People v Beato
2015 NY Slip Op 00617 [124 AD3d 516]
January 26, 2015
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 4, 2015


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Jorge Beato, Appellant.

Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Mark W. Zeno ofcounsel), and DLA Piper LLP (US), New York (Robert W. Ferguson of counsel), forappellant.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Brian R. Pouliot of counsel), forrespondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Cassandra M. Mullen, J.), renderedJanuary 24, 2011, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlledsubstance in the third degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a controlledsubstance in the third degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of one year,affirmed.

The Confrontation Clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions (USConst 6th, 14th Amends; NY Const, art I, § 6) prohibit testimonial evidenceof statements made by an out of court declarant, unless the witness is unavailable totestify at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination(Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 59 n 9 [2004]). Where, however, thetestimonial statements are being used for purposes other than establishing the truth of thematter asserted, they may be admitted. This includes hearsay statements that are admittedfor the purpose of completing a narrative and explaining police actions to prevent juryspeculation (Tennessee v Street, 471 US 409, 415 [1985]; People v DeJesus, 105 AD3d476, 476 [1st Dept 2013], lv granted 22 NY3d 1198 [2014]).

In this observation sale case, an officer testified that two of the persons who madeapparent drug purchases from defendant and his alleged accomplices told the officer thatthey had, in fact, purchased drugs but had swallowed and thereby disposed of them.These claimed purchasers were never identified by name. Although the court instructedthe jury that the statements of the otherwise unidentified buyers were not being receivedin evidence for their truth, but only to explain police actions, the facts of the case did notwarrant any such explanation (compare e.g. People v Rivera, 96 NY2d 749, 751[2001]). We reject the People's argument that this evidence tended to explain why thepolice arrested defendant and his codefendants at a particular point in time. The jury waswell aware that the police made the arrests after observing a series of apparent drug sales.The timing of the arrests was not at issue, and there was nothing mysterious about theunfolding events that could have led to speculation by the jury. Thus, the nonhearsaypurpose of the evidence was barely relevant, and any probative value was plainlyoutweighed by the danger that, regardless of the court's limiting instruction, the jurywould treat the nontestifying buyers' statements as proof that drug selling had, in fact,occurred (see United States v Reyes, 18 F3d 65, 70-71 [2d Cir1994]).

[*2] We likewise reject the People'sargument that the statements were not testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes.The circumstances objectively indicated that the primary purpose of the policeinterrogation of the two alleged buyers was "to establish or prove past events potentiallyrelevant to later criminal prosecution" (Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822[2006]), and there was nothing that even remotely resembled an "ongoing emergency"that would qualify the buyers' statements as nontestimonial (id.).

Nevertheless, we find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.Confrontation Clause violations are subject to a constitutional harmless error analysis (People v Hardy, 4 NY3d192, 198 [2005]), and a review of the entire record demonstrates that the that there isno reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction(People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]).

Even without the hearsay statements, there was overwhelming evidence thatdefendant acted in concert with his codefendants to commit the crimes for which he wasconvicted. The information leading to defendant's arrest was obtained by an investigatoryteam of seven police officers that surveilled defendant's and codefendants' activities overthe course of several hours. Officers observed defendant crouched down as he placedsomething inside a fence. A Ziploc bag containing drugs was later recovered from theapproximate location by the fence where defendant had been seen. The evidence alsoshowed defendant speaking with codefendants, Guny Nunez and Edgar Blanco, forapproximately 20 minutes as the three men huddled around a backpack, later found tocontain 2.479 grams of crack. Defendant was observed speaking with individuals whoapproached him and then directing them by nodding and pointing towards Blanco.Blanco was then observed retrieving an item from the spot in the fence where defendanthad previously concealed something, handing it to the suspected buyers and receivingsomething in exchange. Based on their observations, the officers stopped suspectedpurchasers. One person was found to have a Ziploc containing crack on the roof of hismouth. Another man was found with drug paraphernalia, still warm from recent use. Thelast suspected buyer was stopped after the police observed him hand Blanco something inexchange for something Blanco removed from the fence. The suspected buyer was foundcarrying six Ziploc bags containing crack cocaine. As the events were ongoing,defendant approached Blanco several times and was observed alerting the codefendantsas officers converged on the scene. In addition, while we do not believe the court shouldhave admitted the out of court declarations made by two other alleged buyers intoevidence at all, the court instructed the jury that their statements could not be consideredfor their truth. Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable possibility that theimproperly admitted hearsay statements contributed to the conviction.

We also find that the verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was notagainst the weight of the evidence. We have examined defendant's other arguments andfind them unavailing. Concur—Sweeny, Andrias, Moskowitz and Gische, JJ.

Tom, J.P., concurs in a separate memorandum as follows: It is beyond dispute thatthe evidence against defendant was sufficient to support his conviction and that theverdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The only question is whetherdefendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause were infringed by the introduction ofhearsay testimony. Because the hearsay testimony was received to avoid misleading thejury and to complete the narrative in order to deter jury speculation, it does not implicatethe right of confrontation. In any event, the evidence was merely cumulative, and anyerror in its admission was harmless.

Testimony was received from eight police officers and their sergeant, all of whomwere members of the 30th Precinct Conditions Team assigned to monitor activity in thevicinity of 147th Street between Amsterdam Avenue and Broadway in Manhattan. Onthe date of his arrest, defendant was observed, at approximately 4:40 a.m., exiting abuilding and walking to a nearby chainlink fence, where he lifted up some mesh material,bent down, and placed something inside the fence. Defendant was then observed on thecorner of 147th Street and Amsterdam Avenue in the company of codefendant EdgarBlanco when a third man, codefendant Guny Nunez, drove up. The three were seenstanding over a backpack placed on the pavement.

After the three men separated, members of the team saw defendant direct five ormore persons toward the location of the chainlink fence, where Blanco reached into thefence and retrieved something very small and gave one to each person, who in turn gavesomething to Blanco. Over a six-hour period, officers stopped a number of apparentbuyers but found no drugs in their possession. Sergeant Nicholson testified that when helearned from two such persons that they had purchased drugs and swallowed them beforepolice could intervene, he directed the team to move in right away on the next buy,before the individuals got a chance to discard the narcotics. When the next buyer, JoseGomez, was observed making a purchase, the team surrounded the three suspects andGomez, placing them under arrest. Gomez was found to be in possession of five smallZiploc bags containing what was later identified as crack cocaine. Also arrested wasRonald White, who was found to be carrying a crack pipe and a metal push rod (used toinsert the crack into the pipe). The arresting officer believed the pipe had just beensmoked; however, no drugs were recovered from White's person.

The team recovered $80 from Blanco, as well as $551 from Nunez and the backpackin which a bag containing just under 2.5 grams of unprocessed crack cocaine was found.After everyone was placed under arrest, Nicholson and Valerio searched the fence in thevicinity of where defendant initially placed something and recovered a Ziploc bagcontaining crack.

The sergeant's testimony was followed by that of Officer Valerio, who assisted thesergeant in intercepting suspected buyers. The officer explained that no drugs wererecovered from several individuals who were stopped. The officer stated that when hedirected one of the individuals to open his mouth, a Ziploc bag could be seen "on theroof of his mouth." The individual then immediately closed his mouth and swallowedit.

Defendant contends that his right to confront witnesses was abridged when the policesergeant was permitted to testify that two persons suspected of buying drugs told him that"they had purchased narcotics" and "they had swallowed the drugs." The People assertthat the sergeant's testimony merely completed the narrative by explaining why, whenteam members stopped and searched persons observed to be interacting with defendantand engaging in transactions with Blanco, no drugs were found, and why the police thendecided to converge on the suspected sellers immediately after they engaged in thetransaction with Gomez.

It is settled that even evidence that is testimonial in nature may be used "for purposes[*3]other than establishing the truth of the matterasserted" (Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 59-60 n 9 [2004]), such ascompleting the narrative, explaining police actions, and preventing jury speculation(see Tennessee v Street, 471 US 409 [1985] [accomplice's confession properlyreceived in rebuttal]; People vDeJesus, 105 AD3d 476 [1st Dept 2013], lv granted 22 NY3d 1198[2014] [evidence concerning course of police investigation]). Here, the sergeant'stestimony regarding what he learned from suspected purchasers served to explain whythe police decided to immediately effect the arrest of the sellers when Gomez made hispurchase, and not earlier when prior suspects were stopped, thus deterring speculationthat the surveillance team was merely harassing innocent passersby and bystanders. Inany event, the identical explanation for the lack of drugs found on persons apparentlyengaging in drug transactions was adduced from Officer Valerio. His account ofobserving a Ziploc bag being swallowed by a suspected purchaser is subject to only oneinterpretation—that the suspect was disposing of recently acquired narcotics.Thus, the hearsay testimony received from the sergeant—that two persons heintercepted said that "they had purchased narcotics" and "they had swallowed thedrugs"—which the majority finds so prejudicial, did no more than give expressionto the obvious conclusion to be deduced from Officer Valerio's first-handaccount—that the purchasers were disposing of the Ziploc bags in some expedientmanner before police could intercept them, thereby prompting the surveillance team toimmediately apprehend the sellers in the course of the next transaction.

The sergeant's testimony is not rendered prejudicial merely because it does notsupport defendant's theory that there were no drug sales taking place. The worst that maybe said is that given Officer Valerio's testimony, the sergeant's testimony was cumulative;thus, any error in its admission was harmless (see People v Rawlins, 37 AD3d 183, 184-185 [1st Dept2007], affd 10 NY3d 136 [2008], cert denied 557 US 934 [2009]). Thesergeant's testimony was "coupled with proper limiting instructions" (People v Resek, 3 NY3d385, 389 [2004]) and served to complete the narrative. It was relevant to both theoffense (cf. People v Green, 35 NY2d 437 [1974] [evidence of previousunrelated drug complaint irrelevant and prejudicial]) and a contested issue in the case(see People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241 [1987] [previous drug crimesadmissible to establish intent]), and was not prejudicial (cf. People v Cook, 42NY2d 204, 208 [1977] [error to allow testimony regarding uncharged rape irrelevant toburglary charge but error was harmless]).

Accordingly, the judgment should be affirmed.


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