| Matter of Kagan v New York State Dept. of Corr. &Community Supervision |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03315 [117 AD3d 1215] |
| May 8, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Jacob Kagan, Appellant, v New YorkState Department of Corrections and Community Supervision,Respondent. |
Ruth E. Bernstein Law Firm, New York City (Ruth E. Bernstein of counsel), forappellant.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jeffrey W. Lang of counsel), forrespondent.
Rose, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Connolly, J.), entered July 3,2012 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, dismissedthe petition.
While incarcerated, petitioner applied for admission to the temporary work releaseprogram and was approved, first by his prison facility's Temporary Release Committeeand then by the facility's Superintendent. Respondent's Central Office, however,disapproved petitioner's application and his administrative appeal was unsuccessful.Petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking, among otherthings, a finding that respondent's Central Office had no authority to review theSuperintendent's approval of his application. When petitioner was released on paroleduring the pendency of this proceeding, Supreme Court dismissed it as moot. Petitionernow appeals.
We agree with Supreme Court that petitioner's request for a declaration is moot (see Matter of Diaz v Ledbetter,111 AD3d 1043, 1044 [2013]; Matter of Gallo v New York State Temporary Release Program,100 AD3d 1165, 1166 [2012]; Matter of Shell v New York State Dept. of Corrections TemporaryRelease Program, 26 AD3d 537, 537 [2006]). "It is a fundamental principle ofour jurisprudence that the power of a court to declare the law only arises [*2]out of, and is limited to, determining the rights of personswhich are actually controverted in a particular case pending before the tribunal"(Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 713 [1980]). Petitioner's stateddesire to commence a plenary action against respondent in the future is neither a pendingmatter nor is it contingent on a ruling in this proceeding. Finally, we find that theexception to the mootness doctrine does not apply here as petitioner has not establishedthat a challenge to the Central Office's authority to review an approval for temporarywork release will typically evade review (see Matter of Chandler v Coughlin, 126AD2d 886, 887 [1987]; see e.g.Matter of Lapetina v Fischer, 76 AD3d 722, 723 [2010]; Matter of Herber v Joy, 61AD3d 1142, 1142 [2009]).
Stein, J.P., McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs.