| Matter of Partee v Evans |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03567 [117 AD3d 1258] |
| May 15, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Cedric Partee, Appellant, v AndreaEvans, Respondent. |
Cedric Partee, Rome, appellant pro se.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Zainab A. Chaudhry of counsel),for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), entered July 17, 2013in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant toCPLR article 78, to review a determination of the Board of Parole denying petitioner'srequest for parole release.
Petitioner is presently serving a prison sentence of 25 years to life as the result of hisconviction for murder in the second degree. He reappeared before the Board of Parole inJune 2012 and, following a hearing, the Board denied his application for parole releaseand ordered him held for an additional 24 months. Petitioner commenced this CPLRarticle 78 proceeding after he failed to receive a timely response to his administrativeappeal. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, prompting this appeal.
We affirm. Contrary to petitioner's contention, respondent complied with a 2011amendment to Executive Law § 259-c (4) by issuing a memorandum toBoard members that "sufficiently establishe[d] the requisite procedures for'incorporat[ing] risks and needs principles' into the process of making parole releasedecisions" (Matter of Montane vEvans, 116 AD3d 197, 202 [2014], lv granted 23 NY3d 903 [2014], quoting Executive Law§ 259-c [4]). The Board considered the relevant statutory factors, includingpetitioner's disciplinary record—which includes a recent infraction involvingviolent conduct—"positive program participation, release plans and, significantly,his COMPAS assessment regarding the issues of risk to society, rehabilitation efforts andneeds for successful re-entry into the community" (Matter of Montane v Evans,116 AD3d at 203, see Executive Law §§ 259-c[*2][4]; 259-i [2] [c] [A]). The Board is also obligated toconsider petitioner's prior criminal record and the brutal nature of the offense for whichhe is presently incarcerated (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A]),and the fact that such consideration resulted in the denial of parole to petitioner does notreflect "irrationality bordering on impropriety" (Matter of Russo v New York StateBd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; see Matter of Lashway v Evans, 110 AD3d 1417, 1418[2013]).
We have considered petitioner's remaining contention and find it to be lacking inmerit.
Lahtinen, J.P., Stein, Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed, without costs. [Prior Case History: 40 Misc 3d 896.]