| Matter of Conde v Kelly |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04421 [118 AD3d 534] |
| June 17, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Henry Conde,Petitioner, v Raymond W. Kelly, as Police Commissioner of the City of NewYork, et al., Respondents. |
The Quinn Law Firm, White Plains (Andrew C. Quinn of counsel), forpetitioner.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Edward F.X. Hart ofcounsel), for respondents.
Determination of respondent Police Commissioner, dated March 5, 2012, terminatingpetitioner's employment as a police officer, unanimously modified, on the law, to awardpetitioner back pay for the period in which he was suspended without pay beyond the 30days permitted by Civil Service Law § 75 (3-a), and the proceeding broughtpursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court,New York County [Paul Wooten, J.], entered Feb. 27, 2013) otherwise disposed of byconfirming the remainder of the determination, without costs.
Following a disciplinary hearing, the hearing officer sustained three charges, whichalleged respectively that petitioner, while assigned to the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB):"on or about November 6, 2006, did wrongfully access and subsequently obtainconfidential information from the Internal Affairs Professional Computer System, whichwas not related to the official business of the Department" (5); "on or about November 6,200[6], did wrongfully divulge or discuss official Department business withoutpermission or authority to do so" (6); and on or about October 16, 2006, . . .with intent to obtain a benefit or deprive another of a benefit, . . . obtainedconfidential information from the Internal Affairs Professional Computer System, whichwas not related to the official business of the Department and divulged said informationto another Member of Service" (7).
Petitioner does not challenge the findings with respect to charges 5 and 6. Hisargument that the finding with respect to charge 7 is not supported by substantialevidence is without merit. Petitioner improperly accessed a file regarding a pendingdisciplinary investigation related to a domestic violence incident involving a fellowofficer and the officer's girlfriend, and effectively divulged its contents when he told theofficer, "[I]t is what you said it is."
We reject petitioner's argument that his actions did not constitute official misconductbecause there is no evidence that he acted "with intent to obtain a benefit or depriveanother person of a benefit" (Penal Law § 195.00 [1]). " 'Benefit'means any gain or advantage to the beneficiary and includes any gain or advantage to athird person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary" (Penal Law§ 10.00 [17]). This "includes more than financial gain and can encompasspolitical or other types of advantage" (People v Feerick, 93 NY2d 433, 447[1999]). [*2]On the record before us, it can be reasonablyinferred that petitioner intended to obtain a benefit for his fellow officer and friendwithin the meaning of the statute when he accessed confidential information in the IABcomputer system and confirmed for the officer the scope of the allegations of thecomplainant in the disciplinary investigation against him (see e.g. People v Barnes, 117AD3d 1203, 1206-1207 [3d Dept 2014] [while reversing the criminal misconductconviction on other grounds not applicable in this case, the Court found that"(c)onsidering defendant's statement to the pharmacist, the jury could infer that defendantintended to obtain a benefit—getting Jewett's prescriptions filled morequickly—by flashing her badge and identifying herself as a police officer"];People v Lucarelli, 300 AD2d 1013 [4th Dept 2002] [reinstating the officialmisconduct count where a police officer was informed of the name of a suspected drugdealer and transmitted the information to the suspect's mother, with the intent to benefitthe suspect]).
The penalty of termination is not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shockingto one's sense of fairness (Matter of Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d 32, 39-40 [2001]).Petitioner betrayed his position of trust as an IAB member, who was privy to verysensitive information, and breached his confidentiality agreement with the policedepartment, which stated that the wrongful disclosure of information would not betolerated by the department and that divulging or discussing official department businessexcept as authorized, constituted prohibited conduct and might constitute officialmisconduct under Penal Law § 195.00 (1). Among other things, petitionerinformed a fellow officer that he was the subject of a "criminal association log" anddivulged very sensitive information regarding allegations that the officer was "hangingout" with a drug dealer and that a confidential informant was involved, possibly placingthe informant's life in danger.
Respondents concede that petitioner is entitled to back pay for the period of time inwhich he was suspended in excess of 30 days (Civil Service Law § 75[3-a]). Concur—Tom, J.P., Acosta, Andrias, DeGrasse and Richter, JJ.