| People v Fowler-Graham |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 00166 [124 AD3d 1403] |
| January 2, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vErrol Fowler-Graham, Appellant. |
The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Timothy P. Murphy of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (Michael J. Hillery of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Kenneth F. Case, J.), renderedNovember 18, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of rape inthe first degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimouslyaffirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict ofrape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35 [1]), defendant contends thatCounty Court erred in denying his challenge for cause to a prospective juror. We rejectthat contention. Pursuant to CPL 270.20 (1) (b), a challenge for cause to a prospectivejuror may be made "on the ground that . . . he [or she] has a state of mindthat is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon theevidence adduced at the trial." Only statements that "cast serious doubt on [a prospectivejuror's] ability to render an impartial verdict" trigger a court's obligation to obtain anunequivocal assurance from the prospective juror that he or she can render an impartialverdict (People v Arnold, 96 NY2d 358, 363 [2001]; see People v Harris, 19 NY3d679, 685 [2012]). Here, the prospective juror stated that her daughter had been thevictim of a sexual assault, but nothing that she said raised a serious doubt as to her abilityto render an impartial verdict (see People v Campanella, 100 AD3d 1420, 1421 [2012],lv denied 20 NY3d 1060 [2013]; People v Turner, 6 AD3d 1190, 1190 [2004], lvdenied 3 NY3d 649 [2004]). In any event, in responding to follow-up questions fromthe court and defense counsel, the prospective juror gave an "unequivocal assurance that[she could] set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence"(People v Johnson, 94 NY2d 600, 614 [2000]; see People v Chambers, 97NY2d 417, 419 [2002]).
Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we reject defendant's contention that the verdict is againstthe weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Centra, J.P.,Lindley, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.