Matter of Edwards v Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead
2014 NY Slip Op 07505 [122 AD3d 627]
November 5, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 31, 2014


[*1]
 In the Matter of Seymour Edwards, Appellant, et al.,Petitioners/Plaintiffs,
v
Incorporated Village of Hempstead et al., Respondents,et al., Respondents/Defendants.

Seymour Edwards, Hempstead, N.Y., petitioner/plaintiff-appellant pro se.

Harris Beach PLLC, Uniondale, N.Y. (William J. Garry of counsel), forrespondents/defendants-respondents Incorporated Village of Hempstead, Wayne J. Hall,Sr.-Mayor of the Village of Hempstead, and Incorporated Village of HempsteadCommunity Development Agency.

Forchelli, Curto, Deegan, Schwartz, Mineo & Terrana, LLP,Uniondale, N.Y. (Daniel P. Deegan and Eli Elbaum of counsel), forrespondent/defendant-respondent Renaissance Downtowns UrbanAmerica, LLC.

In a consolidated proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determinationof the respondents/defendants Incorporated Village of Hempstead and IncorporatedVillage of Hempstead Community Development Agency dated February 7, 2012, which,after a public hearing, approved a "Master Developer Agreement" with therespondent/defendant Renaissance Downtowns UrbanAmerica, LLC, and action forinjunctive and declaratory relief, the petitioner/plaintiff Seymour Edwards appeals froman order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.),entered January 22, 2013, which, inter alia, denied the petitioners/plaintiffs' motion,among other things, to preliminarily enjoin the respondents/defendants IncorporatedVillage of Hempstead and Incorporated Village of Hempstead Community DevelopmentAgency from selling any property to the respondent/defendant Renaissance DowntownsUrbanAmerica, LLC, during the pendency of the proceeding/action, and dismissed theproceeding/action.

Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Following a public hearing on February 7, 2012, the Incorporated Village ofHempstead and Incorporated Village of Hempstead Community Development Agency(hereinafter the CDA) approved a "Master Developer Agreement," providing for the saleof certain municipal property to Renaissance Downtowns UrbanAmerica, LLC(hereinafter Renaissance). The petitioner/plaintiff Seymour Edwards commenced ahybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the determination of the Villageand the CDA approving the Master Developer Agreement, and action for injunctive anddeclaratory relief, which was consolidated by stipulation with two other hybridproceedings/actions. Thereafter, the petitioners/plaintiffs moved, inter alia, topreliminarily enjoin the Village and the CDA from selling any property to Renaissanceduring the pendency of the proceeding/action. In an order and judgment entered January22, 2013, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied the petitioners/plaintiffs'motion for preliminary injunctive relief and dismissed [*2]the proceeding/action. Edwards appeals from the order andjudgment, and we affirm.

Contrary to Edwards' contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised itsdiscretion in declining to invalidate the determination of the Village and the CDA, whichapproved the Master Developer Agreement, based on alleged violations of the OpenMeetings Law (Public Officers Law § 100 et seq.). While therewere certain violations of the Open Meetings Law in relation to the notice provided ofthe public hearing on February 7, 2012, the petitioners/plaintiffs failed to establish goodcause to invalidate the decision, rendered after the hearing, to approve the MasterDeveloper Agreement (see Public Officers Law § 107 [1]; Matter of Imburgia v Procopio,98 AD3d 617, 619 [2012]; Matter of Cunney v Board of Trustees of the Vil. of Grand View,N.Y., 72 AD3d 960 [2010]; Matter of Wilson v Board of Educ. Harborfields Cent. SchoolDist., 65 AD3d 1158 [2009]).

Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properlydetermined that there was no violation of General Municipal Law § 507 (2)(d) (cf. Town of Babylon v Racanelli Assoc., 171 AD2d 741 [1991]).

The Supreme Court also providently exercised its discretion in denying thepetitioners/plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief, since they failed toestablish a likelihood of success on the merits, and their claim of irreparable injury wasmerely speculative (seeFamily-Friendly Media, Inc. v Recorder Tel. Network, 74 AD3d 738 [2010]; Village/Town of Mount Kisco vRene Dubos Ctr. for Human Envts., Inc., 12 AD3d 501 [2004]).

Edwards's remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly before thisCourt. Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Maltese and LaSalle, JJ., concur.


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