| Hollowell v Decaro |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04170 [118 AD3d 749] |
| June 11, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Patricia A. Hollowell, Appellant, v JamesDecaro, Respondent. |
Tantone & Gulotta, Ronkonkoma, N.Y. (Anthony J. Gulotta of counsel), forappellant.
Schondebare & Korcz, Ronkonkoma, N.Y. (Amy B. Korcz of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Martin, J.), dated May 9, 2013, whichgranted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaintas time-barred and denied the plaintiff's cross motion pursuant to CPLR 306-b and 2004to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
On December 17, 2007, a vehicle operated by James Decaro collided with a vehicleoperated by the plaintiff. Decaro died on April 4, 2009, of causes unrelated to theaccident. On June 8, 2012, the plaintiff filed a summons and complaint naming "TheEstate of James Decaro" as the defendant, seeking to recover damages for personalinjuries resulting from the subject accident. However, a personal representative forDecaro's estate was not appointed until September 25, 2012.
The Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. Because a plaintiff is unable tocommence an action during the period of time between the death of a potential defendantand the appointment of a representative of the estate, the purported action commenced onJune 8, 2012, was a nullity (seeArbelaez v Chun Kuei Wu, 18 AD3d 583, 584 [2005]; Dime Sav. Bank ofN.Y. v Luna, 302 AD2d 558 [2003]; Laurenti v Teatom, 210 AD2d 300, 301[1994]). Further, the three-year statute of limitations, as tolled for 18 months by CPLR210 (b) due to Decaro's death, expired on June 17, 2012 (see CPLR 214 [5]).
The Supreme Court also properly denied the plaintiff's cross motion pursuant toCPLR 306-b to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint. While thisprovision allows for the extension of time to serve the summons and complaint after anaction has been properly commenced, it does not allow a court to extend the time limitedby law for the commencement of an action (see CPLR 201). Rivera, J.P., Lott,Miller and Duffy, JJ., concur.