| People v Cruz |
| 2015 NY Slip Op 03178 [127 AD3d 987] |
| April 15, 2015 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Humberto Cruz, Appellant. |
Brendan O'Meara, Yonkers, N.Y., for appellant.
David M. Hoovler, District Attorney, Middletown, N.Y. (Elizabeth L. Schulz andAndrew R. Kass of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (DeRosa, J.), rendered April 14, 2010, convicting him of course of sexual conduct against achild in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the seconddegree, and endangering the welfare of a child (seven counts), upon a jury verdict, andimposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant, a youth pastor at the Church of God in Newburgh, was accused ofsexually abusing three boys who were students in the Sunday school class that he taught.The defendant's contention that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to supporthis convictions of criminal sexual act in the first degree and sexual abuse in the seconddegree, as charged in the indictment, is unpreserved for appellate review (seeCPL 470.05 [2]; People vHawkins, 11 NY3d 484 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the lightmost favorable to the prosecution, and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inferenceto be drawn therefrom (seePeople v Ramos, 19 NY3d 133, 136 [2012]; People v Bleakley, 69NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond areasonable doubt that the defendant committed these offenses during the summer of2005, as charged in the indictment. In addition, we find that the designated time period ofJuly 1, 2005, through August 31, 2005, during which the offenses were alleged to haveoccurred, as charged in the indictment and established by the evidence, was sufficientlyspecific to satisfy the requirements of CPL 200.50 (6) (see e.g. People v Spencer, 119AD3d 1411, 1413 [2014]; People v Smith, 272 AD2d 713, 714 [2000]).Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weightof the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we neverthelessaccord great deference to the trier of fact's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear thetestimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004];People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Upon reviewing the record here, we aresatisfied that the verdict of guilt as to those crimes was not against the weight of theevidence (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
In determining whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance ofcounsel, a court must examine whether "the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of aparticular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that theattorney provided meaningful representation" (People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147[1981]; see People v Oliveras, 21 NY3d [*2]339,346 [2013]). Here, the record reveals that defense counsel "prepared and pursued trialstrategies and defense theories, presented a clear and cogent opening and summation, andadequately cross-examined the People's witnesses" (People v Tomlinson, 67 AD3d 826, 827 [2009]; see People v Lee, 105 AD3d870, 871 [2013]; People vDashosh, 59 AD3d 731, 732 [2009]). As such, the defendant receivedmeaningful representation of counsel. "Hindsight does not elevate counsel's unsuccessfultrial strategies to ineffective assistance of counsel" (People v Tomlinson, 67AD3d at 827; People v Dashosh, 59 AD3d at 731; People v Monroe, 52 AD3d623 [2008]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80[1982]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Balkin, J.P., Hall, Millerand Duffy, JJ., concur.