| People v Hill |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04533 [118 AD3d 1191] |
| June 19, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vDustin C. Hill, Appellant. |
Rebecca L. Fox, Plattsburgh, for appellant.
Andrew J. Wylie, District Attorney, Plattsburgh, for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Clinton County (Ryan, J.), renderedFebruary 28, 2012, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of murderin the second degree.
Defendant was charged in an indictment with various crimes after he confessed tostrangling an unknown male and causing his death. In satisfaction of the indictment, hepleaded guilty to the crime of murder in the second degree and was to be sentenced underthe terms of the plea agreement to 18 years to life in prison. During the course of theproceedings relating to the indictment, defendant was found to be in possession of arazor blade while in jail and agreed to be prosecuted by superior court informationcharging him with promoting prison contraband in the first degree. He pleaded guilty tothis charge and agreed to waive his right to appeal. Under the terms of the pleaagreement, he was to be sentenced to 2 to 6 years in prison, to run concurrently to theprison term imposed on the murder conviction. Defendant was sentenced accordinglyand he now appeals.
Defendant's sole contention is that the 18-year to life sentence imposed upon hisconviction of murder in the second degree is harsh and excessive. Preliminarily, we notethat, although defendant waived his right to appeal during the plea proceedings andexecuted a written waiver, it is not clear from the record if the waiver was part of the pleaagreement relating to the murder conviction. Regardless, even if it was, we do not findthat the waiver was valid inasmuch as defendant was not advised that the right to appealwas separate and distinct from the other rights that he was forfeiting by pleading guilty(see People v Watson, 115AD3d 1016 [2014]; [*2]People v Bressard, 112 AD3d 988, 988 [2013],lv denied 22 NY3d 1137 [2014]). Hence, he is not precluded from challengingthe severity of the sentence.
Turning to the merits, we do not find that the challenged sentence was either harsh orexcessive. The sentence is justified by the violent and senseless nature of the crime,combined with the fact that it was the same one agreed to by defendant under the pleaagreement. Indeed, we find no extraordinary circumstances nor any abuse of discretionwarranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice (see People v Weiskopff, 20AD3d 776, 776 [2005]; People v Parson, 209 AD2d 882, 884 [1994], lvdenied 84 NY2d 1014 [1994]). Therefore, we decline to disturb it.
Peters, P.J., Stein, McCarthy, Rose and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that thejudgment is affirmed.