| People v Bonilla |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 03176 [127 AD3d 985] |
| April 15, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Ulises Bonilla, Appellant. |
Andrew E. MacAskill, Westbury, N.Y., for appellant.
Madeline Singas, Acting District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Tammy J. Smiley andLaurie K. Gibbons of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Peck, J.), rendered May 15, 2012, convicting him of murder in the second degree, rapein the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts), criminal possession of aweapon in the fourth degree, and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict,and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing(Honorof, J.), of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were tosuppress his statements to law enforcement officials and to sever certain counts in theindictment.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motionwhich was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials. Contrary to thedefendant's contention, the record supports the Supreme Court's finding that thedefendant did not unequivocally request the assistance of counsel before makingstatements to law enforcement officials (see People v Pinkney, 48 AD3d 707, 707-708 [2008];People v Thompson, 271 AD2d 555 [2000]; People v Dehmler, 188AD2d 1056, 1057 [1992]; People v Diaz, 161 AD2d 789 [1990]; People vSanchez, 117 AD2d 685, 686 [1986]).
Moreover, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant'somnibus motion which was to sever certain counts in the indictment, since the nature ofthe proof for each of the offenses was material and admissible as evidence upon the trialof the other counts in the indictment (see CPL 200.20 [2] [b]; People vBongarzone, 69 NY2d 892, 895 [1987]; People v Dobbins, 123 AD3d 1140 [2014]; People vJackson, 144 AD2d 488, 489 [1988]). As the offenses were properly joined in oneindictment from the outset, the court lacked the statutory authority to sever them(see CPL 200.20 [3]; People v Bongarzone, 69 NY2d at 895; People v Kirksey, 107 AD3d825 [2013]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, viewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), wefind that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of murder in the seconddegree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Moreover, in fulfillingour responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence(see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we neverthelessaccord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear [*2]the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People vMateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt onthose counts, as well as the count of rape in the first degree, was not against the weight ofthe evidence (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]). Balkin, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ.,concur.