| People v Akinpelu |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 02588 [126 AD3d 1451] |
| March 27, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vGordy A. Akinpelu, Appellant. |
The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Alan Williams of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Lawrence Friedman, District Attorney, Batavia (William G. Zickl of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from an order of the Genesee County Court (Robert C. Noonan, J.), enteredSeptember 13, 2013. The order determined that defendant is a level two risk pursuant tothe Sex Offender Registration Act.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed withoutcosts.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order determining that he is a level tworisk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act ([SORA] Correction Law§ 168 et seq.). At the SORA hearing, defendant's attorney informedCounty Court that he reviewed the risk assessment instrument with defendant and that heand defendant would "not be contesting those scores." The court thus adopted therecommendation of the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, which assessed 90 pointsagainst defendant, making him a presumptive level two risk. Defendant did not request adownward departure, and the court determined that he was a level two risk. Defendantnow contends that he was not afforded due process at the hearing because, among otherreasons, the court did not conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine whether heknowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to contest the level two riskdesignation. As defendant concedes, however, his contention is unpreserved for ourreview because he did not assert at the hearing that his due process rights were beingviolated (see People v Kyle,64 AD3d 1177, 1178 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 709 [2009]; see also People v Costas, 46AD3d 475, 476 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 716 [2008]; People v Gliatta, 27 AD3d441, 441 [2006]). In any event, "the due process protections required for a risk levelclassification proceeding 'are not as extensive as those required in a plenary criminal orcivil trial' " (Doe v Pataki, 3 F Supp 2d 456, 470 [1998]; see People v Erb, 59 AD3d1020, 1020-1021 [2009]), and defendant has cited no authority to support hiscontention that "a personal allocution" is required in order to waive the right to a SORAhearing (People v Dexter,21 AD3d 403, 404 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 716 [2005]; see Costas,46 AD3d at 476).
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and conclude that nonewarrants reversal or modification. Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra, Peradotto,Lindley and Whalen, JJ.