| Drakh v Levin |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 09101 [123 AD3d 1084] |
| December 31, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Andrey Drakh, Appellant, v Boris Levin et al.,Defendants, and Eric David Cacciamani et al., Respondents. |
William Pager, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Partnow, J.), dated June 18, 2013, whichdenied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability insofar as assertedagainst the defendants Eric David Cacciamani and Irene K. Cacciamani.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
This case arises from a three-vehicle, chain reaction accident. The plaintiff, who wasoperating the lead vehicle, commenced this action against the defendant Boris Levin, theowner of the middle vehicle, the defendant Julia Levin, the operator of the middlevehicle, the defendant Eric David Cacciamani, the operator of the rear-most vehicle, andthe defendant Irene K. Cacciamani, the owner of the rear-most vehicle. The plaintiffmoved for summary judgment on the issue of liability insofar as asserted against EricDavid Cacciamani and Irene K. Cacciamani (hereinafter together the Cacciamanis),contending that his vehicle was slowing down for a red traffic light when it was struck inthe rear by the Levin vehicle, which was propelled into his vehicle when the Levinvehicle was struck in the rear by the Cacciamanis' vehicle. The Supreme Court denied themotion.
"The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than isreasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the trafficupon and the condition of the highway" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]; see Billis v Tunjian,120 AD3d 1168 [2014]; Sehgal v www.nyairportsbus.com, Inc., 100 AD3d 860,860 [2012]; Napolitano vGalletta, 85 AD3d 881, 882 [2011]). Hence, a rear-end collision with a stoppedor stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of theoperator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference ofnegligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Raimondo v Plunkitt, 102AD3d 851, 852 [2013]; Kertesz v Jason Transp. Corp., 102 AD3d 658, 658 [2013];Perez v Roberts, 91 AD3d620, 621 [2012]). "A nonnegligent explanation includes, but is not limited to,'sudden or unavoidable circumstances' " (D'Agostino v YRC, Inc., 120 AD3d 1291, 1292 [2014],quoting Gambino v City of New York, 205 AD2d 583, 583 [1994]).
Here, the plaintiff established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law bydemonstrating that his vehicle was slowing down for a red traffic light when it wasstruck in the rear by the Levin vehicle, which had been propelled into the plaintiff'svehicle when, due to the alleged [*2]negligence of EricDavid Cacciamani, the Cacciamanis' vehicle struck the rear of the Levin vehicle (see Strickland v Tirino, 99AD3d 888, 890 [2012]). In opposition, however, the Cacciamanis submittedevidence that contradicted the plaintiff's version of the accident, raising triable issues offact as to whether Eric David Cacciamani had a nonnegligent explanation for thecollision and whether the plaintiff was comparatively at fault in the happening of theaccident (see Tutrani v Countyof Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 [2008]; Denezzo v Joseph, 95 AD3d 1060, 1060-1061[2012]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly denied the plaintiff's motion for summaryjudgment on the issue of liability insofar as asserted against the Cacciamanis. Skelos,J.P., Dickerson, Austin and Maltese, JJ., concur.