| People v Peters |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 01829 [126 AD3d 1029] |
| March 5, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vBrion L. Peters, Appellant. |
Mitch Kessler, Cohoes, for appellant.
Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Susan Rider-Ulacco of counsel), forrespondent.
Peters, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County(Hayden, J.), rendered March 9, 2012, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimesof manslaughter in the second degree and unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine inthe third degree.
In the early morning hours of May 8, 2011, defendant and Gary Varlan weremanufacturing crystal methamphetamine in a remote cabin in Chemung County. In sodoing, they placed three plastic pitchers containing lantern fuel on a lit wood-burningstove. The fuel ignited, causing a fire that burned the cabin to the ground. While all fourof the cabin's occupants exited the building, the victim later died in the hospital as aresult of severe burns covering the majority of her body. Defendant was thereaftercharged with manslaughter in the second degree and unlawful manufacture ofmethamphetamine in the third degree and, following a jury trial, was convicted of bothcharges. He appeals, challenging the legal sufficiency and weight of the evidencesupporting his conviction of manslaughter in the second degree.
Defendant specifically asserts that the People failed to establish that he caused thevictim's death, as the evidence did not exclude the possibility that the fire resulted from athird party opening the wood stove door. Defendant further argues that the evidence islegally insufficient to prove that his actions were reckless, as he was assured by Varlanthat placing a pitcher of fuel on the wood stove was safe. In conducting a legalsufficiency review, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People andwill not disturb the verdict so long as [*2]the evidencedemonstrates a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead arational person to the conclusion reached by the jury" (People v Peryea, 68 AD3d1144, 1146 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 804 [2010] [citations omitted];see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; People v Barreto, 64 AD3d1046, 1048 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 834 [2009]). "A person is guilty ofmanslaughter in the second degree when [he or she] recklessly causes the death ofanother person" (Penal Law § 125.15 [1]; see People v Heslop, 48 AD3d190, 195 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 935 [2008]). Recklessness in thiscontext requires that a person be "aware of and consciously disregard[ ] a substantial andunjustifiable risk" of death (Penal Law § 15.05 [3]; see People v Hartman, 4 AD3d22, 24 [2004]).
The trial evidence established that defendant, Varlan, Brian Yontz and the victimwere at Varlan's cabin and had used methamphetamine. In the hours before the fireerupted, defendant and Varlan proceeded to the basement to make a batch of crystalmethamphetamine. Varlan then brought two plastic pitchers of lantern fuel upstairs to theliving room and placed them on top of a grate on the surface of the wood stove. Whendefendant ascended to the living room, he placed a third plastic pitcher of lantern fuel onthe wood stove, on top of three rings, which he believed were made of metal. Accordingto Yontz, who was seated in the living room reading, defendant then became absorbed inlooking for something and panicked when he realized that he had "left the pitcher [on thestove for] too long," melting the bottom of the pitcher so that when defendant attemptedto lift it, fuel ran down the side of the stove and caught fire. Defendant countered Yontz'sdescription by testifying that, after placing the plastic pitcher on the wood stove, hebriefly exited the cabin and, when he returned, a blaze had ignited around the woodstove. Varlan and the victim were in a back room and, although Varlan managed toescape nearly unharmed, the victim was the last to exit the cabin and, when she did so,she was enveloped in flames.
Although defendant now contends that the fire may have been ignited by Yontzopening the wood stove door and exposing the fuel to an open flame, Yontz, Varlan anddefendant himself all testified that the wood stove door was not opened following theplacement of the plastic pitchers on the stove's surface. Furthermore, an arsoninvestigator with the State Office of Fire Prevention and Control testified that lanternfuel can ignite without an open flame and that, following the fire, the wood stove wasfound with the residue of melted plastic on its surface. Additionally, a hazardousmaterials specialist with the same state office testified that a wood stove could heat aplastic pitcher to melting temperature.
Turning to the mens rea element of manslaughter in the second degree, defendantcontends that, based on assurances from Varlan, he believed his placement of the plasticpitcher of fuel on the active wood stove was safe, and that he therefore was not aware ofand did not consciously disregard an unjustifiable risk of death. However, defendantconceded that he knew that lantern fuel was highly flammable, that he had previouslycaused a fire while manufacturing methamphetamine using ether, that the plastic pitcherswould "obviously melt" if placed on a hotplate and that he was aware of other "methfire[s] [and] meth lab explosions." Upon our review of the evidence, we find that it waslegally sufficient to support defendant's conviction of manslaughter in the second degree(see People v Lewie, 17NY3d 348, 358 [2011]; People v DaCosta, 6 NY3d 181, 182 [2006]; People v Reichel, 110 AD3d1356, 1364 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1090 [2014]). Further, since adifferent verdict would not have been unreasonable, upon considering the evidence in aneutral light and according deference to the jury's credibility determinations, we concludethat the verdict on the manslaughter count is not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 349 [2007]; People v Peterson, 118 AD3d 1151, 1153 [2014], lvdenied 24 NY3d 1087 [2014]; People v Barreto, 64 AD3d at1048-1049).
[*3] Rose, Egan Jr. and Clark,JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.