Flomenhaft v Finkelstein
2015 NY Slip Op 03468 [127 AD3d 634]
April 28, 2015
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 3, 2015


[*1]
 Michael Flomenhaft, Appellant,
v
Andrew G.Finkelstein et al., Respondents.

The Flomenhaft Law Firm, PLLC, New York (Stephen D. Chakwin, Jr. of counsel),for appellant.

Finkelstein & Partners, LLP, Newburgh (Anna R. Johnson of counsel), forrespondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Jaffe, J.), entered on or aboutJuly 23, 2014, which granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and to imposesanctions on plaintiff, and denied plaintiff's cross motion for leave to amend hissummons with notice and/or the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law and thefacts, to deny the motion insofar as it sought dismissal of plaintiff's slander per se causeof action and the imposition of sanctions, the slander per se cause of action reinstated,and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff is an attorney who, after dissolving his own practice, became associatedwith nonparty Jacoby & Meyers, LLP (Jacoby). Defendant Andrew Finkelstein(Finkelstein) is an attorney and is the managing partner of defendant law firm Finkelstein& Partners, LLP (FLLP), and the sole shareholder of defendant Finkelstein, PC(FPC). FPC is a partner of both Jacoby and of FLLP. In April 2009, Jacoby assignedplaintiff to work on a personal injury action that had been commenced on behalf ofnonparty Joel Harrison (Harrison) in Supreme Court, Broome County.[FN1] In December 2009,plaintiff resigned from Jacoby and re-formed his old practice. Harrison decided to haveplaintiff continue his representation in the personal injury action and Jacoby caused thenecessary consent to be executed and transferred the file. The retainer agreement betweenplaintiff and Harrison provided that plaintiff would advance all litigation expenses andwould be reimbursed out of Harrison's recovery, if any. After the passage of only a fewmonths, Harrison terminated plaintiff and re-retained Jacoby.

In August 2010, Harrison, represented by FLLP, commenced an action againstplaintiff in Supreme Court, Broome County. The allegations in the complaint, most ofwhich were made upon information and belief, revolved around the litigation expensesthat had been discussed in the retainer agreement between the two parties. Harrisonasserted that, notwithstanding plaintiff's promise that he would advance litigationexpenses, plaintiff told him that he would not do so and urged Harrison to borrow$40,000 for the expenses from a litigation funding company. The complaint alleged, interalia, that plaintiff directed the loan company to pay the proceeds to his law firm and thathe failed to place them in an attorney escrow account. Harrison asserted causes of actionfor conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice, and fraud, and sought anaccounting from plaintiff.

This action is based on a statement allegedly made by Finkelstein to Harrisonconcerning the loan. According to the complaint, Finkelstein told Harrison that plaintiff"took your money and used it for his personal use." Plaintiff claims that this statementconstituted slander per se. He further asserts that Finkelstein was the source of theinformation that Harrison alleged in his [*2]complaintagainst plaintiff, that the information was patently false, and that as a result Finkelstein,FLLP and FPC are liable to him in fraud. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages fromdefendants, based on the two causes of action asserted in the complaint, as well asdefendants' conduct against him that was the subject of a separate litigation between himand defendants (see Flomenhaftv Jacoby & Meyers, LLP, 122 AD3d 422 [1st Dept 2014]). In that action,which was commenced in 2010, plaintiff claimed that defendants here, as well as others,defamed him when, after he left Jacoby, they informed clients on whose matters he hadworked that he had declared personal bankruptcy.

This action was commenced by summons with notice and the complaint was servedupon defendants' demand for it. The summons with notice stated that the action soundedin slander, and did not mention the fraud claim. Defendants moved to dismiss thecomplaint. They argued that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for slander per se,because Finkelstein's statement did not constitute "publication" and because, even if itdid, the statement was privileged as being pertinent to Harrison's action against plaintiff.The statement was pertinent to that litigation, defendants argued, since, according tothem, it was made the day before Harrison's deposition in that case. Defendants furtherargued that the fraud claim should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, since it had notbeen mentioned in the summons with notice as required by CPLR 305 (b). Alternatively,they sought dismissal of that claim for failure to state a cause of action, asserting thatplaintiff was not entitled to rely on any misrepresentations made by defendants toHarrison. They also claimed that the fraud claim was time-barred, since it was no morethan a trumped-up defamation claim. Defendants also sought an order striking the claimfor punitive damages, and an order awarding them costs and attorneys' fees based ontheir belief that the complaint was frivolous.

In opposition, plaintiff argued that Finkelstein's statement to Harrison was notprivileged because the action brought against him by Harrison was a sham, contrived bydefendants as a vehicle for defaming him. Indeed, plaintiff stated, Harrison, uponrealizing that he had been used as a pawn by Finkelstein in an escalating war withplaintiff, discontinued the action against plaintiff, and commenced his own action againstdefendants and others, asserting a host of alleged wrongs against himself, includingtortious interference with his relationship with plaintiff. Plaintiff further argued that,since defendants had agreed in a stipulation not to raise any jurisdictional defenses, theyshould be estopped from seeking dismissal of the fraud claim based on his failure tomention it in the summons with notice. Plaintiff did, however, cross-move to amend thesummons to incorporate the fraud claim, arguing that such an amendment could notpossibly prejudice defendants. As for the merits of the fraud claim, plaintiff contendedthat a third party can rely on one person's misrepresentation to another. He also statedthat the fraud claim departed significantly from the defamation claim, and that sanctionsshould not be imposed because the complaint was not frivolous.

The court granted defendants' motion in its entirety and denied the cross motion. Itfound that the complaint was facially deficient since it failed to establish both that thestatement allegedly made by Finkelstein was not privileged, and that the Broome Countyaction was commenced solely to defame plaintiff. The court rejected plaintiff's relianceon this Court's decision in Halperin v Salvan (117 AD2d 544 [1st Dept 1986]),which plaintiff argued stood for the "sham lawsuit" exception to the pertinency rule,finding that the case "appears to have waned in precedential value, and when it is cited, itis distinguished" (44 Misc 3d 1215[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51121[U], *4 [Sup Ct, NYCounty 2014]).

The court dismissed the cause of action for fraud, finding that plaintiff's omission ofany notice of fraud in his summons with notice constituted a jurisdictional defect thatcould neither be corrected nor amended. The court further found that the stipulation bydefendants not to raise jurisdictional defenses in their answer was inapplicable, sincethey did not file an answer but rather moved to dismiss.

The court found that sanctions were appropriate against plaintiff (personally, notagainst his counsel) because it "reasonably inferred" that plaintiff's opposition to themotion to dismiss was "undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the instant litigation"and that the action was undertaken to harass or maliciously injure defendants (2014 NYSlip Op 51121[U], *6). By a subsequent order, the court directed plaintiff to paydefendants' costs and expenses in the amount of $500.

[*3] Plaintiff does not, and cannot, contest that a statementthat is pertinent to litigation is absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis of adefamation action. That principle of law was first stated by the Court of Appeals inYoumans v Smith (153 NY 214, 219 [1897]), and was recently reaffirmed by theCourt in Front, Inc. v Khalil(24 NY3d 713 [2015]).[FN2] This Court has held that, where theprivilege is invoked, "any doubts are to be resolved in favor of pertinence" (Sexter & Warmflash, P.C. vMargrabe, 38 AD3d 163, 173 [1st Dept 2007], abrogated on other groundsby Front, Inc. v Khalil, 24 NY3d 713 [2015], supra). Further, the test todetermine whether a statement is pertinent to litigation is " 'extremelyliberal' " (id., quoting Black v Green Harbour Homeowners' Assn., Inc., 19 AD3d962, 963 [3d Dept 2005]), such that the offending statement, to be actionable, musthave been "outrageously out of context" (id., quoting Martirano v Frost,25 NY2d 505, 508 [1969]).

This Court has recognized, however, that the privilege is capable of abuse and willnot be conferred where the underlying lawsuit was a sham action brought solely todefame the defendant (seeLacher v Engel, 33 AD3d 10, 13-14 [1st Dept 2006]). Lacher derivedthis principle from Halperin v Salvan (117 AD2d at 544), in which this Courtdeclined to dismiss a defamation claim based on the pertinency privilege where thecontext in which the allegedly offending statement was made was a litigation that theplaintiffs filed but never prosecuted. The existence of this "sham litigation" exception hasbeen confirmed (but not applied) in other cases in this Department, including Casa de Meadows Inc. (CaymanIs.) v Zaman (76 AD3d 917, 920 [1st Dept 2010]) and Sexter &Warmflash, P.C. (38 AD3d at 172 and n 5). Accordingly, we disagree with SupremeCourt's statement that Halperin has "waned in precedential value."

In Halperin, this Court noted that, on a motion to dismiss a defamation actionbecause of the privilege, the complaint must be construed in a light most favorable to theplaintiff and that where there is a question as to the applicability of the privilege, theissue should be decided at trial (117 AD2d at 548). Here, the complaint clearly allegesthat Finkelstein made false representations to Harrison about plaintiff and that thestatements were made specifically to induce Harrison to start an action against plaintiff.Defendants seek to distinguish Halperin by arguing that Harrison prosecuted hiscase against plaintiff. However, there is little in the record before us by which we cangauge to what extent the lawsuit was litigated. The only reference to any activity in thatcase is defendants' claim that the statement at issue was made before Harrison'sdeposition. Still, we have no way of knowing whether the deposition ever took place, orwhether there was other discovery in the case, or even court conferences. Further,Harrison's complaint in the action he commenced against defendants after hediscontinued the action against plaintiff supports plaintiff's claim that the lawsuit byHarrison against plaintiff was a sham. Harrison alleges therein that his belief thatplaintiff converted the proceeds of the loan he procured was entirely based on falsestatements by Finkelstein. It can reasonably be inferred from that complaint that thosefalse statements were, in turn, the basis for Harrison's allegations against plaintiff, mostof which were made upon information and belief. Furthermore, we fail to see why, asdefendants argue, we must disregard that complaint, for purposes of considering thismotion, because it is unverified. Accordingly, under the circumstances, the allegations inthe complaint state a cause of action for slander per se.

Plaintiff further argues that, pursuant to CPLR 305 (c), the court should havepermitted amendment of his summons nunc pro tunc to give notice of his intention toplead a fraud claim against defendants. Defendants do not argue, as the court held, thatamendment is unavailable as a matter of jurisdiction. Rather, they essentially claim thatamendment would be futile because plaintiff cannot state a claim for fraud. Defendantsfocus on the justifiable reliance element necessary to the establishment of any fraudclaim, and assert that plaintiff could not have relied on statements made not to him but toa third party, namely Harrison. Plaintiff claims this is not [*4]so, relying on Buxton Mfg. Co. v Valiant Moving& Stor. (239 AD2d 452, 454 [2d Dept 1997] ["(f)raud, however, may also existwhere a false representation is made to a third party, resulting in injury to the plaintiff"]).Defendants, on the other hand, cite much more recent cases, from this Court, which holdthat a party may not rely on a misrepresentation to a third party (Wildenstein v 5H&Co,Inc., 97 AD3d 488, 490 [1st Dept 2012]; Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v Frankfurt Garbus Klein & Selz,P.C., 13 AD3d 296, 297 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 707[2005]).

Even assuming that plaintiff's fraud claim is not barred solely because he was not thedirect recipient of the alleged misrepresentations, we find that he was not entitled to relyon them. That is because, according to the complaint, the misrepresentations were madesometime after June 16, 2010, which was when Harrison re-retained Jacoby to handle hispersonal injury action. As admitted in the complaint herein, plaintiff learned onDecember 29, 2009, that he had already been the subject of separate statements bydefendants which he alleged were defamatory (see Flomenhaft v Jacoby &Meyers, LLP, 122 AD3d at 423). Accordingly, knowing defendants were, accordingto him, bent on destroying his reputation, it was not justifiable for plaintiff to view thestatements to Harrison as anything other than a further salvo in that campaign.

Finally, we decline to reinstate the punitive damages claim for the same reasons westated in plaintiff's earlier defamation action (122 AD3d at 423 ["Plaintiff's demand forpunitive damages cannot be sustained, since the allegations do not rise to a level of suchwanton dishonesty as to imply a criminal indifference to civil obligations" (internalquotation marks omitted)]). However, we find that sanctions were not appropriatelyleveled because, as found herein, plaintiff stated a valid cause of action for slander perse. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Sweeny, Renwick and Kapnick, JJ. [Prior CaseHistory: 44 Misc 3d 1215(A), 2014 NY Slip Op 51121(U).]

Footnotes


Footnote 1:In the absence of clarityin the record as to whether the attorney of record in Harrison's matter was Jacoby, FLLPor FP, we use Jacoby to refer to all three.

Footnote 2:Although not relevanthere, the Court in Front, Inc. narrowed the applicability of the absolute privilegeto actual litigation or prelitigation matters where there was a good faith basis to anticipatelitigation.


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