| People v Alcindor |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04711 [118 AD3d 621] |
| June 24, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Patrick Alcindor, Appellant. |
Dershowitz, Eiger & Adelson, P.C., New York (Nathan Z. Dershowitz ofcounsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Christopher P. Marinelli ofcounsel), for respondent.
Judgments, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward J. McLaughlin, J.), renderedMarch 6, 2012, as amended March 13, 2012, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, ofattempted grand larceny in the third degree (three counts), tampering with physicalevidence (two counts), and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and sentencinghim, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate term of 6
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weightof the evidence (see People vDanielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There was ample evidence, includingevidence of defendant's managerial role, to support the inference that defendantcommitted the unlawful acts necessary to establish each of the charges, either personallyor by causing a subordinate to do so, and that defendant committed each offense with thenecessary mental state (see e.g.People v Khan, 82 AD3d 44, 50-52 [1st Dept 2011], affd 18 NY3d 535[2012]; People vSilberzweig, 58 AD3d 762, 762-763 [2d Dept 2009], lv denied 12 NY3d920 [2009]). The overall pattern of conduct had no reasonable explanation except thatdefendant was criminally responsible for the unlawful acts, even if he committed themthrough other persons (see Penal Law § 20.00). Although we mayconsider defendant's acquittals of other charges, we do not find that the acquittalsundermine the sufficiency or weight of the evidence supporting the convictions (see People v Abraham, 22NY3d 140 [2013]; People v Rayam, 94 NY2d 557 [2000]), and we note thatan acquittal "does not make the evidence of the [acquitted conduct] disappear" forpurposes of our review (Peoplev Johnson, 73 AD3d 578, 580 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 893[2010]). The evidence also supported the inference that the applicable statutory monetarythreshold was met. We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining argumentsconcerning the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.
The court properly exercised its discretion in precluding a line of cross-examinationthat the court properly deemed irrelevant. There was no violation of defendant's right toconfront witnesses and present a defense (see Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US673, 678-679 [1986]).
Defendant did not preserve his challenge to the court's reasonable doubt charge, andwe decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we reject it onthe merits. [*2]The court's instructions, viewed as awhole, properly conveyed to the jurors the relevant standards, and they were notconstitutionally defective (see People v Cubino, 88 NY2d 998 [1996]; see also People v Umali, 10NY3d 417, 426-427 [2008]; People v Drake, 7 NY3d 28, 33 [2006]). The chargegenerally followed the Criminal Jury Instructions, with differences in phrasing that didnot affect the substance of the definition of reasonable doubt.
We perceive no basis to reduce the sentence.
We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.Concur—Tom, J.P., Moskowitz, Manzanet-Daniels, Feinman and Gische, JJ.