| Matter of Son v Ramos |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03273 [117 AD3d 745] |
| May 7, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of June Son,Respondent, v Manny Ramos, Appellant. |
Anthony A. Capetola, Williston Park, N.Y., for appellant.
Sarisohn Law Partners, LLP, Commack, N.Y. (Floyd Sarisohn and Marvin Waxnerof counsel), for respondent.
Michele T. Pilo, Westhampton Beach, N.Y., attorney for the children.
In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Manny Ramosappeals from (1) an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, SuffolkCounty (Crecca, J.), dated March 22, 2013, which, after a hearing, found that he hadcommitted the family offenses of harassment in the second degree and menacing in thesecond degree, and directed him to comply with an order of protection of the same courtdated March 22, 2013, for a period not to exceed two years, and (2) the order ofprotection dated March 22, 2013, which, inter alia, directed him to stay away from JuneSon and their children until and including March 22, 2015.
Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition and the order of protection areaffirmed, with costs.
The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to beresolved by the Family Court (see Matter of Alam v Alam, 108 AD3d 665, 666 [2013]; Matter of Kanterakis vKanterakis, 102 AD3d 784, 785 [2013]). On appellate review, that court'sdetermination of witness credibility is entitled to great weight unless clearly unsupportedby the record (see Matter ofSaldivar v Cabrera, 109 AD3d 831, 832 [2013]; Matter of Winfield vGammons, 105 AD3d 753, 754 [2013]). In order to facilitate effective appellatereview, however, the Family Court, which is the court best able to assess the credibilityof the witnesses, "must state in its decision 'the facts it deems essential' to itsdetermination" (Matter of Jose L.I., 46 NY2d 1024, 1025 [1979], quoting CPLR4213 [b]). Although the Family Court need not set forth evidentiary facts, "it must stateultimate facts: that is, those facts upon which the rights and liabilities of the partiesdepend" (Matter of Jose L.I., 46 NY2d at 1025-1026).
Here, although the Family Court made certain credibility findings, it failed to statethe facts that it deemed essential to its determination to grant the petition for an order ofprotection. Remittal is nevertheless unnecessary because the record is sufficient for thisCourt to conduct an [*2]independent review of theevidence (see Matter of Panicov Panico, 100 AD3d 907, 908 [2012]; Matter of Sperling v Sperling, 96 AD3d 1067, 1067[2012]). Upon our review, we conclude that a fair preponderance of the evidenceadduced at the hearing established that the appellant committed the family offenses ofharassment in the second degree and menacing in the second degree (see FamilyCt Act § 832; Penal Law §§ 240.26 [1]; 120.14 [1]).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court did not improvidentlyexercise its discretion in making its determination without conducting in camerainterviews of the parties' children (see Matter of Asgedom v Asgedom, 51 AD3d 787, 788[2008]; Matter of Cardarelli v Cardarelli, 277 AD2d 225, 225-226 [2000]).
The appellant's remaining contention is without merit. Balkin, J.P., Dickerson,Roman and Miller, JJ., concur.