| People v Allen |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04503 [118 AD3d 902] |
| June 18, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Tirey S. Allen, Appellant. |
Michael G. Paul, New City, N.Y., for appellant.
Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Laurie Sapakoff and StevenBender of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County(Neary, J.), rendered July 25, 2012, convicting him of assault in the first degree andcriminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches ofthe defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress identification testimony andstatements he made to law enforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court did not err in denying that branch of the defendant's omnibusmotion which was to suppress identification testimony. The evidence adduced at theWade hearing (see United States v Wade, 388 US 218 [1967]) establishedthat the pretrial identification procedures were not unduly suggestive, as the peopledepicted in the computer-generated photo arrays viewed by the complainant and awitness were sufficiently similar in appearance to the defendant (see People v Lago, 60 AD3d784 [2009]; People vHoward, 50 AD3d 823 [2008]).
The Supreme Court also did not err in denying that branch of the defendant'somnibus motion which was to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officials.When the defendant gave what a police officer suspected to be a false name, the officerwarned him that giving a false name would result in an additional charge, as required bythe false personation statute (see Penal Law § 190.23). Thedefendant then repeated the false name after being given a second warning. The officer'swarnings to the defendant did not require Miranda warnings (see Miranda vArizona, 384 US 436 [1966]). There is no basis for suppressing the defendant'srepeated use of a false name. Ascertaining an arrestee's true name is a necessary part ofthe normal booking process, even if the response may have inculpatory connotations (see People v Ligon, 66 AD3d516, 517 [2009]; People vMcCloud, 50 AD3d 379, 380 [2008]). The false personation warnings wererequired by statute and were not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response(see People v Ligon, 66 AD3d at 517; People v King, 247 AD2d 490[1998]). On the contrary, the defendant had already incriminated himself by giving afalse name, and the warnings gave him an opportunity to retract his prior incriminatingresponses (see People v Ligon, 66 AD3d at 517).
The Supreme Court's Sandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34NY2d 371 [1974]) was proper. The court properly weighed the probative value of thedefendant's prior offenses against the possible prejudice to the defendant, and reached anappropriate compromise ruling (see People v Rodriguez, 51 AD3d 950 [2008]; People v Grier, 47 AD3d729, 730 [2008]).
The defendant's contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel iswithout merit (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People vBaldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80[1982]). Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Chambers and Miller, JJ., concur.