Matter of Loudon House LLC v Town of Colonie
2014 NY Slip Op 09081 [123 AD3d 1406]
December 31, 2014
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 28, 2015


[*1]
 In the Matter of Loudon House LLC et al.,Appellants,
v
Town of Colonie et al., Respondents.

Stockli Slevin & Peters, LLP, Albany (Mary Elizabeth Slevin of counsel), forappellants.

Friedman, Hirschen & Miller, LLP, Albany (Carolyn B. George of counsel), forrespondents.

Clark, J. Appeal from an order and judgment of the Supreme Court (Devine, J.),entered August 20, 2013 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioners' application, in acombined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment,to, among other things, review a determination of respondent Town Board of the Townof Colonie enacting Local Law No. 5 (2012) of the Town of Colonie.

Petitioner Loudon House LLC acquired certain real property in the Town of Colonie,Albany County, upon which it wished to build a 24-unit condominium development. Theproperty was zoned for single family residential use and, in 2007, Loudon House soughtto have the property rezoned and placed in a planned development district where theproject would constitute a permissible use. Respondent Town Board of the Town ofColonie approved the rezoning by way of Local Law No. 12 (2007) of the Town ofColonie, but conditioned the approval upon the property being "developed as amulti-family complex with no more than 24 residential condominium apartment units in1 building." Petitioner BCI Construction, Inc. obtained a building permit for the projectand commenced construction in 2008. The financing for the project evaporated in thewake of the global financial crisis that year, however, and construction ground to a haltwith the building being far from [*2]complete.[FN*]

The prolonged inactivity at the construction site drew the ire of neighbors and, inJune 2012, the Town Board conducted a public hearing to consider its legal options,which included rescinding the property's planned development district designation. BCIConstruction successfully applied for a new building permit in July 2012, allegedly as aprelude to obtaining new financing to complete the project. A skeptical Town Boardcontinued to explore the possibility of restoring the property's original zoning and, after apublic hearing conducted later in July 2012, the Town Board did just that by enactingLocal Law No. 5 (2012) of the Town of Colonie (hereinafter Local Law No. 5).Petitioners thereafter commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and actionfor declaratory judgment, seeking, among other things, to annul Local Law No. 5.Respondents served an answer and further moved to dismiss the proceeding. SupremeCourt dismissed the petition and declared Local Law No. 5 to be valid, prompting thisappeal.

We initially agree with petitioners that Local Law No. 5 must be annulled. "Zoningregulations, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed againstthe municipality which has enacted and seeks to enforce them" (Matter of Hess RealtyCorp. v Planning Commn. of Town of Rotterdam, 198 AD2d 588, 589 [1993][citations omitted]; accordMatter of Albany Basketball & Sports Corp. v City of Albany, 116 AD3d1135, 1137 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 907 [2014]). The Town Board wastherefore obliged to "comply with its own procedural rules regarding enactment of thezoning ordinance" in making amendments to that ordinance (Matter of Sibarco Stas. vTown Bd. of Vestal, 29 AD2d 907, 908 [1968], revd on other grounds 24NY2d 900 [1969]; see Town Law § 264 [1]; Matter of L.F. Letts& Son v City of Cortland, 47 Misc 2d 240, 243 [1965]). Chapter 190 of theCode of the Town of Colonie (hereinafter referred to as Colonie Land Use Law) governsthe creation and rescission of planning development districts, and Local Law No. 12(2007) of the Town of Colonie was enacted pursuant to its terms (see ColonieLand Use Law § 190-65 et seq.). As is relevant here, Colonie LandUse Law § 190-72 permits the Town Board to rescind a planneddevelopment district and restore a property to its prior zoning under limitedcircumstances. The Town Board did not make the factual findings required by section190-72, however, and the Town Attorney made clear that the Town Board was notrelying upon that section in enacting Local Law No. 5. Respondents now argue that thefacts of this case permitted the Town Board to rely upon section 190-72. The factremains that the Town Board did not, however, and "a court reviewing an administrativedetermination must judge the propriety of such action solely on the grounds invoked bythe agency, and if those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless toconfirm on grounds it deems adequate or proper" (Matter of Berchielli v Zoning Bd.of Appeals of Town of Westerlo, 202 AD2d 733, 734 [1994], lv denied 83NY2d 757 [1994]; see Matter ofFriends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Gardiner, 56AD3d 883, 884 [2008]). Thus, the Town Board acted in an arbitrary and capriciousmanner by disregarding the [*3]provisions of the ColonieLand Use Law in enacting Local Law No. 5, and the law cannot be sustained (seeMatter of L.F. Letts & Son v City of Cortland, 47 Misc 2d at 243; see alsoMatter of Law Enforcement Officers Union, Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO vState of New York, 229 AD2d 286, 291 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 807[1997]).

We next consider whether petitioners stated a claim for damages premised uponrespondents' violation of 42 USC § 1983. Petitioners specifically assert thatrespondents violated their federal constitutional rights to substantive due process andequal protection (see US Const 5th, 14th Amends). With regard to petitioners'due process claim, it must be shown that petitioners have "a vested property interest"impinged upon by Local Law No. 5 and that the law's passage "was wholly without legaljustification" (Bower Assoc. vTown of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d 617, 627 [2004]). Petitioners allege, and we willassume, that Loudon House has a vested property interest that was impacted by LocalLaw No. 5. That being said, the petition/complaint does not allege, and nothing in therecord suggests, that the actions of the Town Board rose to the level of a constitutionalviolation, i.e., that they were "so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse ofgovernmental authority" (Natale v Town of Ridgefield, 170 F3d 258, 263 [2d Cir1999]). Accordingly, the Town Board did not engage in the type of "egregious conduct"that would support a claim under 42 USC § 1983 (Bower Assoc. vTown of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d at 630; see Harlen Assoc. v Incorporated Vil. ofMineola, 273 F3d 494, 505 [2d Cir 2001]; Kreamer v Town of Oxford, 91 AD3d 1157, 1160[2012]).

Turning to the purported Equal Protection Clause violation, petitioners do not assertthat they are members of a suspect class or that they have been deprived of a fundamentalright. Accordingly, a violation of their right to equal protection will not support a claimfor damages unless they were treated differently from similarly situated entities due to a"malicious or bad faith intent to injure" on the part of respondents (Bower Assoc. vTown of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d at 631). Petitioners did not allege the existence ofsuch an intent in their petition/complaint, and it cannot be inferred from the proof in therecord (see Harlen Assoc. v Incorporated Vil. of Mineola, 273 F3d at 500-503;Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d at 632). Thus, Supreme Courtproperly dismissed those claims founded upon 42 USC § 1983.

To the extent that petitioners' remaining contentions have not been renderedacademic in light of the foregoing, they have been considered and found to be lackingmerit.

McCarthy, J.P., Garry and Lynch, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order and judgment ismodified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as declared Local LawNo. 5 (2012) of the Town of Colonie to be valid; petition granted to that extent andLocal Law No. 5 (2012) of the Town of Colonie is declared invalid and is annulled; and,as so modified, affirmed.

Footnotes


Footnote *:At oral argument, theparties disclosed that the project had been completed and some of the units wereoccupied. Notwithstanding those facts, because issues remain as to the permissible futureuses of the property under the terms of another local law enacted in 2012 and whetherpetitioners are entitled to damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, we agreewith petitioners that the present appeal is not moot (see e.g. Matter of Langer vRaymond, 267 AD2d 790, 791 [1999]).


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