
Here, the petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her failure to servea timely notice of claim upon the Fire District. The petitioner's ignorance of the law didnot constitute a reasonable excuse (see Matter of Bell v City of New York, 100 AD3d 990,990 [2012]; Matter of Taylor vCounty of Suffolk, 90 AD3d 769, 770 [2011]). Moreover, the petitioner failedto submit any medical evidence to support her assertion that she was incapacitated tosuch an extent that she could not have complied with the statutory requirement to serve atimely notice of claim (see Matter of Bell v City of New York, 100 AD3d at 991;Matter of Wright v City of NewYork, 66 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2009]; Matter of Papayannakos v Levittown Mem. Special Educ. Ctr.,38 AD3d 902, 902 [2007]).
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Fire District obtainedtimely, actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim. Although thepetitioner asserted that the Fire District's representatives responded to the scene of theaccident, there was no evidence that they were aware of the facts constituting thepetitioner's potential claims of medical malpractice and negligence against the FireDistrict (see Grasso v NassauCounty, 109 AD3d 579, 579 [2013]; Matter of Anderson v Town of Oyster Bay, 101 AD3d 708,709 [2012]). Additionally, the petitioner failed to establish that any medical recordsufficed to convey to the Fire District actual knowledge of the essential facts constitutingthe claims against it (seeWilliams v Nassau County Med. Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 537 [2006]; Grasso vNassau County, 109 AD3d at 579; Matter of Hernandez v County of Suffolk, 90 AD3d 1049,1050 [2011]; Arias v New YorkCity Health & Hosps. Corp. [Kings County Hosp. Ctr.], 50 AD3d 830, 832[2008]).
Finally, the petitioner failed to establish that the delay in serving her notice of claimwould not substantially prejudice the Fire District in maintaining its defense on themerits (see Matter of Lorseille v New York City Hous. Auth., 295 AD2d 612[2002]). Dickerson, J.P., Hall, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.