[*1]
People v Branch
2014 NY Slip Op 51297(U) [44 Misc 3d 1224(A)]
Decided on August 7, 2014
Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County
Montelione, J.
As corrected in part through January 13, 2016; it will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on August 7, 2014
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County


The People ofthe State of New York

against

David Branch, Defendant.




2014KN003357



For the People: Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney (By DanielCostello, Esq.



For David Branch: The Legal Aid Society (By Anne Oredeko, Esq.)


Richard J. Montelione, J.

Defendant moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument herein, pursuant to CPL§ 170.30, as facially insufficient. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's motionto dismiss the count alleging violation of VTL § 511(1)(a) is granted. Although notincluded in Defendant's Notice of Motion, his papers also contain an argument thatcertain statements he allegedly made be precluded because of the People's failure toprovide timely notice pursuant to CPL § 710.30(1)(a). Although the preclusionargument is now moot with regard to the VTL § 511(1)(a) charge, because theCourt's file notations show that statement notice was served and filed at arraignment, andthe file contains a copy of such notice, there were never any grounds to seek such relieffor that charge. To the extent the argument to dismiss was considered regarding theremaining VTL 509(1) charge, it is denied.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the afternoon of January 12, 2014, the arresting officer responded to the scene ofan accident. Defendant allegedly was one of the drivers involved in the accident. Thearresting officer ran a computer check of the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV")driving records and learned that Defendant's driving privileges had been suspended forfailure to pay child support. Defendant was arrested and charged with violating VTL§ 509(1) (Unlicensed Operator, a violation) and VTL § 511(1)(a) (AggravatedUnlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree, an unclassifiedmisdemeanor).

RELEVANTSTATUTES

VTL § 509(1) provides "no person shall operate or drive a motor vehicle upon apublic highway of this state . . . unless he is duly licensed pursuant to the provisions ofthis chapter." A violation of this section is not a crime, and is punishable by "a fine of notless than seventy-five [*2]nor more than three hundreddollars, or by imprisonment for not more than fifteen days. . . ." VTL §509(11).

A violation of VTL § 511(1)(a), however, is an unclassified misdemeanor. Aviolation of the section has a mandatory punishment set forth in VTL § 511(1)(b):"(i) a fine of not less than two hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, or (ii)a term of imprisonment of not more than thirty days, or (iii) both such fine andimprisonment."

Because of these increased, and mandatory, punishments, the law places a greaterburden on the prosecution to charge and prove a case under VTL § 511(1)(a) thanunder VTL § 509(1). VTL 511(1)(a) provides:



A person is guilty of the offense of aggravated unlicensed operation of amotor vehicle in the third degree when such person operates a motor vehicle upon apublic highway while knowing or having reason to know that such person's license oroperating such motor vehicle in this state . . . is suspended, revoked or otherwisewithdrawn by the commissioner.



There are two essential elements that must be proven for a person to befound guilty of this offense. First, his or her license must have been suspended, revokedor otherwise withdrawn, and second, he or she operated a motor vehicle "while knowingor having reason to know" of such suspension, revocation or withdrawal.

CPL § 100.40 provides, in relevant part, that an information is sufficient on itsface when the "[n]on-hearsay allegations of the factual part of the information and/or ofany supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged andthe defendant's commission thereof." CPL § 100.40(1)(c).

At arraignment, the People filed a complaint sworn to by the arresting officer. In it,the officer avers (1) that his check of the DMV records showed that Defendant's licensehad been suspended for failure to pay child support, and (2) that the DMV mails a noticeof suspension to "any such person at their last known address." The People also filed acopy of Defendant's driving record abstract. That abstract reflects that Defendant'sdriver's license had been suspended on May 6, 2011, for failure to pay child support.

The abstract contains the following certification:



This is to certify that this document is a true and complete copy of anelectronic record on file in the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, Albany,New York. The record was made in the regular course of New York State Department ofMotor Vehicles daily business. It is the business of the New York State Department ofMotor Vehicles to create and maintain the records of drivers in the state of New York.Entries in this document are made at the time the recorded transactions or events tookplace or within a reasonable time thereafter. The person who reports the information isunder a business duty to do so accurately.



The abstract adequately supports the arresting officer's sworn statement thatDefendant's license had been suspended for failure to pay child support, and in turn,provides non-hearsay support for the first element of the offense charged — i.e.,that Defendant's license had been suspended. E.g., People v. Brown, 15 Misc 3d1143 (A) (Crim. Ct. NY County 2007). It does not, however, appear to support thesecond element of the offense charged — i.e., that Defendant knew or had reasonto know of such suspension, which is clearly not within the arresting officer's personalknowledge. Therefore, unless the People can establish non-hearsay support for thissecond element, the complaint is insufficient on its face to plead a violation of VTL§ 511(1)(a).

Although at first blush, it may appear that requiring non-hearsay evidence that adefendant "knew" of a suspension imposes an impossible burden of showing "scienter"before conversion, the statutory standard of "knowing or having reason to know" aboutthe suspension is an objective standard.

Both sides direct the Court to VTL § 214 and lines of cases interpreting thatsection. VTL § 214 may provide assistance in determining whether the scienterrequirement of VTL § 511(1)(a) has been satisfied. VTL § 214 provides:



The production of a copy of the notice of suspension or revocation togetherwith an electronically-generated record of entry of the suspension or revocation upon theappropriate driver's license or registration file of the department and an affidavit by anemployee designated by the commissioner as having responsibility for the issuance ofsuch suspension or revocation setting forth the procedure for the issuance and themailing of such notice of suspension or revocation shall be presumptive evidence thatsuch notice of suspension or revocation was produced and mailed in accordance withsuch procedures.



Thus, at trial, the People may establish that a defendant knew or should haveknown that his license had been suspended by filing, in addition to the DMV abstract, acopy of the notice allegedly sent to the defendant, along with an affidavit from anemployee of the DMV setting forth the DMV's procedures for issuing and mailing suchnotices. The statute, does not however, address whether this procedure also applies indetermining whether a complaint has been converted to an information pursuant to CPL§ 100.40. As discussed below, the courts have divided on this point.

APPLICABILITY OF VTL § 214 AT THEPLEADING

STAGE

A number of courts have specifically approved this procedure at the pleading stageto convert a complaint into an information. People v. J.T., 13 Misc 3d 1212(A) (Crim. Ct. NY County2006); People v. Pabon, 167 Misc 2d 214 (Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1995);People v. Garcia, 163 Misc 2d 862, (Crim. Ct. Bronx County 1989). Seealso, People v. Meyer, 177 Misc 2d 537 (App. Term. 2d Dept. 1998).Although this leaves open the question of whether the People must use this or some otherprocedure to properly plead scienter, the People must always provide non-hearsayevidence (or evidence which is an exception to the hearsay rule) regarding whether thedefendant knew or "should have known" his or her license had been suspended,e.g., an admission by defendant, a plea taken in open court, or correspondencesent to defendant showing notice of suspension. This is because non-hearsay evidencethat defendant "should have known" of a suspension will always provide an inferencethat defendant knew of the suspension, which satisfies whatever scienter requirement isneeded for conversion.

Cases Holding Scienter Is ATrial Issue

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Some reported cases hold that a complaint charging VTL § 511(1) will beproperly converted as long as the driving abstract shows that the defendant's license hadbeen suspended. Essentially, these cases leave the scienter element as a matter of proof tobe made at trial.

For example, in People v. Gabriel, 164 Misc 2d 473 (Crim. Ct. QueensCounty 1995), the court found that "the defendant's knowledge that his privilege to drivehad been suspended is a question of fact at the time of trial and the satisfaction ofVehicle and Traffic Law § 214 is not a prerequisite for the conversion of amisdemeanor complaint to an information." Id. at 476. This case supports thecontention that scienter need only be established at trial, and need not be supported bynon-hearsay at the pleading stage.

In People v. Etienne, 192 Misc 2d 90 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 2002),followed Gabriel, supra. The Etienne court held that:



since [VTL § 214] allows for the presumption of this element of"knowing or having reason to know" it is an issue of fact to be determined at trial.



This is a much more acceptable interpretation Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 511(2)(a)(iv) and § 214 than has been presented by other courts. Typically,Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511(2)(a)(iv) misdemeanor information are dismissedbecause the scienter element is too burdensome to prove for purposes of conversion.However based on the obvious intent of the Legislature in its providing both the hearsayexception to service and the statutory presumption of scienter, this court has chosen toenforce the law. It should be noted, regardless of the statutorily created tools, that theconstitutional rights of the defendant are still preserved by allowing him to confrontwitnesses at trial with regard to the issues of service and notice.



192 Misc 2d at 95 — 96.

In one of the few appellate decisions discussing the appropriate pleading standard forcases arising under VTL § 511(1)(a), the Appellate Term, Second Department heldthat because all traffic summonses contain a warning that "If you don't answer this ticketby mail within 15 days your license will be suspended," an allegation that the arrestingofficer conducted a check of DMV records and learned that the defendant's license hadbeen suspended for failure to answer or appear in response a traffic summons wassufficient to satisfy the non-hearsay requirement of CPL § 100.40. People v. Benitez, 44 Misc 3d129(A) (App. Term, 2d Dept. 2014). Benitez involved a license suspendedfor failure to answer a traffic summons that on its face noted failure to do so wouldnecessarily engender a license suspension. The Appellate Term did not, however, addressthe situation where a license was suspended for a reason other than failure to respond to atraffic summons.Cases Holding That Scienter Must BeAlleged and Supported in the Information

Other cases hold that VTL § 214, while it provides a way for the prosecution toestablish a presumption of scienter at trial, does not relieve the People of providingnon-hearsay allegations regarding scienter in an information.

For example, in People v. Carlsons, 171 Misc 2d 943 (Sup. Ct. NassauCounty 1997), the court reviewed grand jury minutes, and permitted the case to proceedon several of the charges against the defendant. However, it dismissed the charge ofviolation of VTL § 511(1) because in support of that charge, the district attorneyhad submitted only a driving abstract. The court held that



the DMV abstract . . . in and of itself, is insufficient proof of the defendant'sknowledge of the suspension. Because of the absence of any affidavit concerning theprocedure for mailing the notice of the suspension to the driver whose license wassuspended, there was no evidence presented to the Grand Jury concerning the defendant'sknowledge that his license was suspended. Accordingly the third count is legallyinsufficient and must be dismissed.



171 Misc 2d at 945.

In People v. J.T., 13Misc 3d 1212(A) (Crim. Ct. NY County 2006), the court dismissed the VTL §511(1)(a) charge against the defendant. The court noted that the "resolution of the [*3]motion turns on whether the documents submitted by thePeople are sufficient to corroborate the allegation in the complaint that defendant knewor had reason to know his license to drive had been suspended or revoked, which is anessential element of aggravated unlicensed operation." The court held that the abstractalone could not satisfy the scienter requirement but noted that it was not placing anundue burden on the People:



Thus, when charging a defendant with violating any subsection of VTLSection 511, the People need only file, in addition to the usual DMV abstract, a copy ofthe notice allegedly sent to the defendant, together with an affidavit from an employee ofthe DMV setting forth the DMV's procedures for issuing and mailing such notices.Courts have approved the use of this procedure at the pleading stage to convert thecomplaint into an information.



13 Misc 3d 1212(A) at 3 (citations omitted).

In People v. Brown, 15Misc 3d 1143 (A) (Crim. Ct. NY County 2007), defendant Gonzalez was chargedwith violating VTL § 511(1). On facts very much like those in the case at bar, thecomplaint alleged that a computer check by the arresting officer had revealed thatdefendant Gonzalez's license had been suspended for failure to pay child support. Thecomplaint alleged that the DMV sends a notice prior to suspending a license for failure topay child support. The court held, however, that "these allegations, while providingreasonable cause to believe that defendant had reason to know of the suspension, arenevertheless hearsay, and thus insufficient." Id. The court, therefore, dismissedthe charges because no affidavit or documentation was provided showing that the noticehad been mailed to the defendant.

People v. Acevedo, 27 Misc 3d 889 (Crim. Ct. NY County 2010) appears tobe on all fours with the case at bar. In Acevedo, the defendant's license had beensuspended for failure to pay child support. The court held:



Defendant's license was not suspended for failure to answer a trafficsummons, but rather for his alleged failure to answer a notice sent by the DMV. Yet thePeople failed to provide a copy of this notice, or an affidavit from an employee of theDMV setting forth the DMV's procedure for issuing and mailing such notices. As withdefendant Gonzalez in Brown, supra, the only allegation supporting theelement that Defendant had knowledge of his license being suspended is Police OfficerCheca's "belief" based upon a computer check of DMV records. Because this allegationis based on facts of which Officer Checa has not personal knowledge, we find that thecount of Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle has been insufficientlyalleged.



27 Misc 3d at 894 — 95.

LEGALANALYSIS

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On balance, the Court is persuaded by the line of cases holding thatnon-hearsay evidence that defendant knew or should have known of his suspension mustbe properly alleged and supported before a complaint can be converted to an information.Not all cases will require affidavits of the sort contemplated by VTL § 214. Forexample, if the defendant had previously taken a plea that encompassed a licensesuspension, he would have knowledge of that suspension, and a supporting affidavit orminutes of the allocution would suffice. If a defendant admitted, when stopped by thepolice or at any other time, that he knew his license had been suspended, he would haveknowledge of the suspension, and a supporting affidavit likewise will convert thecomplaint to an information. There might well be other exceptions to the hearsay rulethat the People could rely on to establish that a defendant knew, or had reason to know,that [*4]his license had been suspended.



Here, however, the People did not attempt to convert the complaint to aninformation using any documents other than the DMV abstract. The DMV abstract showsthat Defendant's license was, in fact, suspended for failure to pay child support. Theabstract gives no information regarding Defendant's receiving any notice of suspension.They may not, therefore, avail themselves of the presumption contained in VTL §214. Nor have the People attempted to establish Defendant's knowledge in any otherfashion, let alone with non-hearsay evidence or by way of an exception to the hearsayrule. This failure is fatal, and must result in dismissal of VTL § 511(1)(a).

The Court is not persuaded by the cases cited by the People. In its view, thosecases turn primarily on convenience to the prosecution. For example, in Etienne,the court noted "[t]ypically, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511(2)(a)(iv) misdemeanorinformations are dismissed because the scienter element is too burdensome to prove forpurposes of conversion." 192 Misc 2d at 95. See also, People v. Gabriel,164 Misc 2d 473 (Crim. Ct. Queens County 1995).

On the other hand, the Court agrees completely with the holding in People v.Acevedo, supra. Unlike a suspension that follows from failure to respond to atraffic summons, a suspension for failure to pay child support depends on procedures ofthe DMV that are not within the personal knowledge of an arresting officer.



While one commentator has referred to the burdens placed on theprosecution by VTL § 511(1) as a "nightmare," (see, Practice Commentaryto VTL § 214 in McKinney's Consol. Laws of NY [2005]), the section is not anightmare or even a bad dream. Evidence of a non-hearsay nature, or evidence which isan exception to the hearsay rule can certainly be used to convert the complaint to aninformation. Through the objective standard showing that defendant "should haveknown" of the suspension, scienter can be inferred, and the complaint converted underboth the scienter standard (defendant knew of the suspension) and the objectivereasonable person standard (defendant should have known of the suspension).



Of course, this decision only deals with the issue of conversion, and thePeople continue to have the burden of proving all elements of the charges beyond areasonable doubt. As discussed, the People failed to provide an affidavit pursuant toVTL § 214 showing Defendant received notice of his suspension, or any number ofother devices, to convert the complaint to an information, which would also establish aprima facie showing that Defendant "knew or should have known" of hissuspension.



Ultimately, scienter is a trial issue. But the right of a defendant to beprosecuted on an information that contains no hearsay allegations is fundamental.People v. Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 (1987).

In short, the Court finds that the complaint herein contains only hearsay allegationsregarding Defendant's knowledge whether his license had been suspended. As such, it isfacially insufficient to plead a violation of VTL § 511(1)(a).



CONCLUSION



For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge ofviolation of VTL § 511(1)(a) is granted. The motion to preclude Defendant'sstatements contained within the notice filed at arraignment is denied. This opinion shallconstitute the Decision and Order of the Court.



Dated: Brooklyn, New York___________________________

RICHARD J. MONTELIONE,

Judge, Criminal Court




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