| People v Tredeau |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03889 [117 AD3d 1344] |
| May 29, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vScott A. Tredeau, Appellant. |
Donna C. Chin, Ithaca, for appellant.
Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Susan Rider-Ulacco of counsel),for respondent.
Stein, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Hayden,J.), rendered April 22, 2013, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime offailure to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act.
After defendant allegedly resided at two different locations and failed to register as asex offender as required, he was indicted for failure to register under the Sex OffenderRegistration Act. In June 2012, defendant pleaded guilty to that charge and County Court(Buckley, J.) ordered a presentence investigation report (hereinafter PSI) to be completedby sentencing, which was scheduled for November 26, 2012. On November 16, 2012,the Chemung County Probation Department requested an extension for completion of thePSI until February 25, 2013, citing the fact that defendant had since moved to Queensand, as a result of Hurricane Sandy, the New York City Probation Department had beenunable to access the necessary records to complete the PSI. County Court (Hayden, J.)granted the extension.
Subsequently, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, pursuant to CPL 380.30,based upon the lengthy delay in sentencing. The court denied said motion and defendantappeared for sentencing in April 2013. At the commencement of the hearing, the courtquestioned defendant as to whether he had been drinking alcohol. After an initial denial,defendant admitted that he had been drinking the night before and, after his consent to betested, [*2]he was found to have a .089 blood alcoholcontent. Thereafter, defendant was sentenced to 10 months in jail and he nowappeals.
We affirm. We reject defendant's contention that County Court abused its discretionin sentencing him because he lacked capacity due to his intoxication. The record of thesentencing hearing demonstrates that defendant's behavior was appropriate and that heactively participated in the hearing, acknowledged his responsibility to register andargued cogently for leniency. Accordingly, we find that the court did not abuse itsdiscretion in proceeding with sentencing and find no grounds upon which to disturb thesentence imposed (see e.g.People v Yu-Jen Chang, 92 AD3d 1132, 1135 [2012]; People v Dowling, 92 AD3d1034, 1034-1035 [2012], lv denied 18 NY3d 993 [2012]; People vStone, 303 AD2d 782, 782 [2003]; People v Borowsky, 289 AD2d 604,604-605 [2001]). Under these circumstances, we also reject defendant's contention thathe was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object tosentencing (see People vShiels, 93 AD3d 992, 992-993 [2012]; People v McFarren, 83 AD3d 1209, 1210 [2011], lvdenied 17 NY3d 860 [2011]).
Nor do we find merit to defendant's argument that County Court violated his right tobe sentenced without an unreasonable delay. Only delays that are inexcusable and undulylong violate the statutory directive (see CPL 380.30 [1]; People v Dissottle, 68 AD3d1542, 1543 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 799 [2010]; People v Arroyo, 22 AD3d881, 882 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 773 [2006]). Here, inasmuch as theProbation Department was prevented from completing defendant's PSI due to the effectsof a hurricane, the approximate 10-month delay between his plea and sentencing does notwarrant vacatur of his conviction and dismissal of the indictment (see e.g. People vDrake, 61 NY2d 359, 366 [1984]; People v Dissottle, 68 AD3d at 1543;People ex rel. Weingard v Casscles, 40 AD2d 530, 530 [1972]). Defendant'sremaining contentions have been examined and found to be without merit.
Peters, P.J., Garry, Egan Jr. and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.