| Daniels v City of New York |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03793 [117 AD3d 981] |
| May 28, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Marilyn Daniels, Appellant, v City of NewYork et al., Respondents. |
Marilyn Daniels, Brooklyn, N.Y., appellant pro se.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela SeiderDolgow, Keegan K. Stager, and Ellen Ravitch of counsel), for respondents.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for slander and defamation arising fromthe alleged falsification of an infant's school records, the plaintiff appeals, as limited byher brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lewis, J.),dated December 22, 2011, as granted those branches of the defendants' motion whichwere to compel the plaintiff to produce proof of legal guardianship of the subject infantand for a protective order pursuant to CPLR 3103 and denied those branches of her crossmotion which were to strike the defendants' answer and for summary judgment on thecomplaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
CPLR 3101 (a) provides that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter materialand necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden ofproof." " 'The supervision of disclosure and the setting of reasonable terms andconditions therefor rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and, absent animprovident exercise of that discretion, its determination will not be disturbed' "(Montalvo v CVS Pharm.,Inc., 102 AD3d 842, 843 [2013], quoting Mattocks v White MotorCorp., 258 AD2d 628, 629 [1999]; see Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d 531[2007]). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting thatbranch of the defendants' motion which was to compel compliance with the court's priororder, which directed the plaintiff to produce proof of guardianship of the subject infant(see Clark v Halmar Equities,Inc., 88 AD3d 940 [2011]).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's crossmotion which was for summary judgment on the complaint since, at the time of the crossmotion, court-ordered discovery remained outstanding (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Chmelovsky v Country ClubHomes, Inc., 106 AD3d 684 [2013]; Evangelista v Kambanis, 74 AD3d 1278, 1279 [2010]; Matter of Fasciglione, 73AD3d 769, 770 [2010]; Gruenfeld v City of New Rochelle, 72 AD3d 1025, 1026[2010]; Rodriguez vDeStefano, 72 AD3d 926 [2010]; Harvey v Nealis, 61 AD3d 935, 936 [2009]). In any event,the plaintiff failed to demonstrate her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw. Accordingly, that branch of her cross motion which was for summary judgment onthe complaint was properly denied regardless of the [*2]sufficiency of the defendants' opposition papers (seeWinegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Leventhal,Austin and Roman, JJ., concur.