Nicodemus v Nicodemus
2015 NY Slip Op 00735 [124 AD3d 849]
January 28, 2015
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 4, 2015


[*1]
 Frank R. Nicodemus, Respondent,
v
Elsa A.Nicodemus, Appellant.

Terry D. Horner, Poughkeepsie, N.Y., for appellant.

Cohn & Spector, White Plains, N.Y. (Julius W. Cohn and James R. Thayer ofcounsel), for respondent.

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated June24, 2011, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, DutchessCounty (Pagones, J.), dated February 26, 2013, which granted the plaintiff's motion toexpunge from the record a certain mortgage held by the defendant against maritalproperty, and, in effect, to declare it null and void, and for an award of counsel fees, (2) adeclaratory and money judgment of the same court entered March 26, 2013, whichdeclared that mortgage null and void, and awarded the plaintiff $2,000 in counsel feesand $100 in motion costs, and (3) a supplemental judgment of the same court, alsoentered March 26, 2013, which modified the judgment of divorce dated June 24, 2011,by excluding that mortgage from the definition of marital debt.

Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed, as that order was superseded bythe declaratory and money judgment and the supplemental judgment; and it isfurther,

Ordered that the declaratory and money judgment and the supplemental judgment areaffirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff.

During the parties' marriage, they jointly owned a business that restored classicCadillac automobiles. They also jointly owned a second business, Mid-Hudson Castle,Ltd. (hereinafter Mid-Hudson), that held title to property located on Route 376 inWappingers Falls, which was used as a showroom for the restored automobiles. OnOctober 2, 2003, the defendant borrowed the principal sum of $250,000, which wassecured by a mortgage on the former marital residence on Diddell Road. The defendantloaned a portion of the money she had borrowed to Mid-Hudson to satisfy an existingmortgage on the Route 376 property, and make improvements to the showroom. On thatsame day, Mid-Hudson executed a mortgage in favor of the defendant encumbering theRoute 376 property (hereinafter the subject mortgage). Although the subject [*2]mortgage is dated October 2, 2003, it was not recordeduntil more than eight years later.

At the trial of the parties' divorce action, the defendant testified that both the subjectmortgage, and the mortgage on the former marital residence on Diddell Road, secured"the same debt," i.e, the $250,000 that she borrowed on October 2, 2003. The defendantfurther testified that she obtained the subject mortgage from Mid-Hudson in order toprotect her interest in the Diddell Road property.

The parties were divorced by judgment dated June 24, 2011. The Supreme Courtawarded the defendant the property on Diddell Road as her separate property, butawarded the plaintiff a $75,000 credit as his equitable share in the appreciation of thatproperty. The court ruled that all liabilities relating to the property on Route 376 existingat the time of trial "constitute marital debt and are not the sole responsibility of eitherparty and are subject to equitable distribution." It directed the sale of that property andother jointly owned property, with the defendant to receive 70% of the proceeds. ThisCourt, on appeal, modified the defendant's share of marital property from 70% to 50%(see Nicodemus vNicodemus, 98 AD3d 605 [2012]).

On August 23, 2012, eight days after this Court ruled on the appeal, the defendantrecorded the subject mortgage. By letter dated November 12, 2012, the defendantdemanded payment of $165,697.07 from the receiver of the marital property, within 10days, and that, if payment were not received, the defendant would commence an actionagainst the receiver to foreclose the subject mortgage. By order to show cause datedDecember 7, 2012, the plaintiff moved to expunge the subject mortgage from the recordon the ground that the underlying debt should have been disposed of in the distributiveaward of the divorce judgment, and, in effect, to declare it null and void, and for anaward of costs and counsel fees.

The Supreme Court, in its decision, classified the subject mortgage as a claim by thedefendant that she held "a security interest as separate property in a marital asset." Itfound that the defendant was required to prove that claim at the trial of the divorceaction, and failed to do so. The court declared the mortgage null and void on the groundthat no documentary evidence of the subject mortgage was presented at the trial in thedivorce action. The court further directed the defendant to pay the plaintiff $2,000 incounsel fees, and motion costs of $100. The defendant appeals.

Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (a) requires that the court, in anaction for a divorce, determine "the respective rights of the parties in their separate ormarital property, and . . . provide for the disposition thereof in the finaljudgment" (see Cudar vCudar, 98 AD3d 27, 32 [2012]). Indeed, in the context of a matrimonial action,the Court of Appeals has "recognized that a final judgment of divorce settles the parties'rights pertaining not only to those issues that were actually litigated, but also to those thatcould have been litigated" (XiaoYang Chen v Fischer, 6 NY3d 94, 100 [2005]).

Here, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion whichwas to expunge the subject mortgage from the record, and, in effect, to declare it null andvoid, as the status of the subject mortgage was actually litigated at the divorce trial(see Boronow v Boronow, 71 NY2d 284, 287-291 [1988]; Cudar vCudar, 98 AD3d at 31; see also Domestic Relations Law § 234).The defendant testified that the subject mortgage represented the same debt as amortgage on her property on Diddell Road, which was awarded to her as her separateproperty. In the original judgment of divorce, the trial court determined that the propertyon Route 376 was to be sold, and the proceeds distributed between the parties, withoutany deduction in the plaintiff's share made for the mortgage held by the defendant. Thus,a determination was made, and the amount of the subject mortgage was not deductedfrom the value of the marital property. Moreover, in amending the judgment of divorce,the court properly exercised its authority pursuant to CPLR 5519 (a) to "correct errors oromissions in form, for clarification or to make the order conform more accurately to thedecision" (Simon vMehryari, 16 AD3d 664, 666 [2005]).

Further, under the circumstances of this case, the award of counsel fees was aprovident exercise of discretion (see Domestic Relations Law § 237[b]; Bertone v Bertone, 15 AD3d [*3]326[2005]). Balkin, J.P., Chambers, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.