LM Bus. Assoc., Inc. v State of New York
2015 NY Slip Op 00007 [124 AD3d 1215]
January 2, 2015
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 4, 2015


[*1]
 LM Business Associates, Inc., et al., Respondents, vState of New York, Appellant. (Claim No. 107559.)

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Paul Groenwegen of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.

Finucane and Hartzell, LLP, Pittsford (Leo G. Finucane of counsel), forclaimants-respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims (Nicholas V. Midey, Jr., J.), enteredAugust 12, 2013. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, determined that defendantwas liable to claimants for conversion and negligent misrepresentation.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment insofar as appealed from is unanimouslyreversed on the law without costs and the amended claim is dismissed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment, entered following a nonjury trialon the issue of liability, in which the Court of Claims determined that defendant is liableto claimants for conversion and negligent misrepresentation. In 2000 and 2001, the StateInsurance Fund, the State Police, and the Workers' Compensation Board conducted aninvestigation into suspected fraudulent activities by a group of affiliated businesses,including claimants, that were owned and operated in the Village of Palmyra, WayneCounty, by, inter alia, nonparty Mark Boerman. As part of that investigation, a StatePolice investigator sought a warrant to search claimants' offices and to seize any relevantevidence found therein. Attached to the warrant application was an appendix that, interalia, set forth certain general considerations for determining whether any particularcomputer within the purview of the warrant would be "remove[d] from the premises" for"process[ing] by a qualified computer specialist in a laboratory setting," or whether itwould be analyzed on site without the need for removal therefrom.

County Court (Sirkin, J.) granted the application in full and issued the warrant onApril 4, 2001, and the warrant was executed the next day. Insofar as relevant on appeal, anumber of computers were seized from claimants' premises. It is undisputed that thosecomputers were integral to the operation of claimants' businesses. Over one year later, inSeptember 2002, Boerman was indicted on 19 counts of offering a false instrument forfiling in the first degree (Penal Law § 175.35) and 19 counts of workers'compensation fraud (Workers' Compensation Law § 114). Boermanthereafter pleaded guilty in March 2003 to one count of offering a false instrument forfiling in the first degree in full satisfaction of the indictment, and he was sentenced toprobation. Claimants were never charged.

Following his sentencing, Boerman moved for an order in County Court for thereturn of the seized computers. The motion was granted in April 2003, and County Courtdirected that the computers be returned to Boerman "as soon as practicable." Thecomputers were returned within several months. Notably, despite the allegation thatclaimants' businesses failed in 2001 because they did not have their necessary computers,neither Boerman nor claimants had previously filed an application seeking the return ofthe seized computers.

Claimants thereafter commenced the instant action seeking damages for, inter alia,conversion of the seized computers, negligent misrepresentation, and constitutional tort(see generally Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 177-178 [1996]). Thecause of action for negligent misrepresentation stemmed from statements allegedly madeby various State agents, at the time of the warrant's execution and in the days thereafter,in which they supposedly promised Boerman and his attorney that the computers wouldbe returned expeditiously as soon as the necessary data was copied. Following a nonjurytrial, the Court of Claims rendered an interlocutory judgment in claimants' favor on theissue of liability with respect to the causes of action for conversion and negligentmisrepresentation, with damages to be determined following a trial. The court did notreach the cause of action for constitutional tort inasmuch as it held that claimants' injurieswere adequately compensated by imposing liability for conversion and negligentmisrepresentation. We now reverse the judgment insofar as appealed from and dismissthe amended claim.

The court erred in granting judgment to claimants on the issue of liability forconversion. An actionable "conversion takes place when someone, intentionally andwithout authority, assumes or exercises control over personal property belongingto someone else, interfering with that person's right of possession" (Colavito vNew York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 NY3d 43, 49-50 [2006] [emphasisadded]; see State of New York v Seventh Regiment Fund, 98 NY2d 249, 259[2002]). Here, a search warrant specifically authorized law enforcement to "search forand seize" six categories of items, including "[a]ll computers and computer storage mediaand related peripherals, electronic or computer data." Claimants have never challengedthe validity of the search warrant. Moreover, the unchallenged warrant placed no timelimit on the retention of the items seized, and the authorization to "seize" the computerswas not terminated until County Court ordered the property returned followingBoerman's guilty plea. We therefore conclude that defendant's exercise of control overthe computers did not constitute conversion inasmuch as it had the proper authority toexercise such control (see Matter of White v City of Mount Vernon, 221 AD2d345, 346-347 [1995]). We note that Della Pietra v State of New York (125 AD2d936, 937-938 [1986], affd 71 NY2d 792 [1988]) is distinguishable from theinstant case because, in that case, the State seized and held the claimant's propertypursuant to an invalid warrant.

We reject claimants' contention that the warrant authorized only a "limited" detentionof the computers until their contents could be copied by law enforcement. No suchlanguage is found in the warrant itself and, while the warrant incorporated the appendix,nothing in the appendix states or even implies that any seized computer would bereturned expeditiously to its owner or that any forensic analysis of its contents would beconducted immediately following the execution of the warrant (see generally Peoplev Hanlon, 36 NY2d 549, 557-559 [1975]). We therefore further conclude thatdefendant cannot be held liable for conversion for holding the computers beyond theauthority granted by the warrant.

We also reject claimants' alternative contention that, irrespective of the terms of thewarrant itself, "the initial valid seizure of the computers turned into an unlawfulconversion once the purpose for which the equipment was seized came to an end." It iswell established that property seized pursuant to a court order is held "in the custody ofthe law, and [it] cannot be taken away until that custody is ended by a conviction oracquittal, or by an order of the magistrate permitting its surrender to the owner"(Simpson v St. John, 93 NY 363, 366 [1883]). In other words, "property seizedpursuant to a search warrant remains in the control of the issuing judge" (Matter of Moss v Spitzer, 19AD3d 599, 600 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 714 [2005]; see CPL690.45 [8]; 690.50 [5]; 690.55 [1]). Therefore, even if the seized computers wereretained without any legitimate law enforcement purpose, "it was beyond the power of[defendant] to take the property from the custody of the law" and return it to claimantswithout proper judicial authorization (Meegan v Tracy, 220 App Div 600, 602[1927]; see generally DXB Video Tapes v Halay, 239 AD2d 205, 206 [1997]).Claimants therefore may not recover against defendant for conversion under thecircumstances presented here (see Simpson, 93 NY at 366; Siemiasz vLandau, 224 App Div 284, 285 [1928]).

The court also erred in granting judgment to claimants on the issue of liability fornegligent misrepresentation. The tort of "negligent misrepresentation requires [aclaimant] to demonstrate '(1) the existence of a special or privity-like relationshipimposing a duty on the defendant to impart correct information to the plaintiff; (2) thatthe information was incorrect; and (3) reasonable reliance on the information' "(Mandarin Trading Ltd. vWildenstein, 16 NY3d 173, 180 [2011]). We agree with defendant that, as amatter of law, there can be no "privity-like relationship" between an investigator and thetarget of his or her investigation (id.). Indeed, the relationship betweeninvestigator and target is the opposite of a "special position of confidence and trust" inwhich one party might justifiably rely upon the " 'unique or specializedexpertise' " of the other party (id.; see Kimmell v Schaefer, 89NY2d 257, 263 [1996]). Thus, as defendant correctly contends, the negligentmisrepresentation claim fails as a matter of law (see Breen v Law Off. of Bruce A. Barket, P.C., 52 AD3d635, 636-637 [2008]; Automatic Findings v Miller, 232 AD2d 245, 246[1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 804 [1997]).

Finally, in light of its findings with respect to conversion and negligentmisrepresentation, the court did not reach the cause of action for constitutional tort."Upon our review of the record, however, and in the interest of judicial economy"(Matter of McCloskey, 307 AD2d 737, 738, lv denied 100 NY2d 516 [2003]; see generally Scally v Regional Indus. Partnership, 9 AD3d865, 868 [2004]; Matter of Verna HH., 302 AD2d 714, 715 [2003], lvdismissed 100 NY2d 535 [2003]), we hold that this particular cause of action fails asa matter of law. Even assuming, arguendo, that the initial seizure or continued detentionof claimants' computers violated the Search and Seizure Clause of the New YorkConstitution (art I, § 12), we conclude that "no . . . claim [forconstitutional tort] will lie where the claimant has an adequate remedy in an alternateforum" (Shelton v New YorkState Liq. Auth., 61 AD3d 1145, 1150 [2009], citing Martinez v City ofSchenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 83-84 [2001]; see Kashelkar v State of New York, 30 AD3d 163, 164[2006], appeal dismissed 7 NY3d 843 [2006]; Bullard v State of NewYork, 307 AD2d 676, 678 [2003]). Here, claimants could have raised theirconstitutional arguments in an application to County Court seeking the return of theircomputers (see DXB Video Tapes, 239 AD2d at 206) or, if such motion weredenied, in a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking relief in the nature of mandamus orprohibition (see Moss, 19 AD3d at 599-600). Present—Centra, J.P., Fahey,Whalen and DeJoseph, JJ.


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