Karol v Polsinello
2015 NY Slip Op 03024 [127 AD3d 1401]
April 9, 2015
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 3, 2015


[*1]
  John E. Karol, Jr., Respondent, v Mark J. Polsinello etal., Appellant.

[*2]deducted approximately $10,000 from the agreed-uponamount, representing plaintiff's proportionate share of the corporation's unpaid 2010expenses, and began remitting monthly payments to plaintiff based upon the adjustedsum. Plaintiff demanded full payment of the agreed-upon balance, but defendantscontinued to remit the adjusted payments, asserting that the deduction was consistentwith the corporation's longstanding accounting practices.

In April 2011, plaintiff commenced this action alleging that defendants breached theagreement and demanding payment of the alleged arrears resulting from the deduction, aswell as legal expenses and counsel fees pursuant to the agreement. Plaintiff moved forsummary judgment and, in January 2012, Supreme Court (Sise, J.) denied the motion onthe ground that "the matter [was] not ripe for summary judgment" because of issues offact as to the amount of plaintiff's deferred compensation account balance. In 2014,shortly before a scheduled evidentiary hearing, plaintiff again moved for summaryjudgment, offering what he contended was proof of the amount of his plan balance as ofthe time that he left the corporation. In August 2014, Supreme Court (Crowell, J.)partially granted this second motion for summary judgment in plaintiff's favor on theissue of defendants' liability for breach of contract, holding that the 2012 order requiredsuch a ruling, as it was "the law of the case." The court directed a trial on the remainingissue of damages. Defendants appeal from the 2014 order.

Initially, we reject plaintiff's contention that Supreme Court was required to rule thatdefendants were liable for breaching the agreement by the doctrine of the law of the case,which bars courts from reconsidering "pre-judgment rulings made by courts ofcoordinate jurisdiction" in the same case (People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 503[2000]; accord Gadani vDeBrino Caulking Assoc., Inc., 86 AD3d 689, 691 [2011]). The doctrine appliesonly when the prior ruling directly passed upon a question of law that is essential to thedetermination of the matter (see Scofield v Trustees of Union Coll., 288 AD2d807, 808 [2001]; Brown v State of New York, 250 AD2d 314, 320 [1998]). Here,the only determination made in the 2012 order was that material issues of fact existed asto the amount owed. Although additional remarks were made in that order, these weremerely dicta, and did not constitute a legal determination as to whether defendantsbreached the agreement by deducting expenses—an issue that was not directlyaddressed by the 2012 order (see Matter of McNamee, Lochner, Titus &Williams [Killeen], 267 AD2d 919, 922 [1999]; compare Papa Gino's of Am. vPlaza at Latham Assoc., 144 AD2d 172, 172 [1988]). Nevertheless, although thedoctrine of law of the case does not compel a determination that defendants are liable fora breach, upon review we find that plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment onthe merits of this issue and, thus, the motion was correctly decided.

Defendants contend that the deduction of expenses from plaintiff's payments did notconstitute a breach of contract, as the plain language of the plan contemplates thecorporation's longstanding practice of making such deductions from deferredcompensation allocations. Plaintiff does not specifically deny that the corporationpreviously followed this practice; indeed, the record includes a January 2011 email to acorporate representative in which plaintiff appeared to acknowledge that he expected thatthe deductions would be made. However, we agree with plaintiff that the plain languageof the agreement requires defendants to make the payments according to the terms setforth in the plan, and the plain language of the plan makes no provision for such adeduction. It is a "familiar and eminently sensible proposition of law that, when partiesset down their agreement in a clear, complete document, their writing should be enforcedaccording to its terms" (Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v 538 Madison Realty Co., 1 NY3d470, 475 [2004] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis and citation omitted]).Unless a contract is ambiguous, a court must look to the plain language of the instrumentitself to give effect to the parties' intentions (see Schron v Troutman Sanders LLP, 20 NY3d 430, 436[2013]; Williams v Village ofEndicott, 91 AD3d 1160, 1161-1162 [2012]).

[*3] Here, the Plan requires the corporation's accountant tocalculate the "[t]otal [d]eferred [c]ompensation" for the time period in question and toallocate that amount to the participant's account. Total deferred compensation is definedin the plan as "the total collectible [a]ccounts [r]eceivable properly accrued by thecorporation . . . which are . . . attributable to services renderedto patients of the [c]orporation by the [participant]," as well as a percentage of theaccounts receivable attributable to services performed by corporation employees who arenot participants. Contrary to defendants' argument, this language cannot be read toinclude the deduction of corporate expenses. An account receivable is defined as "[a]naccount reflecting a balance owed by a debtor; a debt owed by a customer to anenterprise for goods or services" (Black's Law Dictionary 18 [8th ed 2004]). The word"attributable" is defined as "caused by a particular event, situation, activity, or person"(Macmillan Online Dictionary, attributable[http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/attributable] [accessedMar. 12, 2015]). Thus, total deferred compensation, as defined in the plan, means theaggregate of balances due from patients to whom a participant rendered services, as wellas a percentage of the balances due resulting from services rendered by nonparticipatingemployees. Nothing in this language suggests an intention to include any part of thecorporation's business expenditures. As nothing else in the plan provides for thededuction of expenses from allocations, and the agreement specifically provides thatdeferred compensation funds are to be allocated to plaintiff as set forth in the plan, thededuction of expenses from plaintiff's allocation did not comport with theagreement.

Defendants submitted ample evidence demonstrating that the corporation's pastpractice has been to deduct annual expenses from allocations, and they argue for a"practical construction" of the plan language that takes this practice into account.However, extrinsic evidence may be considered "only where reasonable minds coulddiffer as to what was intended by the parties, and provisions in a contract are notambiguous merely because the parties interpret them differently" (Zinter Handling, Inc. v GeneralElec. Co., 101 AD3d 1333, 1335 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted]). Only when a contract is ambiguous can the interpretation placed upon it by theparties, as shown by their conduct, be considered in determining their intent, and eventhen, the parties' practices are "merely an interpretive tool and cannot be used to create acontractual right independent of some express source in the underlying agreement"(Matter of Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Assn. v City of Geneva, 92NY2d 326, 333 [1998]; see Continental Cas. Co. v Rapid-American Corp., 80NY2d 640, 651 [1993]; Slatt v Slatt, 64 NY2d 966, 967 [1985]; Estate ofHatch v NYCO Mins., 245 AD2d 746, 749 [1997]). Here, defendants do not claimthat there is any ambiguity in the pertinent provisions of the two contracts, and we findnone upon our review of the controlling language. Accordingly, the parties' customarypractice with regard to deferred compensation allocations constitutes inadmissible parolevidence (see Wechsler v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 193AD2d 856, 859 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 656 [1993]; State Univ. Constr.Fund v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 189 AD2d 929, 931-932 [1993]), and plaintiffwas thus entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of defendants' liability forbreach of the agreement.

Peters, P.J., Rose and Lynch, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withcosts.


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