| People v Goodluck |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 03937 [117 AD3d 653] |
| May 29, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Sezzie Goodluck, Appellant. |
Glenn A. Garber, P.C., New York (Glenn A. Garber of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Allen J. Vickey of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Arlene D. Goldberg, J.), renderedApril 15, 2011, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of scheme to defraud in the firstdegree, and sentencing her to a term of 364 days, unanimously affirmed.
Where defendant was charged with participating, along with other defendants, in afraudulent investment scheme, the court properly exercised its discretion in receivingtestimony of investors who did not have contact with defendant. Since the scheme todefraud count required the People to show a pattern of fraudulent conduct targeting morethan one victim (see Penal Law § 190.65 [1] [b]), these witnessesprovided highly probative evidence of the scope of the scheme. Although the People alsointroduced the testimony of the two investors whom defendant directly recruited, thePeople "were not bound to stop after presenting minimum evidence" (see People vAlvino, 71 NY2d 233, 245 [1987]). Moreover, the People only called as witnesses afew of the many victims of the scheme.
The court also properly exercised its discretion in receiving evidence of defendant'srefusal to cooperate with an internal, nonpolice investigation by the bank where she wasemployed. When a bank official who was investigating defendant's solicitation of bankcustomers for the investment scheme at issue asked her to appear for an interview,defendant attempted to resign, and was terminated. This evidence was probative of herconsciousness of guilt (see People v Holland, 174 AD2d 508, 510 [1st Dept1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 1011 [1991]).
The court permitted defendant a full opportunity to cross-examine all prosecutionwitnesses, and it imposed appropriate limits on defendant's elicitation of collateral andirrelevant matters.
The court properly precluded defendant from eliciting evidence of a statement by acodefendant, who was a fugitive, that purportedly exculpated defendant. Althoughdefendant offered this statement as evidence of the codefendant's state of mind, it wasessentially a factual assertion that was irrelevant unless offered to prove the truth of thematter asserted. Accordingly, the statement was hearsay (see People v Reynoso,73 NY2d 816, 819 [1988]), and it was not admissible under any hearsay exception.
We have considered and rejected defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim(see [*2]People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708,713-714 [1998]; Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]). Defendant'sremaining contentions, including all of her constitutional arguments, are unpreserved andwe decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we rejectthem on the merits. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Saxe, Manzanet-Danielsand Feinman, JJ.