| People v Grant |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 50380(U) [42 Misc 3d 1236(A)] |
| Decided on March 17, 2014 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County |
| Qui�ones, J. |
| As corrected in part through March 25,2014; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
The People ofthe State of New York against Keith Grant, Defendant. |
2013KN081259
Appearances of Counsel:
Gregory Gomez, Esq., for the Defendant
Kathleen Murphy, Esq., for the People
Joanne D. Qui�ones, J.
Defendant is charged with Criminal Impersonation in the SecondDegree, in violation of Penal Law (P.L.) section 190.25 (3), Stalking in the FourthDegree, in violation of P.L. section 120.45 (1), and Harassment in the Second Degree,P.L. sections 240.26 (1), (2) and (3). Defendant moves for dismissal of the accusatoryinstrument on the grounds that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial pursuant toCriminal Procedure Law (C.P.L.) sections 30.30 and 170.30.
The factual allegations state, in pertinent part, that on October 21, 2013, atapproximately 7:50 AM in Kings County:
The deponent [ADA James Slatterly] is informed by Jerry Williams that ...while informant was driving ... and upon picking up a passenger and driving away, thedefendant, while driving a white Chevrolet Tahoe ... followed behind before cutting offinformant's vehicle, preventing informant from travelling [sic] any further and defendantdid state to informant in sum and substance that defendant is a police officer, thatdefendant is armed with a firearm, that informant was under arrest and that defendantwas authorized ... to take pictures of informant.
Deponent isfurther informed by informant that when informant attempted to drive away defendantfollowed informant ... for approximately 20 minutes along public streets and repeatedlyflashed defendant's lights at informant.
In this case, the highest crimecharged against the defendant is a class A misdemeanor (see P.L. §190.25).Class A misdemeanors are punishable by a sentence of imprisonment not to exceed oneyear (P.L. §70.15). Where a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishableby a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months, a speedy trial motion must begranted where the People are not ready for trial within 90 days of commencement of thecriminal action (C.P.L. §30.30 [1][b]).
The defendant has the initial burden of showing, through sworn allegations of fact,that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time allotted by the statute(People v. Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986]). Once the defendant has made thatshowing, the People bear the burden [*2]ofdemonstrating sufficient excludable time in order to withstand a motion to dismiss(id.).
Based on a review of the official court file, the submissions of the parties, and theofficial minutes of the calendar call on December 10, 2013, the court finds as follows:
October 22, 2013 - December 10, 201338 days
On October 22, 2013, defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint andreleased on his own recognizance. Defendant was represented at that time by the LegalAid Society (L.A.S.). The matter was adjourned to December 10, 2013, for conversion.
On October 25, 2013, privately retained counsel, Gregory G. Gomez, filed with thecourt a Notice of Appearance. There is no indication that private counsel served eitherL.A.S. or the District Attorney's office with his Notice of Appearance, nor does he assertthat he did.
On November 27, 2013, the People served on L.A.S. the supporting depositionrequired to convert the complaint together with a Statement of Readiness (SOR). ThePeople also filed the supporting deposition and SOR with the court on November 29,2013. It is undisputed that the supporting deposition and SOR were not served on privatecounsel Gomez.
The People are ready for trial when they communicate their actual readiness in opencourt
or file with the court and serve on defense counsel a certificate of actualreadiness, at a time when the People are in fact ready to proceed (see People v.Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 (1985). There is no question that the SOR filed with thecourt on November 29, 2013, " accurately conveyed the People's readiness to proceedwith their case against the defendant ' " (see People v. Dixon, 40 Misc 391229[A], *2 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2013]). The question here, however, is whether, byserving the SOR on L.A.S., the People effectively communicated their trial readiness todefense counsel.
Defendant argues that the SOR was served on the wrong defense counsel and is thusineffective. In support of his position, the defendant cites several cases includingPeople v. Telemaque, 36 Misc 3d 1239[A] (Crim Ct, Kings County 2012),People v. Stewart, 873 NYS2d 236 (Crim Ct, NY County 2008), and Peoplev. Chittumuri, 189 Misc 2d 743 (Crim Ct, Queens County 2001), where the courtheld that the People's service of an SOR on defendant's former counsel was ineffective.
The cases cited by the defendant, while numerous, are in apposite and thus, notpersuasive. In all of the cases cited by the defendant, the prosecution had actual notice ofnew counsel. For example, in People v. Stewart, supra, the court assignednew counsel on the record and in the presence of the People. In People v.Chittumuri, supra, new counsel appeared on the record in the presence of anAssistant District Attorney. Similarly, n People v. Telemaque, supra, newcounsel appeared on the record, in open court, in the presence of an Assistant DistrictAttorney, indicated that he was "newly retained" and handed the People his business cardwith his contact information. In another case cited by the defense, People v.Jordan, 153 AD2d 263 (2nd Dept 1990), the defendant was represented by L.A.S.for the purposes of "arraignment only." The court file indicated that the defendant wasrepresented by L.A.S. for the limited purposes of arraignment and further indicated thatthe defendant was going to retain his own attorney. The Court found that, under thosecircumstances, the People were on notice that L.A.S. was not the attorney to whom theyshould send any notice of a Grand Jury presentation.
The People submit that service on L.A.S. was proper because the People were notaware of a change in defendant's counsel until the calendar call of December 10, 2013.The People [*3]submit that prior to December 10, 2013,the People had no notice of a change in counsel as defendant had not provided thePeople with notice of a change of attorney pursuant to Civil Procedure Law and Rules(C.P.L.R.) section 321(b)(1), nor had prior counsel L.A.S. been relieved or changed byofficial court order pursuant to CPLR section 321(b)(2).[FN1] The People rely heavily on Peoplev. Almarales, 2002 WL 31995811 (Sup Ct, Kings County 2002), where the courtfound that service of an SOR on prior counsel satisfied the notice requirement inKendzia. In Almarales, the court held that where retained counsel filed aNotice of Appearance, and entered her name and address for the record, but did nototherwise "communicate to anyone that [prior counsel] had been effectively dismissed asdefendant's attorney," the People could not be faulted for serving prior counsel with thestatement of readiness (Almarales, 2002 WL 31995811 at*5-6). It found that"[t]o hold otherwise would impose an unreasonable burden on the People to ascertain atevery critical stage of the proceedings whether defendant's last known attorney hasremained on the case" (id. at*6).
22 New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (N.Y.C.C.R.) section 200.5 providesthat "[e]ach attorney appearing in a criminal action is required to file a written notice ofappearance on or before the time of the attorney's first appearance in court or not laterthan 10 days after appointment or retainer, whichever is sooner ... ." Notwithstanding theprovisions of CPLR section 321(b), which is cited by the People, "common custom andpractice in Criminal Courts of NYC recognize the substitution of counsel [when anattorney appears on the record and/or files a Notice of Appearance] without the formalityof the Court uttering the words prior counsel is relieved' " (Telemaque, 36 Misc3d 1239[A] at *2, n2). Moreover, courts have consistently held that "when the People areon notice that a new attorney has been assigned to represent a defendant, or a newattorney was retained and has appeared and become the attorney of record and filed a notice of appearance,' service of the certificate of readiness on the prior attorney will notautomatically satisfy the Kendzia requirement that defense counsel' be promptlynotified of the People's readiness (see, e.g., People v. Burroughs, 35 Misc 3d1209[A] *3, [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2012] [service of SOR on prior institutionaldefender found sufficient where new institutional defender, who represented defendanton older case and appeared on behalf of defendant on two consecutive adjourn dates ininstant case, had not filed a notice of appearance or otherwise requested to be assigned asattorney of record]).
Here, there is no question that newly retained counsel filed a notice of appearancewith the court and that he did so within ten days of having been retained and three daysafter defendant's arraignment. The question thus becomes were the People "on notice" ofprivate defense counsel's substitution in the case? The court answers this question in thenegative. Where, as here, new counsel files a notice of appearance solely with the courtin between adjourn dates and does not alert the People of his or her status as newattorney of record, the People can [*4]not be faulted forserving prior counsel with the SOR (see Almarales, 2002 WL 31995811 at*5-6).The People are not required to repeatedly check the court file to ascertain whetheroriginal counsel has remained on the case or new counsel has been retained as such arequirement "would impose an unreasonable burden on the People" (id. at*6).
Accordingly, the court finds that the People's act in filing and serving an SOR onL.A.S., the counsel who represented the defendant as attorney of record on the courtappearance prior to the People's service of the SOR and supporting deposition and theonly counsel of whom the People were aware, was effective under Kendzia andserved to toll the speedy trial clock for the remainder of the adjournment (People v.Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434, 440 [1998]). The People are thus only charged with theperiod that preceded their declaration of readiness, in this case, thirty-eight (38)days.
December 10, 2013 - January 23, 20140 days
On December 10, 2013, the People answered ready and stated that an SOR andsupporting deposition were filed and served off-calendar on November 29, 2013. Mr.Gomez then advised the court that he had been retained and filed a notice of appearanceon October 25, 2013, but had not received "the supporting deposition nor otherpaperwork." The minutes reflect that the judge presiding in the part inquired as towhether the matter should be adjourned for conversion, to which defense counsel Gomezanswered "yes" (see Minutes of October 10, 2013, page 2, lines 18 - 19). Thematter was then adjourned to January 23, 2014, for conversion.[FN2]
The misdemeanor complaint here, however, was already converted. As discussedabove, the complaint was properly converted when the People filed with the court andserved on defense counsel, L.A.S., the supporting deposition of the informant.Accordingly, the People's declaration of readiness made on the record and in thepresence of new defense counsel on December 10, 2013, was a valid statement ofreadiness as the People "[had] done all that was required of them to do to bring the caseto a point where it may be tried" (see People v. England, 84 NY2d 1, 4 [1994]).This adjournment is thus excludable because the People answered ready on the record inthe presence of defense counsel (see People v Cajigas, 224 AD2d 370, 372 [1stDept 1996], app den 88 NY2d 845 [1996]).
January 23, 2014 - March 17, 20140 days
On January 23, 2014, the defendant filed and served the instant motion todismiss the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds. The court directed the Peopleto file and serve their response off-calendar by January 30, 2014, and adjourned thematter to March 17, 2014, for [*5]decision. Anadjournment for motion practice and the period during which defendant's motion is"under consideration by the court" is excludable (C.P.L. §30.30[4][a] seePeople v. Shannon, 143 AD2d 572, 572-573 [1st Dept], lv den 73 NY2d 860[1988] [time while speedy trial motion under consideration by court isexcludable]).
CONCLUSION
In total, the People are charged with 38 days, which does not exceed theallowable time set forth in C.P.L. section 30.30 (1) (b). Accordingly, defendant's motionto dismiss the accusatory instrument for lack of a speedy trial is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated:March 17, 2014_____________________________
Brooklyn, New York
Hon. Joanne D. Quiñones
J.C.C.
Footnote 1: C.P.L.R. section 321(b)provides:
Change or withdrawal of attorney. 1. ... an attorney of record may bechanged by filing with the clerk a consent to the change signed by the retiring attorneyand signed and acknowledged by the party. Notice of such change of attorney shall begiven to the attorney for all parties in the action ... . 2. An attorney of record maywithdraw or be changed by order of the court in which the action is pending, uponmotion on such notice to the client of the withdrawing attorney, to the attorneys of allother parties in the action ... .
Footnote 2: A close reading of theminutes does not lead this court to believe that the judge then presiding was making adefinitive ruling on the issue of conversion or trial readiness. Further, this court is notbound by calendar notations or interim markings made by other judges as such adetermination is to be made when a defendant moves to dismiss on speedy trial grounds(People v. Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 348-349 [1980] People v. Gordon,31 Misc 3d 1231[A] [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2011] People v. Ashkinadze, 167Misc 2d 80, 83 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1995]).
Moreover, the "law of the case doctrine" is applicable only in those instanceswhere the parties have had an opportunity to fully litigate the issue in controversy, andquestions of law have been "squarely decided" (People v.
Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 502 [2000] People v. Lambert, 2002 NYSlip Op 50278 [U] [Crim Ct, NY County 2002]). An issue is not considered fullylitigated until it has been addressed in written submissions, with notice and opportunityfor response. Rulings speedily made from the bench without the benefit of writtensubmissions are not generally deemed fully litigated (People v. Portorreal, 28 Misc 3d 388, 392 n3 [Crim Ct,Queens County 2010]).