| People v Ingvarsdottir |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 04791 [118 AD3d 1023] |
| June 25, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Helga Ingvarsdottir, Appellant. |
Jonathan R. Pearson, Albany, N.Y., for appellant.
Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Virginia A. Marciano, LaurieSapakoff, and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County(Molea, J.), rendered April 23, 2013, convicting her of grand larceny in the seconddegree, upon her plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, she was not deprived of the effectiveassistance of counsel during the plea proceeding, as her attorney provided her withmeaningful representation (see People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397 [1995]).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismissthe indictment insofar as asserted against her based on an approximate 28-month delay inthe imposition of sentence. Courts are required to impose sentence "without unreasonabledelay" (CPL 380.30 [1]). An unexplained lengthy delay between conviction andsentencing results in the loss of jurisdiction over the defendant unless the delay is theresult of the defendant's own conduct (see People v Drake, 61 NY2d 359, 366[1984]). Here, the delay in sentencing was due to legal proceedings involving thecodefendant, in which the defendant participated pursuant to the terms of a cooperationagreement with the District Attorney's office. The defendant could not be sentenced untilafter the investigation and prosecution of the codefendant had concluded, since only thencould the District Attorney's office fulfill its obligation of evaluating the sincerity andvalue of the defendant's cooperation (see People v Arroyo, 22 AD3d 881 [2005]; People vBaez, 216 AD2d 121 [1995]). Additionally, the record clearly demonstrates that asignificant portion of the delay was attributable to the defendant, who kept requestingadjournments. The record also clearly demonstrates that the defendant was not prejudicedby the delay, since she was, at all times, at liberty prior to sentencing.
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Roman,Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.