| People v Hadfield |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 05462 [119 AD3d 1224] |
| July 24, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| 1 The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vAdam M. Hadfield, Appellant. |
John A. Cirando, Syracuse, for appellant.
Alexander Lesyk, Special Prosecutor, Norwood, for respondent.
Lynch, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County(Richards, J.), rendered October 7, 2011, convicting defendant following a nonjury trialof the crime of assault in the second degree.
Defendant was convicted, after a nonjury trial, of assault in the second degree. Thecharge stemmed from his conduct, while incarcerated at the St. Lawrence CountyCorrectional Facility, in kicking another inmate in the face during a game in therecreational yard.[FN1] When questioned by CorrectionSergeant Jeffrey Bercume, defendant admitted that he had kicked the victim in the facebecause he was annoyed with him, but asserted that it had been accidental. The [*2]incident was recorded by facility cameras, and a videothereof was played and admitted into evidence at trial. Upon his conviction, defendantwas sentenced as a second felony offender to a prison term of seven years with threeyears of postrelease supervision, to be served concurrently to the aggregate 53-yearprison term imposed on the same date for unrelated convictions. Defendant nowappeals.
Contrary to defendant's claims, the verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidenceand is not contrary to the weight of the credible evidence (see People v Bleakley,69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; seealso People v Cahill, 2 NY3d 14, 57-58 [2003]). To prove that defendantcommitted the crime of assault in the second degree as charged, the People were requiredto establish that, while incarcerated after having been charged or convicted of a crime,defendant intentionally caused physical injury to another person (see Penal Law§ 120.05 [7]). Defendant conceded that, at the time of the incident, he wasincarcerated and had been charged with numerous sex offenses and other crimes; hechallenges only the evidence of his intent and of the victim's physical injuries. Viewingthe evidence, particularly the video of the assault, in the light most favorable to thePeople and affording them the benefit of every favorable inference, as we must on a legalsufficiency review (see People v Cabey, 85 NY2d 417, 420 [1995]; People vContes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that the People established beyond areasonable doubt that defendant intentionally caused physical injury to the victim (seePeople v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). His intent was readily inferable from thedeliberate, forceful and unprovoked conduct itself and the surrounding circumstances, allof which were clearly captured on the video (see People v Rodriguez, 17 NY3d 486, 489 [2011];People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977]; People v Johnson, 107 AD3d 1161, 1163 [2013], lvdenied 21 NY3d 1075 [2013]; People v Ford, 90 AD3d 1299, 1300 [2011], lvdenied 18 NY3d 994 [2012]). The People proved that the victim had sustained"physical injury" with evidence that he remained crouched down for several minutes afterthe assault and was later found disoriented and injured in his cell with a swollen face andcut lip, experiencing a high level of pain. The victim had no memory of the incident or ofthe surrounding time period, and the medical evidence established that he had sustained aconcussion (see Penal Law § 10.00 [9]; People v Hines, 9 AD3d507, 511 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 707 [2004]; People v Mack, 301AD2d 863 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 540 [2003]). As "there is a[ ] valid line ofreasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to theconclusion reached by the [factfinder] on the basis of the evidence at trial" (People vBleakley, 69 NY2d at 495), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient.
Upon our independent review of the weight of the credible evidence, we find that, inlight of the video of the assault unmistakably demonstrating defendant's intent to causephysical injury to the victim, a different verdict would have been unreasonable (see People v Johnson, 24AD3d 803, 804 [2005]; People v Clark, 284 AD2d 725, 727 [2001]). Even ifa different verdict would have been reasonable (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2dat 495; see also People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633, 643 [2006]), viewing the probative force of theconflicting evidence in a neutral light and according deference to the credibilitydeterminations of County Court, as factfinder, given its ability to view the witnessesfirsthand, we are satisfied that the verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence(see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495; see also People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]; People v Mitchell, 57 AD3d1308, 1309-1310 [2008]). The court rationally rejected as incredible defendant'sexplanation that his actions in kicking the victim in the face were accidental or part of thegame, as his conduct can only reasonably be viewed as intentional.
[*3] Contrary to defendant's claims, his statement toBercume was not the result of a custodial interrogation requiring Mirandawarnings. While Bercume admittedly did not administer such warnings prior toquestioning defendant about the incident, Miranda warnings are only requiredprior to questioning an inmate in a prison setting where "the circumstances of thedetention and interrogation . . . entail added constraint that would lead aprison inmate reasonably to believe that there has been a restriction on that person'sfreedom over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility"(People v Alls, 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090[1994]; see People vPassino, 53 AD3d 204, 205-206 [2008], affd 12 NY3d 748 [2009]). Atthe Huntley hearing, Bercume testified that he viewed the video recording of theincident, and then went to defendant's single cell around 10:40 p.m., after the inmateshad been locked down for the night. He entered the cell, which remained unlocked, andasked defendant "if he had any idea what occurred in the rec yard" to the victim.Defendant initially denied any knowledge of the incident but, when Bercume told himthat he had viewed a video of the incident, defendant stated that he had become agitatedwith the victim and had asked him to stop doing something, and, when the victimcontinued to annoy him, defendant kicked him in the face. The entire conversation lastedabout five minutes, defendant was not transported to an isolated location, handcuffed orrestrained, Bercume was unarmed and no one else was present. We find that theinteraction was "analogous to the relatively brief, generally public, or otherwiseon-the-scene investigatory detentions in nonprison settings found not custodial forMiranda purposes" (People v Alls, 83 NY2d at 100). As the record isdevoid of any proof of "added constraint . . . over and above that ofordinary confinement in a correctional facility," the questioning was not custodial forpurposes of Miranda, and Miranda warnings were not required(People v Alls, 83 NY2d at 100; see People v Passino, 53 AD3d at205-206; compare People vGause, 50 AD3d 1392, 1393 [2008]; People v Van Patten, 48 AD3d 30, 33-34 [2007], lvdenied 10 NY3d 845 [2008]).
Defendant further argues that his indelible right to counsel was violated when he wasquestioned in jail about this assault at a time when he was represented by counsel onpending charges for which he was incarcerated, and that his statement should have beensuppressed. "Under New York's indelible right to counsel rule, a defendant in custody inconnection with a criminal matter for which he [or she] is represented by counsel maynot be interrogated in the absence of his [or her] attorney with respect to that matter or anunrelated matter unless he [or she] waives the right to counsel in the presence of his [orher] attorney" (People vLopez, 16 NY3d 375, 377 [2011]). Relevant to this inquiry is whether thecorrection officer knew or should be charged with the knowledge of defendant'srepresentation by counsel on the unrelated charge (see id. at 382). Whiledefendant raised this issue in his stipulation in lieu of motions, he did not pursue it at thesuppression hearing and his request to reopen the hearing was denied. However, "aclaimed deprivation of the State constitutional right to counsel may be raised on appeal,notwithstanding that the issue was not preserved by having been specifically raised in asuppression motion or at trial," provided there is a "factual record sufficient to permitappellate review" (People v Kinchen, 60 NY2d 772, 773-774 [1983]; accord People v Westervelt, 47AD3d 969, 972 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 818 [2008]). Accepting,arguendo, that Bercume was aware that defendant was in custody and represented bycounsel on pending charges (see People v Burdo, 91 NY2d 146, 150 and n[1997]), we agree that the questioning[FN2] of defendant without [*4]counsel regarding this assault violated his indelible right tocounsel (see People v Lopez, 16 NY3d at 380-383). However, we conclude thatthe erroneous admission of his statement—acknowledging that he had kicked thevictim but claiming it had been accidental—was harmless beyond a reasonabledoubt and reversal is not required, as "there is no reasonable possibility that the errormight have contributed to defendant's conviction" (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d230, 237 [1975]; accord People v Smith, 97 NY2d 324, 330 [2002]; People vWestervelt, 47 AD3d at 973; see People v Lopez, 16 NY3d at 386-387; see also People v Wardlaw, 6NY3d 556, 560-561 [2006]). Indeed, the video of the incident providedoverwhelming evidence of his intent and guilt, as County Court noted in announcing itsverdict.
Finally, given defendant's extensive criminal history, we find no extraordinarycircumstances or abuse of discretion supporting a reduction of the sentence in the interestof justice (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]; [6] [b]; People v Elliot, 57 AD3d 1095, 1097 [2008], lvdenied 12 NY3d 783 [2009]).
Stein, J.P., McCarthy, Egan Jr. and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote 1:Defendant was in thecorrectional facility awaiting trial on an indictment charging him with, among otherthings, criminal sexual act in the first degree (five counts), unlawful imprisonment in thefirst degree, menacing in the second degree, criminal mischief in the fourth degree,kidnapping in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, rape in the first degreeand driving while intoxicated. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of thosecharges and, upon appeal, this Court has affirmed the judgment of conviction (Peoplev Hadfield, 119 AD3d 1217 [2014] [decided herewith]).
Footnote 2:The fact that defendantwas questioned by a correction officer rather than by a police officer does not alter ourconclusion (see People v Garofolo, 46 NY2d 592, 603 [1979]; see e.g. Peoplev Hopkins, 86 AD2d 937, 939 [1982], affd 58 NY2d 1079 [1983]).