| People v Griffin |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03882 [117 AD3d 1339] |
| May 29, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vHarvey J. Griffin, Jr., Appellant. |
Albert F. Lawrence, Greenfield Center, for appellant.
Mary E. Rain, District Attorney, Canton (Patricia C. Campbell of counsel), forrespondent.
McCarthy, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County(Richards, J.), rendered July 9, 2012, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of thecrime of aggravated driving while intoxicated.
Defendant waived indictment and agreed to be prosecuted by a superior courtinformation charging him with aggravated driving while intoxicated. Thereafter,pursuant to a negotiated agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to that charge and waivedhis right to appeal. County Court, consistent with the plea agreement, sentenceddefendant, as relevant here, to a prison term of 1 to 4 years, to be served consecutively tohis current term of incarceration, followed by a three-year conditional discharge withignition interlock conditions. Defendant appeals.
We affirm. While defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of his plea survives hisuncontested waiver of the right to appeal, the issue is not preserved for our reviewbecause the record fails to indicate that he moved to withdraw his plea (see People v Smith, 112 AD3d1232, 1232-1233 [2013]; People v Osgood, 111 AD3d 1029, 1030 [2013], lvdenied 22 NY3d 1089 [2014]). The exception to the preservation requirement isinapplicable as he made no statements during the colloquy that raised questions about hisguilt or the voluntariness of his plea (see People v Brabham, 112 AD3d 1066, 1067 [2013]; People v Bressard, 112 AD3d988, 988-989 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1137 [2014]). In any event, therecord demonstrates that, in conjunction with his plea agreement, defendant was aware ofthe requirement that he be subject to an ignition interlock condition, which is onlyeffectuated through either the imposition of a period of probation or conditionaldischarge (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 [1] [c] [iii]; People v Brainard, 111 AD3d1162, 1163-1164 [2013]). Finally, defendant's valid waiver of appeal precludes himfrom arguing that the agreed-upon sentence is harsh and excessive (see People v Dyckman, 114AD3d 994, 995 [2014]; People v Orminski, 108 AD3d 864, 866 [2013], lvdenied 22 NY3d 958 [2013]). Defendant's remaining contention was considered andfound to be without merit.
Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Garry and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.