| People v Watkins |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03874 [117 AD3d 1092] |
| May 28, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Richard Watkins, Appellant. |
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Amy Boddorff, Louis O'Neill, and EricMajchrzak of counsel), for appellant.
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., District Attorney, Staten Island, N.Y. (Morrie I. Kleinbartand Paul M. Tarr of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County(Collini, J.), rendered October 26, 2011, convicting him of grand larceny in the fourthdegree and reckless endangerment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, andimposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was charged with grand larceny in the third degree, a class D felonypursuant to Penal Law § 155.35, and other related crimes in connectionwith his alleged taking of the complainant's automobile on April 13, 2011. Thecomplainant, who owned an ATM located at a minimart on Staten Island, had parked inthe minimart parking lot to stock the ATM with cash, and left his keys in the ignition ofthe vehicle. While in the minimart, the complainant learned that his car was being drivenaway by someone. The complainant ran outside and saw the defendant in the driver's seatof his vehicle, backing it up. The complainant jumped onto the hood of his vehicle andyelled "It's my car, get out of my car." The defendant drove it in reverse until thecomplainant slid off the hood, and then the defendant sped away. The incident wasvideotaped by a store surveillance camera. Minutes later, the vehicle was foundabandoned at a nearby intersection, and the defendant was arrested on a train platformlocated across the street. The complainant's personal property that was inside the vehicleprior to the incident, including $10,000 stored in a bank bag, four Mets-Yankees tickets,and a checkbook, were still there when the car was recovered.
A jury acquitted the defendant of grand larceny in the third degree, but convicted himof grand larceny in the fourth degree, a class E felony pursuant to Penal Law§ 155.30, and reckless endangerment in the second degree, a class Amisdemeanor pursuant to Penal Law § 120.20. On appeal, the defendantcontends that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt of grand larcenyin the fourth degree beyond a reasonable doubt, and is otherwise against the weight ofthe evidence. Specifically, he argues that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonabledoubt that he intended to permanently "deprive" the complainant of his vehicle, or"appropriate" it to himself or another, as those terms are defined by Penal Law§ 155.00 (3) and (4).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People vContes, [*2]60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find thatit was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's guilt ofgrand larceny in the fourth degree. The jury could have rationally inferred that thedefendant possessed the requisite intent from the fact that the defendant drove the vehiclefrom the minimart lot after the complainant had clung to its hood shouting "It's my car,get out of my car" (cf. People v Pauli, 130 AD2d 389 [1987]). Further, the jurycould have rationally inferred that the defendant's plan for the car changed after the crimewas completed, given the circumstances of the theft and the fact that several peoplewitnessed it.
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of theweight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we neverthelessaccord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimonyand observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; Peoplev Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we aresatisfied that the verdict of guilt as to grand larceny in the fourth degree was not againstthe weight of the evidence (seePeople v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The defendant's challenge to the trial court's Sandoval ruling (see Peoplev Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]) is without merit. By precluding the prosecutorfrom eliciting the underlying facts of the defendant's convictions, the Supreme Courtavoided any undue prejudice to the defendant (see People v Thompson, 99 AD3d 819 [2012]).
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction must be affirmed. Dillon, J.P., Leventhal,Sgroi and Maltese, JJ., concur.