| Matter of Alister UU. (Angela VV.) |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02991 [117 AD3d 1137] |
| May 1, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Alister UU., and Others, ChildrenAlleged to be Permanently Neglected. Tompkins County Department of Social Services,Respondent; Angela VV., Appellant. |
Francisco Berry, Ithaca, for appellant.
Keith I. Cassidy, Tompkins County Department of Social Services, Ithaca, forrespondent.
Robin A. Masson, Ithaca, attorney for the children.
McCarthy, J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Tompkins County(Rowley, J.), entered May 10, 2013, which granted petitioner's application, in aproceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, to adjudicate thesubject children to be permanently neglected, and terminated respondent's parentalrights.
Respondent is the mother of three children (born in 1999, 2003 and 2006). In a 2009custody proceeding, the children's grandparents were awarded custody and respondentconsented to an order of protection prohibiting her from allowing her then-paramour,Ray VV., to have any contact with the children until 2024. In 2011, the children wereremoved from the grandparents' home and placed in petitioner's care. After the childrenhad been in foster care for more than a year, petitioner commenced this proceedingseeking an adjudication of permanent neglect and termination of respondent's parentalrights. Family Court granted that petition. Respondent appeals.
[*2] We affirm. To establish permanent neglect, petitionerwas required to prove by clear and convincing evidence "that it made diligent efforts tostrengthen the parent-child relationship and that, despite those efforts, the parent hasfailed to . . . substantially plan for the child[ren]'s future for one year afterthe agency has been charged with the child[ren]'s care," although physically andfinancially able to do so (Matterof Tatianna K. [Claude U.], 79 AD3d 1184, 1185 [2010]; see SocialServices Law § 384-b [7] [a]; Matter of Gerald BB., 51 AD3d 1081, 1083 [2008], lvdenied 11 NY3d 703 [2008]). Petitioner created and regularly reviewed a serviceplan, scheduled and supervised weekly visitation, arranged for phone contact betweenrespondent and her children, held family team meetings, offered to help respondentsecure appropriate housing, provided her transportation assistance, and referred her tomental health services and an advocacy center to address her own prior experiences as avictim of sexual abuse and domestic violence. Petitioner's caseworkers also talked withrespondent at least weekly and constantly told her that the children would not be returnedto her unless she ended her relationship with Ray, because he was a sex offender. Whilerespondent now contends that petitioner should have given her detailed informationregarding Ray's history of sexual abuse, she did not ask for more details and chose tobelieve Ray's version. Additionally, she had previously acknowledged that Ray wasinappropriate to be around her children when she consented to the 2009 order ofprotection that does not expire until her youngest child turns 18. Petitioner was notrequired to offer or obtain a sex offender evaluation for Ray, "as petitioner's statutoryduty to encourage the parental relationship did not constitute a duty to theparamour" (Matter of MichaelJJ. [Gerald JJ.], 101 AD3d 1288, 1291 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 860[2013]). Thus, petitioner proved that it made the required diligent efforts that weretailored to respondent's circumstances (see Matter of Laelani B., 59 AD3d 880, 881 [2009]).
Respondent did not substantially plan for her children's future. To her credit, she didcomplete a parenting class and an anger management class, attended counseling andregularly participated in visitation. On the other hand, she did not obtain suitablehousing, despite petitioner's offer of assistance and respondent's regular assurances thatshe was working on the issue. She also failed to understand or accept that Ray posed adanger to her children (compareMatter of James X., 37 AD3d 1003, 1006 [2007]). Her attitude on this subjectwas manifested by her persistent provision of false information to petitioner'scaseworkers about the true status of her relationship with Ray: she continuously toldthem that she was no longer with Ray and did not live with him, despite evidence to thecontrary; when confronted with allegations that she had brought Ray to an event with thechildren, and posted a picture of him with the children at that event on her Facebookpage, she denied the allegations and stated that someone hacked her computer accounts,created a fake photograph from separate pictures of Ray and the children, then postedthat fake photo through her account; she married Ray after the children were removedand after she had been advised that she needed to end her relationship with him to regaincustody of her children; and she stated that she filed for divorce when she had not, andlater stated that no one could force her to get a divorce against her wishes. Givenrespondent's lack of appropriate housing and her refusal to address the potential dangerposed to her children by her relationship with someone who had previously beenindicated for a sex offense involving a child, she failed to adequately plan for thechildren's future by addressing the problems that prevented their return to her care (see Matter of Sharon V. v MelanieT., 85 AD3d 1353, 1355 [2011]; Matter of James U. [James OO.], 79 AD3d 1191, 1193[2010]). Thus, Family Court did not err in finding that she permanently neglected herchildren.
Stein, J.P., Rose and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withoutcosts.