| Joseph v City of New York |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 07983 [122 AD3d 800] |
| November 19, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Kennard Joseph, Respondent, v City of NewYork et al., Appellants. |
Wallace D. Gossett, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Michael Rabinowitz of counsel), forappellants.
Edelstein & Grossman, New York, N.Y. (Jonathan I. Edelstein and BrandonM. Cruz of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal, aslimited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Gavrin, J.), dated January 4, 2013, as denied those branches of their motion which werefor summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against thedefendants City of New York and New York City Transit Authority.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action against the City of New York, the MetropolitanTransit Authority (hereinafter the MTA), and the New York City Transit Authority(hereinafter the NYCTA) (hereinafter collectively the defendants) to recover damages forinjuries allegedly sustained by him when he fell while descending a staircase at a subwaystation in Queens. After the completion of discovery, the defendants moved for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court granted that branch of themotion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as assertedagainst the MTA, and denied those branches of the motion which were for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the City and the NYCTA.The defendants appeal.
The Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the motion which were forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the City and theNYCTA. Those defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgmentas a matter of law because they did not address specific claims in the plaintiff's verifiedbill of particulars related to the subject staircase, including specific conditionsconcerning its treads and risers (see Lipari v Town of Oyster Bay, 116 AD3d 927, 928[2014]; Miller v Village of E.Hampton, 98 AD3d 1007, 1008-1009 [2012]; Braver v Village of Cedarhurst,94 AD3d 933, 934 [2012]; Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp., 76 AD3d 210, 214 [2010];Grant v Hudson Val. Hosp.Ctr., 55 AD3d 874, 874-875 [2008]). Since the City and the NYCTA did notdemonstrate their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the SupremeCourt properly denied those branches of the motion which were for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, regardless of the sufficiency ofthe plaintiff's opposition [*2]papers (see Winegrad vNew York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).
The defendants' remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Chambers,Cohen and Maltese, JJ., concur.