| Matter of Dashawn R. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 06093 [120 AD3d 1250] |
| September 10, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Dashawn R., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent, Appellant. |
Mark Diamond, New York, N.Y., for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Edward F. X. Hart, JulieSteiner, and Faith Lovell of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3,Dashawn R. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County(Ambrosio, J.), dated September 4, 2013, which, upon an order of fact-finding of thesame court (McElrath, J.), dated July 2, 2013, finding that he committed acts which, ifcommitted by an adult, would constitute the crimes of robbery in the second degree,assault in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, assault in the thirddegree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, adjudged him to bea juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation for a period of 18 months. The appealbrings up for review the order of fact-finding and the denial, after a hearing (Ambrosio,J.), of those branches of the appellant's motion which were to suppress identificationtestimony and his statements to law enforcement officials.
Ordered that the order of disposition is modified, on the law, by deleting theprovision thereof reciting that count 2 is "Covered by Penal Law 160.10 01 CF," andsubstituting therefor a provision reciting that count 2 is withdrawn; as so modified, theorder of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the order offact-finding is modified accordingly.
The appellant contends, and the presentment agency agrees, that the order offact-finding and order of disposition inaccurately describe the disposition of count 2 (actswhich, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of attempted robbery in thesecond degree). Accordingly, the order of fact-finding and order of disposition aremodified to indicate that count 2 was withdrawn by the presentment agency.
The Family Court properly declined to suppress the appellant's statements to lawenforcement officials (see Family Ct Act § 344.2). The hearingevidence demonstrated that the arresting detective properly placed the appellant in adesignated juvenile room in a police station prior to questioning (see 22 NYCRR205.20 [d]; Matter of Javier L., 272 AD2d 474 [2000]). The appellant, in thepresence of his mother, was given the proper Miranda warnings (see Mirandav Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), and they indicated that they understood those rights.Nonetheless, the appellant agreed to answer questions posed by law enforcementofficials (see Family Ct Act § 305.2 [7], [8]; Matter of Dominique R., 29AD3d 702 [2006]; Matter of Michael L., 285 AD2d 466 [2001]; Matterof Javier L., 272 AD2d at 474). Even if the Family Court believed the mother'stestimony regarding a promise of leniency, this would not render the appellant'sstatements involuntary, since the appellant concedes that no promise was ever conveyedto him (cf. People v Morillo, 225 AD2d 479 [1996]).
[*2] Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the victim'sidentification of the perpetrators in a videotape of the incident was not a formalidentification procedure, as the victim was simply ratifying the events depicted on thevideotape that she had experienced firsthand (cf. People v Gee, 99 NY2d 158,162 [2002]). Furthermore, the victim's inability to identify the appellant in a photographprior to trial goes to the weight of her in-court identification, and not to its admissibility(cf. People v Grant, 94AD3d 1139 [2012]).
Viewing the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing in the light most favorableto the presentment agency (seeMatter of Tanasia Elanie E., 49 AD3d 642 [2008]; Matter of Shariff A., 28 AD3d546, 547 [2006]), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the determinationsmade in the order of fact-finding, other than the determination as to count 2.
In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of theevidence, we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the factfinder toview the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Briona T.G., 47AD3d 811 [2008]; Matterof Carliph T., 26 AD3d 440 [2006]; Matter of Jabari W., 18 AD3d 767, 768 [2005]; cf.People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]). The Family Court's credibilitydeterminations should thus be accorded great weight on appeal and should not bedisturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see Matter of Charles S., 41 AD3d 484 [2007]; Matter of Steven L., 21 AD3d962, 963 [2005]; Matter of Kryzstof K., 283 AD2d 431 [2001]). Uponreviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the determination of the Family Courtwas not against the weight of the evidence (cf. People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
Counsel provided meaningful representation throughout the proceedings (see Matter of Shaheen P.J., 29AD3d 996 [2006]; cf. People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 [1998]; Peoplev Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 [1981]). Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Cohen and Duffy, JJ.,concur.