Matter of Parietti v Sampson
2014 NY Slip Op 03518 [117 AD3d 830]
May 14, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 2, 2014


[*1]
 In the Matter of Michael Parietti et al.,Respondents,
v
Christian G. Sampson, as the Town Clerk of the Town ofRamapo, N.Y., et al., Appellants, and Rockland County Board of Elections et al.,Respondents.

Michael L. Klein, Town Attorney, Suffern, N.Y., for appellants.

Michael Parietti, Suffern, N.Y., and Robert Romanowski, Monsey, N.Y.,petitioners-respondents pro se (one brief filed).

Thomas E. Humbach, County Attorney, New City, N.Y. (Thomas Simeti of counsel),for respondents (no brief filed).

In a hybrid proceeding, in effect, pursuant to Election Law article 16 to validate apetition to hold a referendum on a proposition to increase the number of members on theTown Council of the Town of Ramapo from four to six, and action for declaratory relief,Christian G. Sampson, as the Town Clerk of the Town of Ramapo, and the Town ofRamapo appeal, by permission, from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County(Garvey, J.), dated March 7, 2013, which, inter alia, denied their motion to dismiss thepetition/complaint as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs to the petitioners-respondents.

On September 6, 2012, the petitioners/plaintiffs Michael Parietti and RobertRomanowski filed a petition (hereinafter the referendum petition) with the Town Clerkof the Town of Ramapo, seeking to compel the Town to conduct a referendum askingTown voters "SHALL THE NUMBER OF COUNCILMEN OR COUNCILWOMENOF THE TOWN OF RAMAPO BE INCREASED FROM FOUR TO SIX?" On October23, 2012, after general and specific objections were filed, the Town Clerk issueddeterminations and findings invalidating all of the signatures in the referendum petition,thus concluding that the referendum petition did not comply with Town Law§ 81.

On November 20, 2012, the petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners)commenced this hybrid proceeding, in effect, pursuant to Election Law article 16 andaction for declaratory relief, seeking to validate the referendum petition and to compelthe Town Clerk to schedule a special election on the subject referendum, and for ajudgment declaring that the referendum petition is valid. On November 21, 2012, thepetitioners served copies of the initiatory papers in this matter upon the Town of Ramapoand the Town Clerk (hereinafter together the appellants).

[*2] The appellants thereafter moved pursuant to CPLR3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the petition/complaint on the ground that it was time-barred byvirtue of Election Law § 16-102 (2). Specifically, the appellants argued thatthe proceeding/action was time-barred since it was not commenced within three businessdays after October 23, 2012, the date on which the Town Clerk made the determinationthat the referendum petition was invalid. The petitioners opposed the motion, arguing,among other things, that the proceeding/action was timely commenced because thefour-month statute of limitations applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings (seeCPLR 217 [1]), rather than the three-day limitation period set forth in Election Law§ 16-102 (2), applied.

In an order dated March 7, 2013, the Supreme Court denied the appellants' motion todismiss the petition/complaint. The court concluded that, although the three-day statuteof limitations set forth in Election Law § 16-102 (2) was applicable (seeHealth v Town of Islip, 169 Misc 2d 382, 386 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1996]), andthat a petitioner raising a challenge under this section must file and complete service onall necessary parties within the prescribed time period in order to timely institute theproceeding (see Matter ofGoodman v Nassau County Bd. of Elections, 87 AD3d 668, 668 [2011]; Matter of McDonough vScannapieco, 65 AD3d 647, 648 [2009]; Matter of Wilson v Garfinkle, 5 AD3d 409, 410 [2004];Matter of Green v Mahr, 230 AD2d 873 [1996]), the petitioners' failure to file theunderlying petition within this three-day period did not render the proceedingtime-barred because the limitations period was to have expired on October 26, 2012, theday that Hurricane Sandy hit New York State. Accordingly, the court determined thatGovernor Andrew M. Cuomo's Executive Order No. 52 (9 NYCRR 8.52), signed by theGovernor on October 31, 2012, suspended the statute of limitations, and that thepetitioners thereafter timely commenced the proceeding/action within the statute oflimitations, as extended by Executive Order No. 52.

The appellants' sole argument on this appeal is that the Supreme Court erred infinding that Executive Order No. 52 was effective as of October 26, 2012. The appellantsassert that the Executive Order was not effective until October 31, 2012, the date onwhich it was issued, and that since the statute of limitations for this proceeding expiredon October 26, 2012, the proceeding/action is time-barred. We disagree.

Executive Order No. 52 provides:

"Temporary Suspension and Modification of Statutory Provisions Establishing TimeLimitations on Actions and Time in Which to Take an Appeal

"WHEREAS, on October 26, 2012, I issued Executive Order Number 47 declaring adisaster emergency in all 62 counties in the State of New York;

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, ANDREW M. CUOMO, Governor of the State of NewYork, by virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 29-a of Article 2-B of theExecutive Law to temporarily suspend specific provisions of any statute, local law,ordinance, orders, rules or regulations, or parts thereof, of any agency during a Statedisaster emergency, if compliance with such provisions would prevent, hinder or delayaction necessary to cope with the disaster, I hereby temporarily suspend, for theperiod from the date of this Executive Order until further notice, the followinglaws:

"Section 201 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, so far as it bars actions whoselimitation period concludes during the period commencing from the date that thedisaster emergency was declared pursuant to Executive Order Number 47, issued onOctober 26, 2012, until further notice, and so far as it limits a court's authority toextend such time, whether or not the time to commence such an action is specified inArticle 2 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules;

"Section 5513 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, so far as it relates to a limitationperiod that concludes during the period commencing from the date that the disasteremergency was declared pursuant to Executive Order Number 47, issued on October 26,2012, until further notice;

"Section 25 of the Court of Claims Act, so far as it relates to a limitation of time toappeal in which a limitation period concludes during the period commencing from thedate that the disaster emergency was declared pursuant to Executive Order Number47, issued on October 26, 2012, until further notice;

"Sections 30.10 and 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law, so far as they may barcriminal prosecutions brought in Bronx, Dutchess, Kings, Nassau, New York, Orange,Putnam, Queens, Richmond, Rockland, Suffolk and Westchester Counties, in caseswhose limitation periods conclude during the period commencing from the date thatthe disaster emergency was declared pursuant to Executive Order Number 47, issued onOctober 26, 2012, until further notice;

"Subdivision (2) of section 310.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law, so far as it maylimit the duration of a recess of a deliberating jury in Bronx, Dutchess, Kings, Nassau,New York, Orange, Putnam, Queens, Richmond, Rockland, Suffolk and WestchesterCounties, in cases where such a recess was declared during the period commencingfrom the date that the disaster emergency was declared pursuant to Executive OrderNumber 47, issued on October 26, 2012, until further notice;

"Sections 460.10, 460.30, 460.50 and Article 460 of the Criminal Procedure Law, sofar as they relate to a limitation of time to appeal and such limitation period concludesduring the period commencing from the date that the disaster emergency was declaredpursuant to Executive Order Number 47, issued on October 26, 2012, until furthernotice; and

"Section 1113 of the Family Court Act, so far as it relates to a limitation of time toappeal and such limitation period concludes during the period commencing from thedate that the disaster emergency was declared pursuant to Executive Order Number 47,issued on October 26, 2012, until further notice;

"In addition, I hereby temporarily suspend and modify, for the period from thedate of this Executive Order until further notice, any other statute, local law,ordinance, order, rule or regulation or part thereof, establishing limitations of time for thefiling or service of any legal action, notice or other process or proceeding that the courtslack authority to extend through the exercise of discretion, where any limitation oftime concludes during the period commencing from the date that the disaster emergencywas declared pursuant to Executive Order Number 47, issued on October 26, 2012, untilfurther notice" (9 NYCRR 8.52 [emphasis added]).

Executive Law § 29-a, pursuant to which the Governor issuedExecutive Order No. 52, provides that orders issued under section 29-a "shall beeffective from the time and in the manner prescribed in such orders" (Executive Law§ 29-a [3]). The appellants assert that Executive Order No. 52 clearly statesthat it is effective "for the period from the date of this Executive Order until furthernotice," and since the Governor issued the order on October 31, 2012, that is theeffective [*3]date. The petitioners assert that ExecutiveOrder No. 52 clearly states that it applies to cases "where any limitation of timeconcludes during the period commencing from the date that the disaster emergency wasdeclared pursuant to Executive Order Number 47, issued on October 26, 2012, untilfurther notice." Although these two provisions appear to be facially in conflict with eachother, "[t]he rules of statutory construction . . . require that, where it ispossible to do so, the various parts of the statutory scheme be harmonized, reading andconstruing them together (see Matter of Pilgrim Psychiatric Ctr. [Christian F.],197 AD2d 204 [1994]; McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes§ 97), and reconciling the apparently conflicting provisions in the mannermost consistent with the overall legislative intent (see Levine v Bornstein, 4NY2d 241, 245 [1958]; People ex rel. Mason v McClave, 99 NY 83, 89 [1885];McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 98)" (Matter of Ador Realty, LLC vDivision of Hous. & Community Renewal, 25 AD3d 128, 134 [2005]).Interpreting Executive Order No. 52 as suggested by the appellants would undermine itspurpose. If the suspension of limitations periods took effect on October 31, 2012, thoseindividuals who were unable to initiate actions on the day Hurricane Sandy struck inNew York would be unable to benefit from the suspension. This would be anunreasonable result (see Peoplev Garson, 6 NY3d 604, 614 [2006]).

The Supreme Court's determination in this regard is further supported by readingExecutive Order No. 52 in conjunction with Executive Law § 29-a (2) (a)and Governor Andrew M. Cuomo's Executive Order No. 81 (9 NYCRR 8.81). ExecutiveLaw § 29-a (2) (a) provides that "no suspension shall be made" pursuant tothat section "for a period in excess of thirty days, provided, however, that uponreconsideration of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, the governor may extendthe suspension for additional periods not to exceed thirty days each." In Executive OrderNo. 81, issued by Governor Cuomo on November 20, 2012, the Governor recognizedthat section 29-a provides that no suspension shall be made for a period in excess of 30days, and commented that Executive Order No. 52 would "expire on November 25,2012" (9 NYCRR 8.81). The Governor then extended most of the provisions ofExecutive Order No. 52, including the one relevant to this appeal, through December 25,2012. The fact that the Governor stated that Executive Order No. 52 was set to expire onNovember 25, 2012, is significant because that is exactly 30 days after October 26, 2012.Had the Governor intended for Executive Order No. 52 to be effective from October 31,2012, he would have stated that it was set to expire on November 30, 2012. Based on theforegoing, we conclude that the Supreme Court's interpretation of Executive Order No.52 was correct, and that the appellants' sole contention on appeal is without merit. Eng,P.J., Miller, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur.


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