| People v Edwards |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04512 [118 AD3d 909] |
| June 18, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Raheem Edwards, Appellant. |
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Patricia Pazner of counsel), for appellant.
Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, KeithDolan, and Gamaliel Marrero of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Firetog, J.), rendered December 14, 2009, convicting him of murder in the seconddegree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict,and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court's Sandoval ruling(see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 376 [1974]) was not improper. "Theextent to which the prosecution should be allowed to impeach the credibility of adefendant is a matter that is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court" (People v Rodriguez, 111 AD3d856, 858 [2013]; see People v Bennette, 56 NY2d 142, 146 [1982]). Here,the court's Sandoval ruling permitting the People to inquire as to whether thedefendant had been convicted of three felonies and one misdemeanor, but precluding anyquestioning about the underlying facts of those prior crimes, avoided any undueprejudice to the defendant and constituted a provident exercise of the court's discretion(see People v Brown, 101AD3d 895, 896 [2012]; People v Murad, 55 AD3d 754, 755 [2008]; People vJamison, 303 AD2d 603 [2003]). The fact that the defendant may have been the onlypossible source of testimony for his defense increased the importance of his credibilityand his testimony, and did not mandate a ruling prohibiting inquiry about his priorcriminal conduct (see People v Hayes, 97 NY2d 203, 208 [2002]; People v Lopez, 37 AD3d496, 497 [2007]; People vCruz, 21 AD3d 967, 968 [2005]).
The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in precluding certaincross-examination of a detective who had testified on the People's behalf at thesuppression hearing. At trial, the detective testified that he had prepared a writtenstatement for the defendant's signature after the defendant was in custody, and that hehad read the statement aloud to the defendant prior to the defendant's execution of thestatement. At the suppression hearing, the detective made no mention of having read thestatement aloud to the defendant before the defendant signed it. The defendant contendsthat the Supreme Court erred in precluding him from cross-examining that detective attrial regarding this omission from the detective's suppression hearing testimony.Although we agree with the defendant's contention that the preclusion of thiscross-examination constituted error, the error was harmless, as there was overwhelmingevidence of the defendant's guilt, and no significant probability that the error might havecontributed to his conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242[1975]; People v Greene,110 AD3d 827, 829 [2013]).
[*2] Thedefendant's challenges to certain remarks made by the prosecutor during summation areunpreserved for appellate review, as the defendant either did not object to the challengedremarks, or made only a general objection, and his motion for a mistrial, made after thecompletion of summations, was untimely (see People v Allen, 114 AD3d 958, 959 [2014]; People v Read, 97 AD3d702, 703 [2012]; People vMalave, 7 AD3d 542 [2004]). In any event, the challenged remarks eitherconstituted fair comment on the evidence (see People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105,109 [1976]; People vGouveia, 88 AD3d 814, 815 [2011]), were responsive to arguments and theoriespresented in the defense's summation (see People v Herb, 110 AD3d 829, 831 [2013]; People v Crawford, 54 AD3d961, 962 [2008]), were permissible rhetorical comment (see People v Brown, 84 AD3d1263 [2011]), or constituted harmless error (see People v Crimmins, 36NY2d at 241-242). Skelos, J.P., Lott, Roman and LaSalle, JJ., concur.