| Matter of Kent v Cuomo |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 00680 [124 AD3d 1185] |
| January 29, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Susan M. Kent, as President of the NewYork State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO, et al., Appellants, v Andrew M.Cuomo, as Governor of the State of New York, et al.,Respondents. |
Lisa M. King, New York State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO, Albany(Eric Kwasniewski of counsel), for appellants.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Victor Paladino of counsel), forrespondents.
Garry, J. Appeal from that part of a judgment of the Supreme Court (Teresi, J.),entered June 18, 2013 in Albany County, which partially dismissed petitioners'application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to, among other things, reviewa determination of respondent State Budget Director to pay overtime to certainovertime-ineligible employees.
Petitioners Michael Ufko, Hugh Cirrito, Joan Bobier and Heide-Marie Dudek(hereinafter collectively referred to as petitioners) are state workers employed,respectively, by respondents Department of Transportation, Department ofEnvironmental Conservation, Department of Health, and Division of Homeland Securityand Emergency Services (hereinafter collectively referred to as the employerrespondents). Petitioners serve in positions that are categorized as ineligible for overtimecompensation (see generally 9 NYCRR 135.2). Respondent State BudgetDirector has discretionary authority to grant overtime compensation to such employeeswhen they "work beyond a normal workweek during . . . an extremeemergency" (Civil Service Law § 134 [6]). In October 2012, the BudgetDirector acted pursuant to that authority by issuing a bulletin (hereinafter bulletinG-1034) that declared Hurricane Sandy to be an extreme emergency and [*2]authorized overtime compensation for otherwise ineligibleemployees who worked more than 47.5 hours in a week as a result of the storm.Petitioners worked more than 40 hours per week as a result of Hurricane Sandy, butpursuant to bulletin G-1034, they were not compensated for weekly hours greater than 40and less than 47.5.
Petitioners—together with petitioner Susan M. Kent, the president ofpetitioners' labor union—commenced this proceeding arguing that the BudgetDirector was statutorily required to compensate petitioners and all other similarly situatedstate employees for all hours worked more than 40 per week as a result of HurricaneSandy. As pertinent here, Supreme Court partially dismissed the application to the extentthat it sought to require this 40-hour threshold. Petitioners and Kent appeal.
Initially, we must determine whether the Budget Director's interpretation of CivilService Law § 134 (6) is entitled to deference. This Court will defer to thegovernmental agency responsible for the administration of a statute when interpretationof the language at issue requires the agency's expertise in the matters covered by thestatute, but will accord no such deference when "the question is one of pure statutoryreading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent"(Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451, 459 [1980]; accord Matter of New York StateSuperfund Coalition, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 18 NY3d289, 296 [2011]; see Matterof New York Constr. Materials Assn., Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 83 AD3d 1323, 1325 [2011]). Although the Civil Service Lawprovides that the "workweek for basic annual salary" for employees who are eligible forovertime shall not exceed 40 hours (Civil Service Law § 134 [1]),overtime-ineligible employees are expressly excluded from the coverage of that section,and nothing else in the legislation defines the phrase "normal workweek" as used in CivilService Law § 134 (6) for such employees or prescribes the number ofhours contained in such a workweek. Under these circumstances, in our view, thenumber of hours in the "normal workweek" of an overtime-ineligible state employeenecessarily implicates the Budget Director's specialized knowledge of state employmentpractices and "involves knowledge and understanding of underlying operational practicesor entails an evaluation of factual data and inferences to be drawn therefrom"(Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d at 459; see Matter of County of Albany vHudson Riv.-Black Riv. Regulating Dist., 97 AD3d 61, 67 [2012], lvdenied 19 NY3d 816 [2012]; Matter of Posada v New York State Dept. of Health, 75 AD3d880, 883 n 2 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 712 [2010]). Accordingly, thisCourt will defer to the Budget Director's determination and uphold it if it is not irrationalor unreasonable (see Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d at 459;Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434, 438 [1971]).
Following the enactment of Civil Service Law § 134 (6), respondentDivision of the Budget (hereinafter DOB) issued a bulletin stating that "[e]mployeesnormally ineligible to be compensated for work in excess of 40 hours per week may,under special emergency circumstances, be made eligible for compensation for suchhours of work" and, in order to receive such compensation, "must work a number ofhours clearly in excess of the hours his [or her] position should reasonably require" (1974NY St Div of the Budget Bulletin Item G-140). The 47.5-hour threshold is not referencedin this bulletin, but a DOB official averred by affidavit that it has been in place for manyyears and was originally devised after consultation with other agencies involved inemergency planning and service delivery based upon such factors as the importance ofdelivering emergency response services to citizens, fair treatment of otherwise ineligibleemployees, and responsible use of taxpayer resources. The DOB official noted thatovertime-ineligible state employees—who are typically highly compensated andfunction in professional or managerial positions or other capacities involving the use ofskill or discretion—[*3]might routinely be calledupon in nonemergency situations to work more than 40 hours in a week withoutadditional compensation. The 47.5-hour threshold takes this factual assessment intoaccount by adding an additional full workday of 7.5 hours to the 40-hour workweek. Therecord reveals that the 47.5-hour threshold has been applied in other emergencycircumstances, most recently including Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee in late2011. Accordingly, the threshold cannot be said to be arbitrary on the ground that itdeparts unreasonably from DOB's approach in other emergency situations (compareMatter of Welch v Constantine, 194 AD2d 1008, 1011 [1993]). As we find nothingthat is otherwise irrational or unreasonable in the Budget Director's imposition of the47.5-hour threshold for work related to Hurricane Sandy, the determination must beupheld (but see Matter of Roberts v Cuomo, 42 Misc 3d 1209[A], 2013 NY SlipOp 52264[U], *6 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2013]).
The statutory language supports this determination. The Civil Service Lawspecifically requires that "the workweek for basic annual salary" for employees who areeligible for overtime shall not exceed 40 hours, and provides that eligible employeesrequired to work overtime are to be compensated for every weekly hour over 40 at a rateof 1
Next, petitioners and Kent contend that the employer respondents acted arbitrarilyand capriciously and were irrational in refusing to request that the Budget Directorauthorize payment for hours beyond 40 per week worked as a result of Hurricane Sandy.However, Civil Service Law § 134 (6) grants no authority to any officialother than the Budget Director to determine whether and how much emergency overtimecompensation is to be paid to otherwise ineligible employees, and here the BudgetDirector had not failed or refused to exercise this statutory authority (compare Matterof Welch v Constantine, 194 AD2d at 1010-1011). On the contrary, the payment ofemergency overtime compensation for work related to Hurricane Sandy had beenauthorized and the employer respondents had been advised that no such compensationwould be paid for weekly hours greater than 40 but less than 47.5. Under thesecircumstances, they did not act irrationally in failing to request such compensation.
Lahtinen, J.P., Rose and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs. [Prior Case History: 2013 NY Slip Op 31036(U).]