| Chin v Long Is. Coll. Hosp. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05406 [119 AD3d 833] |
| July 23, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| 1 Brian Chin, Respondent, v Long IslandCollege Hospital et al., Defendants, and Jon Slaughter,Appellant. |
Ivone, Devine & Jensen, LLP, Lake Success, N.Y. (Robert Devine of counsel),for appellant.
Joseph M. Lichtenstein, P.C., Mineola, N.Y. (Mark R. Bower of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the defendant Jon Slaughterappeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bunyan, J.), enteredFebruary 4, 2013, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint insofar as asserted against him.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of thedefendant Jon Slaughter for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted against him is granted.
On November 5, 2009, at 6:33 a.m., the then-51-year-old plaintiff arrived byambulance at the defendant Long Island College Hospital (hereinafter LICH). Theplaintiff was admitted to the emergency room complaining of feeling overwhelmed bystress. The defendant Laurie Mahoney, an emergency room physician, after examiningthe plaintiff, concluded that his symptoms were consistent with depression, orderedseveral tests, and ordered a consultation with a psychiatrist. After some of the test resultscame back, Mahoney telephoned the defendant Jon Slaughter (hereinafter the appellant),a psychiatrist working in LICH's psychiatric emergency room, for a psychiatricconsultation. Mahoney advised the appellant that she anticipated that the plaintiff wouldbe medically cleared, and asked the appellant to confirm her initial assessment that theplaintiff was not suicidal or a risk to others and, thus, would not require involuntaryadmission. First, the appellant reviewed the plaintiff's chart, looking for any indicationthat he had suicidal or homicidal ideation. Then, after performing his evaluation, theappellant concluded that the plaintiff was not a danger to himself or others and would notrequire involuntary admission. The appellant, inter alia, offered the plaintiff a referral foroutpatient psychiatric treatment for depression. As the appellant was gatheringinformation regarding the outpatient referral, the plaintiff and his partner left the hospitalbefore being formally discharged by Mahoney, who was still waiting for medical test[*2]results and overseeing his treatment.
The plaintiff became unresponsive in the cab ride home and returned to theemergency room at approximately 11:28 a.m., about 45 minutes after leaving LICH.Mahoney reexamined him, ordered more tests, and consulted with a cardiologist, whorecommended a neurology consultation. Subsequently, a neurology resident informedMahoney of his assessment that the plaintiff was having a stroke. The plaintiff wasdiagnosed as having suffered an ischemic stroke. The appellant did not treat the plaintiffat any time after he returned to the hospital emergency room.
The plaintiff commenced this medical malpractice action against, among others,LICH, Mahoney, and the appellant. As to the appellant, the plaintiff alleged that hedeparted from accepted medical practice in various ways that contributed to a failure totimely diagnose and treat the stroke. Specifically, the alleged departures included, interalia, the appellant's failure to perform a neurological examination and rule out aneurological etiology for his symptoms, develop a list of differential diagnoses, and referthe plaintiff for further diagnostic studies to work up neurological problems. TheSupreme Court denied the appellant's motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint insofar as asserted against him.
"Although physicians owe a general duty of care to their patients, that duty may belimited to those medical functions undertaken by the physician and relied on by thepatient" (Rivera v New YorkPresbyt. Hosp., 95 AD3d 861, 862 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Covert v Walker, 82 AD3d825, 826 [2011]; Wasserman v Staten Is. Radiological Assoc., 2 AD3d 713,714 [2003]). Here, the appellant established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as amatter of law by demonstrating that his duty of care as a consulting psychiatrist did notextend to the departures alleged by the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, where theplaintiff was being actively treated by an emergency room physician for any medicalcauses of his symptoms, and exhibited no clear signs of neurological problems at thetime, the appellant had no duty beyond properly performing an evaluation to determinewhether the plaintiff was a danger to himself or others and would require involuntaryadmission for depression (seeBurtman v Brown, 97 AD3d 156, 161-162 [2012]; Rivera v New YorkPresbyt. Hosp., 95 AD3d at 862; Covert v Walker, 82 AD3d at 826; Dombroski v Samaritan Hosp.,47 AD3d 80, 84-86 [2007]; Wasserman v Staten Is. Radiological Assoc., 2AD3d at 714; see alsoOzugowski v City of New York, 90 AD3d 875, 876 [2011]). In opposition, theplaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the appellant's motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. Mastro,J.P., Chambers, Lott and Roman, JJ., concur.