| Zellner v Odyl, LLC |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03830 [117 AD3d 1040] |
| May 28, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Jeff Zellner, Respondent, v Odyl, LLC,Appellant. |
Vedder Price, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Lyle S. Zuckerman and Michelle D. Velasquezof counsel), for appellant.
Abdul K. Hassan, Queens Village, N.Y., for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract and violations ofLabor Law §§ 191 and 215, the defendant appeals, as limited by itsbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bunyan, J.), datedJanuary 13, 2013, as denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) to dismissthe complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In determining a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7),"the sole criterion is whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its fourcorners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause ofaction cognizable at law [, the] motion for dismissal will fail" (Guggenheimer vGinzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]; see Wilner v Allstate Ins. Co., 71 AD3d 155, 159 [2010]).The complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff andall allegations must be accepted as true (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88[1994]). "Whether the complaint will later survive a motion for summary judgment, orwhether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove its claims, of course, plays no part inthe determination of a prediscovery CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss" (Shaya B. Pac., LLC v Wilson,Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 38 AD3d 34, 38 [2006]; see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs& Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; Alan B. Greenfield, M.D., P.C. v Long Beach Imaging Holdings,LLC, 114 AD3d 888 [2014]). A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant toCPLR 3211 (a) (1) may be granted only if the documentary evidence submitted by thedefendant utterly refutes the factual allegations of the complaint, conclusivelyestablishing a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law (see Goshen v MutualLife Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2dat 88).
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motionpursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint. The factual allegationsset forth in the complaint state cognizable causes of action to recover damages for breachof contact, as well as violations of, inter alia, Labor Law §§ 191 and215. Furthermore, the email messages submitted by the defendant did not constitute"documentary evidence" for the purposes of CPLR 3211 (a) (1) (see Rodolico v Rubin &Licatesi, P.C., 114 AD3d 923 [2014]; United States Fire Ins. Co. v North Shore Risk Mgt., 114 AD3d408 [2014]; Cives Corp. vGeorge A. Fuller Co., Inc., 97 AD3d 713, 714 [2012]; Fontanetta v John Doe 1, 73AD3d 78, 83-84 [2010]). Even if it had constituted documentary evidence, it failedto utterly refute the plaintiff's allegations or conclusively establish a defense as a matterof law (see [*2]CPLR 3211 [a] [1]; Louzoun v Kroll Moss &Kroll, LLP, 113 AD3d 600 [2014]; Granada Condominium III Assn. v Palomino, 78 AD3d996, 997 [2010]). Rivera, J.P., Lott, Miller and Duffy, JJ., concur.