Howard v Stanger
2014 NY Slip Op 08088 [122 AD3d 1121]
November 20, 2014
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 31, 2014


[*1]
  Gail C. Howard, Individually and as Administrator ofthe Estate of Scott R. Howard, Deceased, Appellant, v Craig Stanger et al.,Respondents.

Freeman Howard, PC, Hudson (Paul M. Freeman of counsel), for appellant.

Feldman Kieffer, LLP, Buffalo (James E. Eagan of counsel), for Craig Stanger andanother, respondents.

O'Connor, O'Connor, Bresee & First, PC, Albany (Justin O'C. Corcoran ofcounsel), for Columbia Memorial Hospital, respondent.

Egan Jr., J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), enteredMarch 27, 2013 in Columbia County, which granted defendants' motions for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint, and (2) from an order of said court (Zwack, J.),entered July 23, 2013 in Columbia County, which denied plaintiff's motion forreconsideration.

On January 29, 2009, Scott R. Howard (hereinafter decedent) became ill whiletestifying at the Columbia County Courthouse. Decedent advised responding emergencyservices personnel that he was suffering from, among other things, back pain andnumbness in his legs and thereafter was transported via ambulance to defendantColumbia Memorial Hospital. Upon his arrival in the hospital's emergency department,decedent relayed his symptoms to the nursing staff, indicating, among other things, thathe had experienced dizziness and a "sudden onset of back discomfort" and that he "felttingling in his legs." While in the emergency department, decedent displayed variousgastrointestinal symptoms, including nausea and vomiting, in response to whichdefendant Craig Stanger, one of the attending physicians on duty that day, orderedmedication to treat decedent's nausea and blood tests to evaluate his condition. Afterspeaking with decedent and reviewing his laboratory results, Stanger dischargeddecedent with a diagnosis of gastroenteritis, acute stress reaction and renal insufficiencyand directed him to follow up with his personal physician. The following day, decedentreturned to the hospital's emergency department in cardiac arrest and, shortly thereafter,died—purportedly as the result of a cardiac tamponade due to a ruptureddissecting thoracic aortic aneurysm.

Plaintiff subsequently commenced this medical malpractice and wrongful deathaction against the hospital, Stanger and Stanger's employer, defendant ColumbiaEmergency Services, P.C. Following joinder of issue and discovery, defendantsseparately moved for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Supreme Court(McGrath, J.) granted defendants' motions, prompting plaintiff to move forreconsideration. Supreme Court (Zwack, J.) denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration,and these appeals by plaintiff ensued.

Beginning with plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, to the extent that such motionsought reargument, no appeal lies from the denial thereof (see Wells Fargo, N.A. v Levin,101 AD3d 1519, 1520 [2012], lv dismissed 21 NY3d 887 [2013]). To theextent that plaintiff sought leave to renew, it is well settled that "a motion to renew mustbe based upon newly discovered evidence which existed at the time the prior motion wasmade, but was unknown to the party seeking renewal, along with a justifiable excuse asto why the new information was not previously submitted" (Matter of Kelly v Director of TRCPrograms, 84 AD3d 1657, 1658 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]; see Premo v Rosa,93 AD3d 919, 920 [2012]). Notably, a motion to renew is "not a second chance toremedy inadequacies that occurred in failing to exercise due diligence in the firstinstance" (Onewest Bank, FSBv Slowek, 115 AD3d 1083, 1083 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]).

Here, plaintiff's motion to renew was based upon her discovery that Stanger's licenseto practice medicine was under a one-year stayed suspension[FN1] at the time that he tendered his affidavitin support of defendants' respective motions.[FN2] As Stanger's license was undersuspension, the argument continues, his affidavit necessarily was insufficient todischarge defendants' initial burden on the motions for summary judgment. Setting aside,for the moment, the overall sufficiency of Stanger's affidavit, the flaw in plaintiff'sargument on this point—viewed in the context of the motion to renew—isthat Stanger's license suspension was effective June 7, 2012, the underlying consentorder entered into between Stanger and the Office of Professional Medical Conduct wasa public document and plaintiff has failed to offer any explanation as to why suchsuspension could not have been discovered with due diligence prior to the point in timethat plaintiff opposed defendants' motions in November 2012. Under thesecircumstances, plaintiff's motion to renew was properly denied (see Vieyra v Penn Toyota, Ltd.,116 AD3d 840, 841-842 [2014]; Webber v Scarano-Osika, 94 AD3d 1304, 1305-1306[2012]; Hoffman v Pelletier,6 AD3d 889, 890 [2004]).

Turning to the merits, "[t]he essential elements of medical malpractice are (1) adeviation or departure from accepted medical practice, and (2) evidence that suchdeparture was a proximate cause of injury" (Wexelbaum v Jean, 80 AD3d 756, 757 [2011] [internalquotation marks and citations omitted]). Here, plaintiff alleged that defendants departedfrom accepted standards of medical care by failing to, among other things, appreciate thesignificance of decedent's symptoms (particularly the sudden onset of back pain),properly interpret the results of his blood tests, consider a differential diagnosis of aorticdissection or aneurysm and order appropriate diagnostic testing—specifically, aCAT scan or transesophageal echocardiogram. Hence, in order to prevail upon theirrespective motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, defendants bore theinitial burden of demonstrating that they did not deviate from accepted standards ofpractice or, if they did so, that such deviation did not cause any injury to decedent (see Cole v Champlain Val.Physicians' Hosp. Med. Ctr., 116 AD3d 1283, 1285 [2014]; Longtemps v Oliva, 110 AD3d1316, 1317 [2013]; LaFountain v Champlain Val. Physicians Hosp. Med. Ctr., 97AD3d 1060, 1061 [2012]). To that end, defendants primarily relied upon Stanger'saffidavit, wherein he discussed the "typical presentation for an aortic dissection and/oraortic aneurysm," delineated decedent's chief complaints and presenting symptoms uponarrival in the hospital's emergency department, recited the results of decedent's bloodwork and explained why he did not believe that further diagnostic testing waswarranted.

To be sure, "a defendant physician's affidavit or affirmation describing the facts inspecific detail and opining that the care provided did not deviate from the applicablestandard of care" may be sufficient to discharge the moving party's initial burden on amotion for summary judgment (Cole v Champlain Val. Physicians' Hosp. Med.Ctr., 116 AD3d at 1285; seeMartino v Miller, 97 AD3d 1009, 1009-1010 [2012]; see also Derusha v Sellig, 92AD3d 1193, 1193-1194 [2012]) and, contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the fact thatStanger's license was under a stayed suspension at the time he prepared the subjectaffidavit does not render his affidavit inadmissible for purposes of the underlyingmotions (cf. Williams vHalpern, 25 AD3d 467, 468 [2006]). Additionally, we find no merit to plaintiff'sclaim that Stanger prepared his affidavit in violation of either the underlying consentorder or the terms of his probation. Although the terms of probation permitted Stanger to"practice medicine only when monitored by a licensed physician, board certified in anappropriate specialty," the terms of probation did not require the practice monitor todirectly supervise Stanger's treatment of patients or, insofar as is relevant here, to reviewor supervise the preparation of Stanger's affidavit. Rather, the terms of probationrequired the practice monitor to visit Stanger's practice on at least a monthly basis and toreview no fewer than 20 of Stanger's patient records in order to determine whetherStanger's medical practice was being conducted in accordance with generally acceptedstandards of care.

That said, we nonetheless are troubled by the fact that Stanger failed to disclose thestatus of his medical license when he prepared his affidavit in support of defendants'motions for summary judgment. The very first paragraph of Stanger's affidavit recites, "Iam a physician duly licensed to practice in the State of New York." Noticeably absentfrom both that opening paragraph and Stanger's affidavit as a whole is any mention of thefact that, only two months earlier, a one-year stayed suspension of his medical licensehad been imposed and that he was practicing medicine subject to certain terms ofprobation. This glaring omission is entirely inconsistent with Stanger's ethical obligationsas a practicing physician and, in our view, seriously calls into question the medicalopinion he has rendered regarding his diagnosis, care and treatment of decedent.Additionally, further review of Stanger's affidavit reveals that the opinion set forththerein was "[b]ased on [Stanger's] review of the [medical] records in this matter, as wellas [his] personal recollection of the care and treatment rendered to [decedent]." In thisregard, Stanger acknowledged that he did not complete his charting of decedent's January29, 2009 hospital visit until after he (1) learned that decedent had returned to theemergency department the following day, (2) was advised that decedent had died, and (3)had been questioned by another physician regarding the care and treatment he hadprovided to decedent the previous day. Under these circumstances, we do not findStanger's affidavit to be sufficient to satisfy defendants' initial burden on the motions forsummary judgment, thereby warranting the denial thereof.

Moreover, even if we were to conclude that Stanger's affidavit was sufficient todischarge defendants' burden in this regard, we would find that plaintiff's proof inopposition was sufficient to raise questions of fact as to whether defendants' diagnosis,care and treatment of decedent deviated from accepted medical practices. Initially, wewould agree that the brief and conclusory affidavit tendered by plaintiff's expert offeredno insight into the manner in which Stanger's diagnosis, care and treatment of decedentdeparted from accepted medical practices and, hence, would be insufficient to raise aquestion of fact (see Longtemps v Oliva, 110 AD3d at 1319; Martino vMiller, 97 AD3d at 1010-1011).[FN3] That said, plaintiff also tenderedStanger's examination before trial testimony, wherein he acknowledged that the "suddenonset of back pain can be a harbinger of bad stuff," including "aortic aneurysm, aorticdissection, heart attack," and decedent's hospital records reflect "a sudden onset of backdiscomfort" accompanied by dizziness and a tingling in decedent's legs while he wastestifying. Similarly, although Stanger testified that decedent did not display certainindicators of an aortic dissection/aneurysm (hypertension) and that some of decedent'snoted symptoms (diarrhea) were "not part of [that] picture," he also testified that nausea,vomiting and numbness or tingling in the legs—all of which decedent didcomplain of or display—either were or could be indicative of an aortic dissectionor aneurysm. Stanger further testified that a CAT scan, which he did not order(purportedly due to decedent's representation that his back pain had resolved), was the"go-to test" for diagnosing this condition. Finally, although Stanger's written dischargesummary indicated that decedent was "feeling better" after he received fluids andanti-nausea medication and was "ok for discharge," Stanger acknowledged, as notedpreviously, that he did not complete his charting of decedent's January 29, 2009 hospitalvisit until after he learned that decedent had returned to the emergency department thefollowing day and died. Accordingly, even assuming that Stanger's affidavit wassufficient to discharge defendants' burden on the subject motions in the first instance, wenonetheless would find that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment dismissingthe complaint.

Peters, P.J., Stein, Rose and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order entered March27, 2013 is reversed, on the law, with costs, and motions denied. Ordered that the orderentered July 23, 2013 is affirmed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:The suspension was theproduct of a consent agreement and order, wherein Stanger agreed—in fullsatisfaction of the charges against him—not to contest the allegations that hecommitted professional misconduct by practicing medicine with negligence on more thanone occasion with respect to his care and treatment of patients A and B in February 2008and September 2008, respectively.

Footnote 2:The hospital expresslyincorporated by reference Stanger's affidavit in support of its summary judgment motion.

Footnote 3:Having previouslyconcluded that plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was properly denied, we would notconsider the supplementary affidavit tendered by plaintiff's expert or the attached autopsyreport.


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