| Fannie Mae v 133 Mgt., LLC |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 01780 [126 AD3d 670] |
| March 4, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Fannie Mae, Respondent, v 133 Management,LLC, et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants. |
Sol Mermelstein, Brooklyn, N.Y. (S. Herman Klarsfeld of counsel), forappellants.
Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Mark A. Slama andSamuel M. Mizrahi of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants 133 Management, LLC, andYuda J. Furth appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the SupremeCourt, Kings County (Graham, J.), dated December 21, 2012, as granted the plaintiff'smotion for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and tostrike their answer.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Contrary to the contention of the defendants 133 Management, LLC, and Yuda J.Furth (hereinafter together the Management defendants), the Supreme Court properlygranted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as assertedagainst them and to strike their answer. The plaintiff established, prima facie, that, as setforth in the provisions of the mortgage, it was not required to give the Managementdefendants notice of their default or the plaintiff's intent to accelerate the debt (see Charter One Bank, FSB vLeone, 45 AD3d 958 [2007]; Long Is. Sav. Bank of Centereach, F.S.B. vDenkensohn, 222 AD2d 659 [1995]). Moreover, the plaintiff's commencement of theaction and filing of a notice of pendency constituted a valid election to accelerate thematurity of the debt (see Charter One Bank, FSB v Leone, 45 AD3d at 958). Inopposition, the Management defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Management defendants' remaining contentions are either academic or withoutmerit. Dillon, J.P., Leventhal, Chambers and Roman, JJ., concur.