| Matter of Madeline D. |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 01634 [125 AD3d 965] |
| February 25, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Madeline D., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent, Appellant. |
Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo andSusan Paulson of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (JacquelineD. Williams, J.), dated March 28, 2014. The order adjudicated Madeline D. to be ajuvenile delinquent, and placed her on probation under the supervision of the New YorkCity Department of Probation for a period of 24 months. The appeal brings up for reviewan order of that court (Emily M. Olshansky, J.), dated December 17, 2013, which deniedthe motion of Madeline D. to suppress identification evidence, and an order offact-finding of that court (Emily M. Olshansky, J.), dated January 14, 2014, which, aftera hearing, found that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult,would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the second degree (two counts), assaultin the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and criminal possession ofstolen property in the fifth degree.
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The suppression court properly found that the showup procedure at which theappellant was identified was not unduly suggestive. " 'While showup proceduresare generally disfavored, they are permissible, even in the absence of exigentcircumstances, when they are spatially and temporally proximate to the commission ofthe crime and not unduly suggestive' " (People v Cuesta, 103 AD3d 913, 915 [2013], quoting People v Berry, 50 AD3d1047, 1048 [2008]). In this case, the appellant was detained approximately 15minutes after the commission of the subject offenses and a few blocks away from wherethey were committed. She was then immediately returned to the crime scene, where asubway booth clerk, who had witnessed the commission of the offenses, identified her asone of the perpetrators. Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the showup was notrendered unduly suggestive merely because the appellant was handcuffed (see People v Calero, 105 AD3d864, 865 [2013]; People v Bitz, 209 AD2d 709, 709-710 [1994]), or becausethe witness knew that the police had a suspect or suspects in custody (see People v Crumble, 43AD3d 953, 953 [2007]; People v Gil, 21 AD3d 1120, 1121 [2005]).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, her detention by the police was not unlawful.The hearing evidence demonstrated that the police had reasonable suspicion that theappellant and the three individuals accompanying her were the individuals described in aradio report as the perpetrators of a robbery which had been committed only a fewminutes prior to the stop of the [*2]appellant and hercompanions. The police were justified in stopping and detaining the appellant and thethree other individuals based on the similarities between them and the individualsdescribed over the radio, including the number of individuals, their ages and clothing, theclose proximity of the individuals to the site of the crime, and the short passage of timebetween the commission of the crime and the observation of the four individuals (see People v Palmer, 84 AD3d1414, 1414 [2011]; Peoplev Williams, 73 AD3d 1097, 1099 [2010]; People v Holland, 4 AD3d 375, 376 [2004]). Furthermore,the police detention of the appellant, during which she was transported to the crime scenefor a showup procedure, permitting the subway booth clerk to identify her as one of theperpetrators of the subject offenses, did not constitute an arrest (see People v Parris, 70 AD3d725, 726 [2010]; People v Largo, 282 AD2d 548, 549 [2001]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (cf.People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient toestablish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which, ifcommitted by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the seconddegree, assault in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and criminalpossession of stolen property in the fifth degree. Moreover, upon the exercise of ourfactual review power (cf. CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the determinationwas not against the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Lenford C., 35 AD3d 462, 462 [2006]).Rivera, J.P., Austin, Roman and Barros, JJ., concur.