| People v Briggs |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 09010 [123 AD3d 1051] |
| December 24, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Christopher Briggs, Appellant. |
Martin Goldberg, Franklin Square, N.Y., for appellant.
Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Tammy J. Smiley and Sarah S.Rabinowitz of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Robbins, J.), rendered January 29, 2013, convicting him of attempted murder in thesecond degree, assault in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the thirddegree (two counts), and endangering the welfare of a child (two counts), upon his pleaof guilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
To the extent that the defendant claims that his statutory right to a speedy trialpursuant to CPL 30.30 was violated, he forfeited appellate review of this claim bypleading guilty (see People v O'Brien, 56 NY2d 1009, 1010 [1982]; People vHowe, 56 NY2d 622, 624 [1982]; People v Franco, 104 AD3d 790 [2013]; People v Sze, 113 AD3d795, 796 [2014]).
By contrast, an alleged violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial is notforfeited by a plea of guilty (see People v Blakley, 34 NY2d 311, 314 [1974]; see also People v Hanley, 20NY3d 601, 605 n 2 [2013]). The defendant's valid waiver of his right to appeal doesnot foreclose appellate review of his constitutional speedy trial claim (see People v Romeo, 47 AD3d954, 957 [2008], affd 12 NY3d 51 [2009]). "[A] bargained-for waiver of theright to appeal is ineffective to the extent it impairs the defendant's ability to obtainappellate review of a constitutional speedy trial claim" (People v Alexander, 19 NY3d203, 218 [2012]; see People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 282 [1992];People v Blakley, 34 NY2d at 314). Moreover, contrary to the People'scontention, the defendant's constitutional speedy trial claim was properly preserved forappellate review (see People v Watts, 78 AD2d 1008, 1009 [1980]; cf. Peoplev Cedeno, 52 NY2d 847, 848 [1981]; People v Lieberman, 47 NY2d 931,932 [1979]). However, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motionseeking to dismiss the indictment on this ground. His constitutional right to a speedy trialwas not violated by the lapse of approximately 24 months between his arrest and thecommencement of trial, despite the fact that he was incarcerated for this entire period,because much of the delay was directly attributable to the defendant, and not the result ofdilatory tactics by the People. Moreover, the defendant has not demonstrated that thelapse of time resulted in any prejudice to him (see People v Woodard, 234 AD2d613, 614 [1996]; People v Murphy, 212 AD2d 811 [1995]; People vThorpe, 183 AD2d 795, 796 [1992]).
As to the specific allegations of due process violations caused by the practices of the[*2]criminal courts in the County of Nassau, which wereraised for the first time on this appeal, even if this Court were inclined to reach them inthe exercise of its interest of justice jurisdiction, " 'review of [these]constitutional issue[s] is precluded by the lack of an adequate record[,] which it wasdefendant's burden to provide' " (People v Card, 107 AD3d 820 [2013], quoting People v Smith, 48 AD3d1095, 1096 [2008]; see People v Olivo, 52 NY2d 309, 320 [1981];People v James, 188 AD2d 296 [1992]). Balkin, J.P., Leventhal, Hall andHinds-Radix, JJ., concur.