| People v Ryan |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 00915 [125 AD3d 695] |
| February 4, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Appellant, v James Ryan, Respondent. |
Madeline Singas, Acting District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Robert A. Schwartz andSarah S. Rabinowitz of counsel), for appellant.
Matthew C. Hug, Troy, N.Y., for respondent.
Appeal by the People, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of theSupreme Court, Nassau County (Carter, J.), dated December 16, 2013, as granted thosebranches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to dismiss counts one throughseven of the indictment on the ground that the evidence presented to the grand jury waslegally insufficient.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, and thosebranches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to dismiss counts one throughseven of the indictment on the ground that the evidence presented to the grand jury waslegally insufficient are denied, those counts of the indictment are reinstated, and thematter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings on theindictment.
According to the evidence presented to a grand jury, on October 18, 2012, beforedawn, the defendant allegedly caused two collisions when he drove his car on the LongIsland Expressway while he was under the influence of alcohol. In the immediateaftermath of those collisions, the defendant's stopped vehicle was in the eastbound HighOccupancy Vehicle (hereinafter HOV) lane, facing perpendicular to the direction oftraffic. Within a few minutes, a police officer responded to the scene. While the officerwas standing near the defendant's stopped car, he was struck and killed when the driverof a sport utility vehicle traveling in the HOV lane did not see him or the defendant'sstopped car in time to avoid hitting them.
A grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with numerous crimes.Several of those crimes contained as an element that the defendant "caused" the death ofthe victim (i.e., the officer). In his omnibus motion, the defendant moved to dismiss thosecounts of the indictment on the ground that the proof before the grand jury was legallyinsufficient to establish that he caused the officer's death. The defendant contended, inpart, that the actions of the sport utility vehicle's driver, who failed to see the officer aswell as the defendant's stopped vehicle, were a superseding cause of the officer'sdeath.
The Supreme Court agreed. The court noted that 5 to 10 minutes had elapsedbetween the collisions that resulted in the stopping of the defendant's vehicle in the HOVlane and [*2]the collision that killed the police officer. Inlight of this gap, the court found that the death of the officer was not part of a"continuing chain of events" set in motion by the defendant, but was caused solely by theconduct of the driver of the sport utility vehicle (People v Ryan, 42 Misc 3d 643, 649-650 [Sup Ct, NassauCounty 2013]). The People appeal.
"Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate'whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained anduncontradicted—and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of theevidence—would warrant conviction' " (People v Mills, 1 NY3d269, 274-275 [2003], quoting People v Carroll, 93 NY2d 564, 568 [1999];see People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 525 [1998]; People v Jennings, 69NY2d 103, 114 [1986]; Peoplev Warren, 98 AD3d 634, 635 [2012]; People v Jessup, 90 AD3d 782, 783 [2011])." 'Legally sufficient evidence' means competent evidence which, if accepted astrue, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant'scommission thereof" (CPL 70.10 [1]).
In order to be held criminally liable for a person's death, a defendant must haveengaged in conduct that "actually contribute[d]" to that person's death (People v DaCosta, 6 NY3d181, 184 [2006]), by setting in motion the events that resulted in the death (seePeople v Matos, 83 NY2d 509, 511 [1994]). The defendant's actions need not be thesole cause of death and, indeed, the defendant need not have committed the fatal act to beliable (see id. at 511-512). The test is, instead, whether it may be reasonablyforeseen that the defendant's actions would result in the victim's death; if so, thedefendant's actions may, under the criminal law, constitute a "sufficiently direct cause" ofthe death to warrant criminal liability for it (People v Kibbe, 35 NY2d 407, 412[1974]; see People v DaCosta, 6 NY3d at 186; People v Matos, 83 NY2dat 512).
Here, viewing the evidence before the grand jury in the light most favorable to theprosecution (see People v Mills, 1 NY3d at 274-275), we find that there waslegally sufficient proof before the grand jury that the defendant's actions "caused" theofficer's death. Specifically, it was reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's conductwould cause collisions and that the police would respond and be required to be in theroadway, where they would be exposed to the potentially lethal danger presented byfast-moving traffic (see People v DaCosta, 6 NY3d at 186; cf. People v Ballenger, 106AD3d 1375 [2013]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of thedefendant's omnibus motion which were to dismiss counts one through seven of theindictment on the ground that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legallyinsufficient. Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Hall and Sgroi, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 42Misc 3d 643.]