| People v Holland |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05202 [119 AD3d 708] |
| July 9, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| 1 The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Isaac Holland, Appellant. |
Beverly Van Ness, New York, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Douglas Noll and Andrea M.DiGregorio of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Grella, J.), rendered July 1, 2010, convicting him of attempted murder in the first degree(four counts), burglary in the first degree (four counts), robbery in the first degree (fourcounts), burglary in the second degree, robbery in the second degree, criminal possessionof a weapon in the second degree (four counts), and criminal possession of a weapon inthe third degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him, as a second violent felonyoffender, to indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 25 years to life on each count ofattempted murder in the first degree, to run concurrently with each other andconsecutively to the sentences for the remaining counts, determinate terms ofimprisonment of 25 years followed by five-year periods of postrelease supervision oneach count of burglary in the first degree and robbery in the first degree, to runconcurrently with each other and with the sentences for burglary in the second degree,robbery in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degreeunder counts 17 and 18, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree andconsecutively to the sentences for the remaining counts, determinate terms ofimprisonment of 15 years followed by five-year periods of postrelease supervision on theconvictions of burglary in the second degree, robbery in the second degree, and criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree under counts 17 and 18, to run concurrentlywith each other and with the sentences for burglary in the first degree, robbery in the firstdegree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and consecutively to thesentences for the remaining counts, determinate terms of imprisonment of 15 yearsfollowed by five-year periods of postrelease supervision on the convictions of criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree under counts 15 and 16, to runconsecutively to each other and to the sentences for the remaining counts, and anindeterminate term of imprisonment of 3
Ordered that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest ofjustice, by reducing the indeterminate terms of imprisonment imposed on the convictionsof attempted murder in the first degree from 25 years to life to 20 years to life, byreducing the [*2]determinate terms of imprisonmentimposed on the convictions of burglary in the first degree and robbery in the first degreefrom 25 years to 10 years, by reducing the determinate terms of imprisonment imposedon the convictions of burglary in the second degree, robbery in the second degree, andcriminal possession of a weapon in the second degree from 15 years to 10 years, and byproviding that all terms of imprisonment shall run concurrently with each other, exceptthat the terms of imprisonment on the convictions of attempted murder in the first degreeshall run concurrently with each other and consecutively to the sentences for theremaining counts.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, there is no basis to disturb the hearing court'sdetermination that the defendant's statements were made after he knowingly, voluntarilyand intelligently waived his Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384US 436 [1966]; People vKnudson, 114 AD3d 703, 704 [2014]; People v Brown, 113 AD3d 785, 785-786 [2014]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establishthe defendant's guilt of attempted murder in the first degree, robbery in the first degree,and robbery in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon ourindependent review pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guiltas to those crimes was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d633 [2006]).
The sentence imposed was excessive to the extent indicated (see People vSuitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Lott, Millerand Duffy, JJ., concur.